Blaxell and Fedman make reference to the displacement and deculturation of Ainu in the process of Hokkaidō's incorporation into modern Japan. Indeed, the assimilation of Ainu resulted in what some have characterized as near “cultural extinction” and provoked enduring worries about the loss of Ainu identity as mixed marriages between Ainu and Japanese increased; practices in clothing, housing, and food became more Japanese; and the Ainu language fell out of daily use. In response, there have been attempts, especially since the 1970s to protect, revive, and promote Ainu culture. Kayano Shigeru (1926-2006) was a prominent conservationist of Ainu culture who, in 1999, offered in a children's book an adaptation of an Ainu kamuy yakur, a song of gods and demigods. Or more precisely, a yakur is an epic poem that draws on Ainu oral traditions, and kamuy are spirit forces that are believed to control the visible universe. This particular kamuy yakur, translated into English by Kyoko Selden, is about an encounter between Pikatakamuy, the goddess of the wind, and Okikurmi, the guardian god of the Ainu. Consider this song as a primary source that speaks to Ainu views of gods, nature, and the relationship between humans and nature. And compare this to the understandings of the natural environment that were discussed in the Blaxell and Fedman essays, with sensitivity to both resonances and tensions. Kayano Shigeru wore many hats as a promoter of Ainu culture. In one significant legal case he became an environmental activist against the construction of the Nibutani Dam on the Saru River in Hokkaidō during the 1990s. Like many environmental activists in Japan over the last century, one inspiration was Tanaka Shōzō, profiled in the next essay.

Despite his recently failed third attempt to become prime minister, Aso Taro remains one of Japan's best-known and most influential politicians. The former foreign minister still aspires to the top post and in two books published earlier this year he has sketched a road map for the nation.

Japan the Tremendous, a bestseller written in a populist tone, highlights the peaceful nature of postwar Japan and calls the country a “fount of moral lessons” for Asia. Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons expatiates on Aso's tenure as foreign minister from October 2005 to August 2007.

Since the Democratic Party took power in Japan with the Hatoyama administration in September 2009, there has been little movement on immigration issues in Japanese politics. There has, however, been notable discussion by civil society commentators who are advocating the establishment of some form of regularized immigration policy as a partial solution to Japan's demographic decline. Among them one could mention the policy proposals made by the Council on Population Education/Akashi Research Group (2010), “Seven Proposals for Japan to Reestablish its Place As a Respected Member of the International Community: Taking a Global Perspective on Japan's Future.” One of the seven proposals is to enact an Immigration Law and establish an Immigration Agency. The Council notes, “Political will and leadership will be required to take the necessary action for the enactment of such a law” (Council on Population Education/Akashi Research Group, 2010:6). In the current economic doldrums, however, with the media reporting on the difficulties even college students are facing trying to secure jobs before spring graduation, this political will is quite unlikely to surface.

The murders committed by AUM Shinrikyo guru Asahara Shoko and his henchmen may be the most malevolent crimes in Japanese history. March 20, 1995 was Japan's 9/11, and but for a little dumb luck—including the failure to puncture all the bags of sarin that were planted in the subway trains—the death toll could have been much higher than 13 and the number of persons injured might have reached five digits instead of the true total of 6300.

In 1978, Yasukuni enshrined the spirits of 14 Class A war criminals as “martyrs,” after which Emperor Hirohito (and, from his accession to the throne in 1989, Emperor Akihito) ceased making visits to the shrine. Nevertheless, visits by prominent elected representatives (most notoriously, the annual visits by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro on the anniversary of Japan's surrender) have continued, stirring international protest and internal legal challenges. As the following article suggests, at stake in these challenges is not only the constitutionality of such visits, but also the meaning of enshrinement itself. If, as legal arguments contend (and the Osaka High Court affirmed), shrine visits by Koizumi took place in his official capacity as Prime Minister, this represents a violation of the separation of religion and state power affirmed in the post-war Constitution. At the same time, these official visits imply to many at least tacit governmental support for the policies of the shrine, which not only works to glorify Japan's imperialist past, but also enshrines a number of names (including those of former Taiwanese and Korean colonial subjects) over the strong objection of surviving relatives.

