This volume of The Rodney Papers, the second of a projected three-vol- ume edition of the admiral's papers, covers the admiral's life from the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 until August 1780. During these years, Rodney, through a lavish lifestyle and a habit of gambling, squandered his fortune and fell into the clutches of moneylenders. This led him to at- tempt, without success, to recoup his finances by becoming in 1770 the commander-in-chief of the squadron at Jamaica. Upon his return from the West Indies, having by then no Parliamentary immunity, Rodney was Forced to flee to Paris to escape his creditors. Only the goodwill and money of a French nobleman, Duc de Biron, enabled a pennyless Rodney to leave Paris in 1778, just days before the beginning of the war between britain and france. In 1779 the British government, desperate for the services of an admiral who could fight and win battles, appointed Rodney commander-in-chief of the squadron in the leeward islands. On his pas- sage to the West indies Rodney fought and won the moonlight battle against the spanish and successfully relieved Gibraltar. Once in the West indies, during 1780 Rodney fought several indecisive battles, in the course of a skilful defensive campaign against superior French forces, before sailing for North America at the onset of the hurricane season. During the years 1763–1780 Rodney plunged from being a Member of Parliament, a successful admiral and the Governor of Greenwich Hospital to a debtor's exile in France only to rise again and become a victorious admiral and a national hero.

The selection of documents in this volume of The Rodney Papers deals with Rodney's career during the years following the end of the seven years War and the start of the American War. The documents cover the relief of Gibraltar and the 1780 campaign in the Leeward Islands. The present edition attempts to elucidate the role of Rodney in the military and political events of the 18th century as well as to present his views on naval affairs and on the workings of the navy as an institution. The materi- als for this volume come from the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the British Library, the New-York Historical Society and the William Clements Library of the University of Michigan.

Vice Admiral George Brydges Rodney, upon his return to England from the Leeward Islands at the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, was a person of substance and position within English society, being a success- ful flag officer in the Royal Navy, the owner of a landed estate and a Member of Parliament. Nevertheless, when he hauled down his flag and came ashore, despite his many professional achievements as an officer in the Royal Navy during both the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War, Rodney was in many respects singularly ill-equipped to cope with the pressures generated by the demands of peacetime. In the years between the Seven Years’ and American wars Rodney would, in a stag- gering display of ill judgement, come close to destroying his career as a navy officer, alienate his friends and patrons, and be forced to flee Eng- land in order to escape his creditors after dissipating his fortune through high living, electioneering and gambling. Over-bearing, avaricious and disfunctional, Rodney would pass the years 1763–1778 crashing through life while alternatively squandering money and attempting to grasp it.

In 1764 Rodney married Henrietta Clies. While there is no surviving record telling exactly when this event took place, there is no doubt as to the identity of the bride. Indeed, the marriage probably surprised some of Rodney's friends and acquaintances. He most probably first came into contact with the Clies family when he was a captain at Lisbon. Members of Henrietta Clies's family were retainers and employees of the Compton family when Rodney was courting his first wife Jane Compton. The rela- tionship with the Clies family was transferred to London when Rodney and his first wife established a household in England and the Clies became part of it. Then, when Jane Rodney died, Henrietta's mother assumed the role of looking after Rodney's children. Rodney's marriage to Henrietta Clies can easily be understood in human terms, especially those of loneli- ness, for in 1764, when the marriage took place, Jane Rodney had already been dead for seven years. Nevertheless, Henrietta Clies was twenty years younger than Rodney and there can be no doubt that the Clies family had been dependents.

Throughout the period 1815 to 1865, the primary tasks undertaken by Chatham dockyard were those of constructing new ships and of undertaking large-scale repairs on older vessels. In common with most other yards, Chatham also undertook a multiplicity of further duties. Among these were the fitting and re-fitting of ships [29, 37], the care and maintenance of vessels moored in the ordinary [37] and minor repairs on operational warships. With regard to the latter, Chatham was not especially suited. In part, this was because of its great distance from the sea but also a result of the declining depth of the Medway. The river, during much of this period, was subject to considerable shoaling, there being an insufficient depth both for the larger ships of the ordinary and for rapid, trouble-free passages between the dockyard and the open sea. It was recognition of these problems that prompted John Deas Thomson, a member of the Navy Board, to submit to Lord Melville in 1829 a recommendation that Chatham should be strictly confined to those duties to which it was geographically suited [31]. However, the idea of Chatham specialising in building and large-scale repairs, was not adopted at this time and the yard continued to perform a mixture of duties throughout the nineteenth century.

