This chapter examines the US and Canadian government’s programs that allow for the sanctioning of countries as State Sponsors of Terrorism. The chapter also provides views into why countering countries engaged in state sponsorship of terrorism efforts are so difficult to counter.

This chapter examines why people should care about the costs associated with terrorist attacks. The chapter looks at the cost of terrorism over time by looking at the cost associated with specific attacks, such as 9/11. The chapter further lays out the organization of the book.

This chapter examines the roles played by the FATF and the UN in countering terrorist access to finance. The chapter also notes the role played by the G-7 (G-8), OAS, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Among the issues discussed in detail are sanctions, capacity building, and the importance of FATF’s recommendations that are a feature of government efforts to counter terrorist financing and money laundering.

The private sector, including but not limited to banks, plays a vital role in countering the financing of terrorism. The success of the private sector has been uneven when it comes to countering the financing of terrorism. In some cases, this has resulted in groups gaining access to funds in furtherance of their objectives. The chapter also points to the importance of true collaboration between the public and private sectors in combatting the financing of terrorism.

This chapter examines how various types of intelligence, such as HUMINT and FININT, play a critical role in countering the financing of terrorism.

This chapter reviews the various definitions associated with terrorist financing, including how the IMF, UN, and other international bodies define the term. This chapter also examines the terrorist financing cycle (raise, move, store, and use funds) and how it differs from the money laundering cycle. This chapter provides a general base for understanding what terrorist financing is, which is critical for understanding how it is countered.

After 2010, China’s economic growth rate continued to decline. This is partly due to the fact that, after the financial crisis in 2008, the developed economies have not fully recovered, resulting in insufficient external demand for China. Meanwhile, China suffered from excess capacity. To address this malaise, in addition to reducing production capacity on the supply side, it can adopt beyond Keynesianism stimulus, featuring proactive fiscal policy to support investment in infrastructure. Such investments can help eliminate growth bottlenecks in industrial upgrading and strengthen weak links on the supply side.

In 1998, China experienced deflation accompanied by fast economic growth, which made many foreign scholars doubt the reality of China’s economic growth. The main cause for this paradox is overcapacity from previous massive investments. To address these challenges, this chapter introduces a new initiative called the “new socialist countryside drive.” This initiative aims to improve public infrastructure in rural areas, leverage the stock of rural demand to absorb the existing production capacity and overcome deflation. Additionally, these efforts contribute to narrowing the gap in public services between urban and rural areas.

China’s gradual transition has avoided the economic collapse and stagnation caused by the shock therapy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but many problems arising during the rapid development are closely related to the incomplete SOE reform. The root cause of SOEs’ problems is the policy burdens. Privatizing SOEs without first addressing the policy burden would only exacerbate the problems. Therefore, the removal of policy burdens is the prerequisite for a smooth transition to a market economy.