[This is part of a continuing series of reports and assessment of the US firebombing of Japan from March through August, 1945.]

The air armada of B-29 planes, their silver skins gleaming under a Japanese moon, thundered over Tokyo on March 10th, 1945 to scorch that sleeping city and Japanese empire's headquarters.

During the next three months, North Korea will unload its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, removing fuel rods that can be reprocessed into plutonium for more nuclear weapons. Once again, Pyongyang is offering to negotiate a freeze that would prevent further reprocessing, as it did in June, 1994, leading to the Agreed Framework, and as it has repeatedly offered to do in the six-party talks.

Just after 9/11, the United States allegedly threatened to bomb Pakistan “back to the stone age” unless it joined the war on terror. In his new book, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf attributes the ultimatum to Richard Armitage, who flatly denies it. Sounding slightly less sure, President Bush says he was “taken aback by the harshness of the words.”

The U.S. has long viewed the island of Guam, an unincorporated U.S. territory that already hosts two of the Department of Defense's most “valuable” bases in the world, an indispensable part of its “Pacific Century.” Prior to talk of the “Pacific Pivot,” the Governments of Japan (“GOJ”) and the United States agreed to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa in response to intense local pressure. Defense Department planning for Guam is closely bound up with changing plans for basing in Okinawa. In 2006, the governments of Japan and the US formalized a “roadmap” to move 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The plan was contingent, however, on closing the dangerous Futenma Base and expanding an existing base at Henoko, an approach fiercely resisted by Okinawan people and politicians.

Despite the fact that Japan has in the past set the maximum radiation exposure for citizens at 1 millisievert, the government has now increased that amount to 20 millisieverts for Fukushima school children. Defending this twentyfold increase, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology argues that 20 millisieverts is still within the recommended range of 1-20 millisieverts set by the International Commission on Radiological Protection for exposure in emergency situations. Others question the wisdom of using maximum guidelines for children in areas that may be impacted for years to come. A petition has been launched to urge the Japanese government to repeal this decision as experts write about the potential risks.

When President Vladimir Putin in his State of the Union speech last year called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”, cold warriors on both sides of the Atlantic pounced on the statement as fresh evidence of Russia's imperial ambitions.

Very few were prepared to accept Putin's statement at face value - a powerful articulation of an incontrovertible fact from the Russian point of view. The fact remains that half a million Soviet citizens perished during the painful transition, and 50 million people were displaced. Last week, on the anniversary of the August 19 coup that led to the disbandment of the Soviet Union, public opinion in Russia looked back at the events 15 years ago as a crude power struggle devoid of any high principles.

[The following dialogue reads rather like the classic dispute between the Pacifist and the Realist (“To protect the peace, prepare for war”; “But one mustn't …”) carried to a higher level. But quantity becomes quality: when you are talking about nuclear weapons, the conversation is no longer the same as when you are talking about swords or even firearms. This is what Emmanuel Todd doesn't seem to grasp, while Yoshibumi Takamiya (at least partly) does.

Who enshrines the dead? A widely held international principle, that surviving family members determine the disposition of the dead, including those who die in combat, is being tested anew in Japanese courts. Nearly 50,000 Taiwanese and Korean soldiers who died in Japanese uniforms have been enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine without consultation with family members. On May 13, 2004, the Osaka District Court issued its verdict in one of seven lawsuits filed in response to Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro's pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine. It was the first case to address Japan's oppression of indigenous peoples and their mandatory enshrinement at Yasukuni during the nation's colonial rule of Taiwan (1895-1945). Chief Justice Yoshikawa Shin'ichi not only dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for reparations, but also came up with a novel way of judging whether the Prime Minister's pilgrimages are public or private.

