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This article explores Triphiodorus’ use of Cassandra in his brief epic Sack of Troy. An examination of the placing of the prophetess within the poem's plot and a comparison with previous literary attestations demonstrate that Triphiodorus makes extended use of the previously supplementary character. The reader is particularly invited to read Cassandra against the Cassandras of Euripides’ Trojan Women and Quintus Smyrnaeus’ Posthomerica, thus identifying ties with both epic and tragedy. Cassandra's speech alludes to the proem of the epic. At the same time, Cassandra's prophecy constitutes the key for understanding the connection between imagery deployed prior and subsequent to her presence, thus ensuring the thematic congruity of the poem. Triphiodorus’ Cassandra constitutes a doublet of the poet, depicted as imitating his poetic voice and effectively summarizing the entire epic in her speech; entwined in Triphiodorus’ poetic agenda, she also becomes its intradiegetic mouthpiece.
This article argues that the word ψυχαγωγία and its cognates which are found in the writings of Philodemus retain a semantic connection to the domain of magic and are best translated in terms of ‘enchantment’ rather than the more generic sense of ‘entertainment’.
The Telchines, magical craftsmen and wizards, are best known for their criticism of Callimachus’ poetry in the prologue to the Aetia. The other two appearances of the Telchines are also in programmatic passages in Callimachus’ extant works. In the Hymn to Delos (30–3), the narrator asks an aporetic question about the theme of his song. There, the Telchines are the makers of the trident used to form every island but Delos, highlighting her singular status as uniquely created without force (30–3). In Aet. fr. 75, the Telchines appear in Xenomedes’ history of Ceos. There, Callimachus explicitly names one source for his material, but omits direct citation of equally important sources, namely Pindar and Bacchylides, while still alluding to their songs. This article examines verbal and thematic parallels among these three passages and argues that Callimachus uses the Telchines not only to link the passages but also to comment on his authorial process, his use of sources and his poetic programme.
Eumenides 517–25 contains a centrepiece of Aeschylean ideology—the role of punishment and fear in the ruling of the city. However, the text is vexed by serious issues at lines 522–5. This paper reassesses the main problems, reviews the most influential emendations, and puts forward a new hypothesis. It argues in favour of circumscribing the corruption, offering a new interpretation that permits retention of parts of the text that most editors have deemed impossible to restore.
This article introduces and clarifies a neglected sense of the word ἤ (‘or’) employed by Aristotle and other authors. In this sense, called ‘indifferent’, ἤ signifies ‘one or the other, regardless of which’. It is shown how attention to this use makes it possible to explain the source of the ambiguity of certain sentences, most obviously, though not exclusively, sentences that make a necessity claim about an embedded disjunction, for example ‘It is necessary that A or B’. Why this sense cannot be explained, as some scholars have suggested, by the distinction between exclusive and inclusive ἤ is also discussed. Finally, it is shown how awareness of this sense might rescue Aristotle from a gross inconsistency.