In this chapter, I discuss textual uses of fictive discourse: How should we think of the utterances that convey fictions? MacDonald (1954) and Searle (1975) argue that they are mere pretense – the simulation of acts like assertions or questions. They don’t constitute sui generis, dedicated representational practices of a specific kind, fictionalizing, on a par with assertions or questions. This was the standard view in analytic philosophy from Frege until the 1990s, and was casually endorsed by Austin, Kripke, van Inwagen, and many others. Walton (1990) and others made decisive objections to this view, predicated on its lack of explanatory power, which will be developed here. Walton himself also rejects views of the kind that MacDonald and Searle question, which take fictionalizing to be a sui generis speech act. Currie (1990) articulated one such account in a Gricean psychologistic framework, while García-Carpintero (2013a), Abell (2020), and others have argued for social, Austinian accounts. I earlier classified speech acts of fictionalizing as directives; while other authors classify them as declarations, like ejecting players, naming ships, or sentencing offenders. I’ll question the declaration view, but I’ll argue for another alternative to the directive account, which treats fictionalizings as a variety of constative act.