I am an admirer. I love your beauty and your strength, your serenity and your energy, your creativity and your traditions. Beyond that, I am deeply grateful to you for providing me with at least part of the education and experience that allowed me to follow a diplomatic career, one it is true which is over.

Long ago in my teenage years, nothing gave me more joy than reading. Finally the day came though when I wanted to have the type of adventures I had been reading about, so I dropped out of college and hitchhiked around the world. It was in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan that I met a young Japanese musician and reporter who was writing about nomadic peoples. Because I spoke a little Farsi I was able to help him negotiate a price for a horse and guide that was agreeable to all. That was the beginning of my Japanese karma. In fact we later met again by chance in Istanbul. At that point we decided to return to Europe together, where he had once performed as a musician and still seemed to have quite a few girlfriends. When it was time for him to return to Japan he invited me to come along. I was though at the moment deeply involved in learning French with a beautiful young woman, and said if he didn’t mind I would try and come later.

While the United States and South Korea consider whether or not to accept North Korea's call for an “unconditional” return to the Six Party Talks (6PT) or China's call for multilateral negotiations, Northeast Asia is sliding in the direction of deepening conflict that could lead to war. China-Japan relations, which had been warming since the departure of Koizumi Junichiro, and especially since the victory of the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009, are again in a deep freeze over disputed territory. One consequence is a reorientation of Japan's defense strategy southward, in the direction of the Senkakus (Diaoyutai). Washington is encouraging that shift, as well as closer military cooperation between Japan and South Korea. North-South Korea relations are very tense as the result of the Cheonan incident, the North's artillery barrage against a small South Korean island, and revelations of a modern North Korean uranium enrichment plant—all coming in the wake of the Lee Myung Bak administration's almost complete reversal of his predecessors' engagement policies. And China-US relations are increasingly contentious, going beyond the longstanding differences over currency valuation and human rights to include a host of security matters. Even though China-Taiwan relations have improved, U.S. naval activity in the Pacific has picked up, with a number of exercises conducted alone and with allies leading some Chinese analysts to conclude that containment is again prominent on the U.S. policy agenda. And both China and the United States are beefing up their weapons capabilities relevant to the Taiwan Strait.

The look on Nakamae Akira's face said it all. In the somber press conference that followed the end of the 2007 International Whaling Commission conference in Anchorage, the deputy director of Japan's Fisheries Agency was as impassive as an Alaskan iceberg. Japan's silk-smooth spokesman Morishita Joji as always did most of the talking. When Nakamae did eventually answer a single question after spending the bulk of the press conference staring out the window of the Hotel Captain Cook, he was brutally direct: “Why should we leave the IWC, we're not the problem.”

[In this post-hegemonic analysis, Parag Khanna, Director of the Global Governance Initiative of the New American Foundation, posits a tripolar world pivoting around three poles: China, Europe and the US, each of which will be required to pay growing attention to what he describes as “swing states” and emerging “anti-imperialist belts”. The author is particularly upbeat on the possible merger of European and swing state interests:

… nothing has brought about the erosion of American primacy faster than globalization. While European nations redistribute wealth to secure or maintain first-world living standards, on the battlefield of globalization second-world countries' state-backed firms either outhustle or snap up American companies, leaving their workers to fend for themselves. The second world's first priority is not to become America but to succeed by any means necessary.

German sociologist Ulrich Beck writes that Japan has become part of the ‘World Risk Society’ as a result of the 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima. By World Risk Society he means a society threatened by such things as nuclear accidents, climate change, and the global financial crisis, presenting a catastrophic risk beyond geographical, temporal, national and social boundaries. According to Beck, such risk is an unfortunate by-product of modernity, and poses entirely new challenges to our existing institutions, which attempt to control it using current, known means. As Gavan McCormack points out, ‘Japan, as one of the most successful capitalist countries in history, represents in concentrated form problems facing contemporary industrial civilization as a whole’. The nuclear, social, and institutional predicaments it now faces epitomise the negative consequences of intensive modernisation.