This chapter employs ethnographic insights to develop a generalizable theory of criminalized governance. The theory accounts for why gang organizations and their members engage in varying levels of coercion and benefits provision to residents living in areas where they operate. When gangs compete, they rely more on coercion and violence as they demand heightened levels of obedience from local communities. When police are actively enforcing against gangs, however, they will provide more responsive benefits to local populations to gain resident support in their effort to avoid detection and arrest. Although gang-level incentives may seem to predominate, the role of residents is crucial. The chapter describes how resident responses within these various security environments can shape the nature of the threats to gangs and, thereby, governance outcomes. The chapter concludes by describing the dynamics that should be observed within each of the ideal-typical criminalized governance regimes and addresses several alternative factors that may shape these outcomes.

This chapters traces the evolution of the Nova Holanda gang’s governance practices from the mid-1990s until the occupation of Maré by the Brazilian Military in April 2014 through the analysis of newspaper archives, oral histories with residents and gang members, and a dataset of anonymous gang denunciations. Following its integration into the Comando Vermelho faction, CVNH maintained a benevolent dictator regime, combining high levels of coercion with responsive benefits, until several years of warfare with their primary rival led to the use of extreme forms of coercion against residents as disorder prevailed. By 2004, the war between CVNH and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) had ended though enforcement continued to be active and frequent, leading to a social bandit regime, in which the gang offered significant benefits and engaged in low levels of coercion. Then, following the resurgence of TCP in 2009 until the arrival of the Brazilian military, CVNH can be considered a benevolent dictator gang once again. They ramped up their coercive behavior in response to TCP’s more aggressive posture while providing significant benefits to avoid frequent police enforcement efforts.

While most scholars of criminalized governance in Rio de Janeiro attribute its origins to the prison-based factions which formed during the military dictatorship (1964–85), this chapter argues that these arrangements emerged before, in the homes and on the streets and alleyways of the city’s favelas and housing projects. This chapter investigates these origins by focusing on the first embryonic gangs in Complexo da Maré in the 1970s. Combining archival research with oral histories of longtime residents, the chapter documents the emergence of Maré’s gangs after a variety of other non-state actors that had previously provided governance were increasingly marginalized during Brazil’s military dictatorship and as the abusive practices of police became more widespread. Maré’s incipient gang networks quickly began to compete over valuable drug-selling turf and, as the more successful ones consolidated territorial control, they expanded their organizations and governance activities. The chapter concludes with a description of the history of Rio’s prison-based factions and the marriage between these two organizational forms as the favela-based gangs integrated into these citywide networks.

This epilogue describes the author’s final interview with Severino, a former gang member and one of the principal interlocutors of the project. It describes his circumstances following his exit from the gang and the prospects for his future.