The Admiralty, whenever a new vessel was to be constructed, took the initial decision with instructions forwarded to Chatham by either the Navy Board (prior to its abolition in 1832) or the Admiralty office (after 1832). Such orders were often accompanied by a set of drawings, although on occasions it might be a simple notification, with drawings sent nearer to the time of construction [56, 57, 73]. On being informed that a new ship was to be built, the Master Shipwright, whose department oversaw both construction and repair work, would consider the facilities and manpower that would be required. Of course, the administrators in London already had an awareness of docks and slips likely to be available, sometimes precisely stipulating which facility was to be used [12, 14, 28]. The choice of Chatham for construction of a new vessel was not always contingent upon the availability of a particular dock or slip; instead it might result from an accumulation of the necessary building materials at that yard [17].

The Caribbean in the Age of Fighting Sail was considered to be one of the great treasure troves of the world and the West Indian islands were for nearly two hundred years objects of almost continuous European maritime rivalry. Great fleets and thousands of soldiers in the course of the 18th century would battle for control of the West Indian islands. When Rodney arrived in the Lesser Antilles in 1780 fighting between Britain and France for control of the Sugar Islands had been raging for two years. Major naval and military operations in the West Indies during the American War had begun with the capture of the island of St. Lucia by a British expeditionary force from New York. The island of St. Lucia in the Leeward Islands had been seized by the British at the beginning of the conflict with France in order to serve as a base from which to checkmate enemy naval forces based on the adjacent French island of Martinique. St. Lucia was to serve as the main base for the ships of Rodney's squadron during the campaign in the Lesser Antilles which would culminate in the Battle of the Saints.

On 17 March 1780, after a speedy passage from Gibraltar, Rodney ar- rived at Carlisle Bay on the island of Barbados. Several days later, discovering that the Leeward Islands squadron was at St. Lucia, Rodney sailed from Carlisle Bay and arrived on 8 March at the British anchorage in Gros Islet Bay on the west side of St. Lucia. Five days before Rodney's arrival at St. Lucia powerful French reinforcements from Europe, under the command of Lieutenant General Luc-Urban Du Bouexic, Comte de Guichen, had already arrived at Martinique. The next day a French fleet of ‘thirty two sail’ appeared off British-held St. Lucia. The French ships paraded off St. Lucia until the morning of 7 March when they returned to Martinique. Soon after his arrival at St. Lucia Rodney concluded that an opportunity to defeat the French in detail had been missed. The admiral believed that, if information on the location and strength of the British squadron in the Leeward Islands as well as the latest intelligence of the expected movements of the French forces had been awaiting him at Bar- bados, he might have been able to prevent the junction of the French ships at Martinique with those arriving from Europe.

Of paramount concern during the immediate post-war period was the necessity of bringing a greater degree of managerial efficiency to the dockyards [333]. A fundamental weakness was the position of the resident Commissioner. Working as a member of the Navy Board, it was the Commissioner's task to provide a link between the subordinate Board and the dockyard. All correspondence between the Boards in london and the respective officers of the yard passed unsealed through his office [342]. Aware of any Navy Board instructions, it was the Commissioner's task to report upon any shortcomings in the subsequent performance of the principal officers. However, should chastisement appear necessary, this would emanate entirely from the Navy Office [337, 340]. While sir thomas byam martin felt that this was sufficient for effective management [343], the Board of Admiralty disagreed and believed the authority of the Commissioner should be strengthened [341].

A further structural weakness identified by the Board of Admiralty during one of their post-war inspections was the number of post holders who had either overlapping authority or sub-divided duties. Between them, the Master Shipwright and Master Attendant were responsible for all the artisans and labourers employed in the yard. The former had authority over those directly employed on ships building and repairing, while the Master Attendant controlled similar groups employed on vessels moored in the harbour [332]. The storekeeper, clerk of the survey and clerk of the check were responsible for overseeing the delivery of stores. Additionally, the storekeeper was charged with the safekeeping and distribution of these stores; the clerk of the survey kept accounts of the quantities arriving and held in stock; and the clerk of the check examined the storekeeper's accounts [332]. The clerk of the check was also responsible for keeping the pay and muster books. It was his office that inspected the indentures of all new artificers and kept a record of workers employed and discharged [332]. The ropeyard was regarded as a completely separate entity. The clerk of the Ropeyard took responsibility for stores while the Master Rope-maker [337] was responsible for the direction of the workforce [341].

It was not only at principal officer level that there was an apparent excess of managers. The same was true at ‘inferior officer’ level. Here was a diverse group, which included some eligible for a dockyard house with others paid only slightly more than the ordinary yard artisan.

This chapter contains the transcripts of courts martial for the various types of social crime. For the present purpose the term ‘social crime’ can be defined as a transgression against either the conventions or morality of eighteenth-century British society ashore. therefore, included here are trials dealing exclusively with alcohol [51–6], property [57–64], violence [65–73], disturbances of the peace [74–5] and sex [76–80].

Social crimes constituted only about a quarter of the alleged offences tried by naval courts martial. A preliminary survey of the charges listed in 22 of the 118 volumes of transcripts for the period under consideration reveals that 22 per cent of these transgressions were of this nature. Some were combined with other offences. Mariners tried solely for social offences constituted just 15.8 per cent of the total.

