Tusculans 1 offers a multi-faceted refutation of the proposition ‘death is an evil’, accomplished in part through a detailed doxography of a wide range of philosophers of different schools. This survey is far from a jumble of contradictory views, however: Cicero avoids dogmatic insistence on the arguments of any single school and has instead crafted a minimally sectarian protreptic designed to convince readers of any philosophical persuasion that death is not an evil, an approach whose origin he traces back to Socrates’ reflections on death in Plato’s Apology. Furthermore, I argue that this approach amounts to a direct challenge to Cicero’s philosophical rivals, a group of Epicurean authors writing in Latin – including, I speculate, Lucretius – whom Cicero had criticiaed in several prefaces for their narrow-minded dogmatism. In Book 1 Cicero therefore tackles a topic of perennial interest, illustrates how philosophy can and should be written, and attempts to marginalise his Epicurean opponents.

The present volume is a translation and commentary of books 21–40 of Diodoros’ Bibliotheke Historike, the first English version of these books in over half a century. The text used is that of the Budé edition of Paul Goukowsky with some adjustments from the Loeb of Francis Walton and the present author. The ordering and numbering of fragments generally follows that of the Budé text.

The Lusitanians at first did not have a worthy leader, and thus were easily defeated in the war with the Romans, but later, after they found Viriathus, they inflicted great damage on the Romans.1 He was one of the Lusitanians2 who lived near the Ocean and was a shepherd from childhood, accustomed to a life in the mountains. He was assisted by the nature of his body, since in his strength, quickness, and agility he was far superior to the rest of the Iberians. He was accustomed to little food and much exercise, and only as much sleep as was necessary. In general, by living under arms and always contending with wild beasts and brigands, he became famous among the people and was chosen to be their leader, and in a short period gathered a group of brigands around him.3

Nabis, the tyrannos of the Lakedaimonians, killed Pelops the son of King Lykourgos, who was a child at the time.1 This was a matter of precaution, since the child, when he came of age, might restore the freedom of his country, using the assurance of his noble birth. He also selected the most accomplished Lakedaimonians and put them to death, and gathered mercenaries of the worst type from everywhere to guard his power. Thus temple robbers, thieves, brigands, and those sentenced to death came to Sparta from every place. He had made himself tyrannos through his impiety, and he believed that only by such people could he best be guarded.

In Tusculans 1 Cicero gives a lengthy rebuttal of the thesis that death is an evil. This raises a puzzle: how can such a one-sided presentation aspire to reveal whether it is more plausible that death is or is not an evil? Invoking the Tusculans’ practical aim – the removal of emotional disturbance – does not fully satisfy, since it is unclear how effective persuasion can be if the contrary position does not receive a fair hearing. I show that as main speaker in the book Cicero warns against over-confidence in embracing positions that one wishes to be true; and I argue that as author Cicero portrays the interlocutor of Tusculans 1 as a salutary example of how not to approach the kind of questions about death with which the work engages. We are encouraged to see the interlocutor’s failure as one not of character but of inexperience in philosophical method.

Philip [V],1 the Macedonian king, persuaded Dikaiarchos of Aitolia, a man of daring, to become a pirate, and gave him twenty ships.2 He ordered him to levy tribute on the islands and to aid the Cretans in their war against the Rhodians. According to these instructions, he plundered merchants and through robbery exacted money from the islands.

On the same day the senate voted a declaration of war against Perseus, and even though it gave an audience to his envoys, it gave no reply to them.1 It also ordered the consuls to make an explicit proclamation to the assemblies, and that the envoys and all the Macedonians were to leave Rome on the same day, and Italy within thirty days.

The definitions of the emotions in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 3 which refer to magnitude are not meant to represent Stoic orthodoxy, and should not be read as direct evidence for the Stoic theory. Cicero’s aims and methods in the Tusculans led him to use non-Stoic accounts of the emotions, in order to offer a kind of consolation that is neutral between Stoic and Peripatetic theories of value. This chapter also discusses the structure of the Tusculans as a unified whole.

The final book of the Tusculans is intended to bring together the results of the preceding books in two ways. It concludes the argument that virtue is sufficient for happiness, where that is understood as invulnerable tranquillity and peace of mind. The book also fills out its opening praise of philosophy, understood as Academic sceptical method. However, the forceful final coda raises problems of philosophical consistency which, when examined carefully, cannot be reconciled with the book’s initial aims.