By comparison, naval crimes amounted to nearly 78 per cent of all the offences in the sample. Given that social crimes adjudicated by naval courts martial were far fewer, how can a chapter pertaining to these offences that is roughly the same length as that on naval crimes be justified? The answer to this question is straightforward. It is only through the inclusion of multiple examples of trials for social offences that a clear picture emerges of the legal standards used to determine guilt or innocence in such cases. For example, from the transcripts of proceedings for drunkenness it is evident that those found guilty of this offence had to have been too intoxicated to do their duty. similarly, the minutes of enquiries involving indictments for buggery reveal that the criterion for conviction was anal penetration.

Of the social offences mentioned in the sample, alcohol-related crimes were the most common, comprising almost a third of the charges. The second most frequent type of accusation involved transgressions against property (theft, plunder, embezzlement, fraud, and so on), which constituted about 28 per cent. These were followed by offences involving violence (homicide, fighting, striking an officer, self-mutilation), which made up 21 per cent of the total. Sexual offences were next, amounting to a little more than 9 per cent of the aggregate. And disturbances of the peace (rioting, quarrelling) were the least frequent cause for indictment, coming to only about 8 per cent of the allegations in this category. These social offences are dealt with here in the same order.

In the first years of the American War, the armed forces of Great britain were, on the one hand, humiliated and defeated by the American rebels and, on the other, frustrated by the French and Spanish. In this period the British army had failed to suppress the American rebellion. Indeed, after the defeat at Saratoga the war in America became for the British no less than a quag- mire, which endlessly absorbed military resources. The Royal Navy, the strongest navy in the world at the time and a force with a tradition of victory, proved, in the first years of the American War, to be not only powerless to prevent blockade runners from carrying military supplies to the enemy in America, but also equally unable to prevent attacks by American cruisers on British seaborne trade. When the French entered the war in 1778 many among the British had hoped for, and even expected, the conflict to begin with a decisive battle, such as Quiberon bay, that would allow the Royal Navy, in essence, to sweep the French from the seas. However, 1778 was not 1759. The war with france began with an indecisive action off Ushant between the French and British fleets. It was followed in 1779 by an attempt by the French and Spanish to invade the British Isles. During the summer of 1779 the British would see, while the Royal Navy appeared to be stand- ing by idly, the warships of france and Spain parade in the english channel off Plymouth. To many observers, it was only the ineptitude of the French and Spanish that actually prevented an invasion of Britain.

The ideological nature of the American War as well as military defeat at the hands of the Americans and French had a corrosive effect, not only on the British body-politic but also on the officers of the Royal Navy, di- viding the officer corps into two warring camps, which would keep battling each other over the conduct and propriety of the American War for the duration of the conflict. A number of officers of the Royal Navy who opposed the government's American policy refused to serve against the Americans. For instance, Admiral hon. Augustus Keppel, an outspo- ken critic of the government's American policy, openly proclaimed that ‘he was ready to do his duty but not in the line of America’.

A great deal has been written about the actions of seagoing fleets, the individuals who commanded them and the vessels that made up those fleets. In contrast, the organisational infrastructure necessary for the purpose of building and preparing warships for the fleet has often been ignored. It was this failure to recognise an important aspect of naval history that first spurred me into several decades of researching and writing the history of naval dockyards. In britain, which had the first industrial revolution, the royal dockyards could boast a civilian workforce that was considerably larger than that of any other industrial enterprise long before the industrial take-off. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the seven home yards of the Royal navy employed a workforce of nearly 16,000 men and even some women. Even among industrial and social historians this scale of employment has often been ignored. Yet, on account of their size, the dockyards add much to our understanding of developing social processes. For it was within those yards that a system of recruitment, training and supervision of a large-scale workforce was pioneered. At the same time the artisans and labourers of the yards developed their own particular response to the means by which they were managed, attempting to ensure their own interests were protected and acknowledged.

My entry into the field of dockyard research was eased by the seminal work of Michael Oppenheim on Tudor and early Stuart naval administration, of John Ehrman on the navy of the late seventeenth century, and of Daniel Baugh on naval administration during the early eighteenth century. By fully integrating the function and working of the dockyards into their overall research, these three naval historians established the importance of the yards while indicating necessary directions for future research. Publications by the Navy Records Society added depth to my knowledge by issuing two volumes of collected documents edited by Baugh and Merriman. While the former revisited and underpinned his earlier publication, expanding his time frame, Merriman examined naval administration, including the dockyards, during the age of Queen Anne (1702–14). Later but also of importance were the works of Roger Morriss and Jonathan Coad. Both focussed specifically on the royal dockyards, morriss undertaking an in-depth study of the wartime period 1793–1815 while Coad, in two illustrated books, concentrated on the architecture of the yards.