Realism offers a compelling explanation for the West's ambivalence towards the Syrian conflict. Realism posits that as the balance of power evolves, political vacuums emerge (Waltz 1979). In this context, Russia and Iran have filled the void, backed by a mutual commitment to uphold Syria's territorial integrity. From a realist perspective, because Syria falls outside their sphere of influence, Western countries are reluctant to commit troops to a country that does not serve their collective interests.

As the world transitions towards a multipolar order, the US and its NATO allies are recalibrating their approach towards China. Moreover, the legacy of US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with NATO's operations in Libya, forced Western powers to re-evaluate their priorities. The cost of regime change – intended or otherwise – and the burden of trying to rebuild broken states have proven too taxing, even for major powers such as the US.

This chapter examines the relationship between the Syrian state and major Western powers, the US and the EU. I argue that the US, fatigued by its intervention in Iraq and with a desire to pivot to Asia, and the EU, scarred by its intervention in Libya, had no real appetite to engage forcibly in Syria, even after red lines were drawn.

Moreover, the UNSC has been hamstrung by Russia and China, especially after it sanctioned the NATO-led intervention in Libya where, according to Beijing and Moscow, the latter exceeded its mandate in removing the Gaddafi regime (Terry 2015).

As a result, the Syrian regime no longer believes – following former US President Obama's red line retreat – that Western powers will intervene and displace it. Indeed, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which encountered no meaningful resistance from Western powers, reassured the Syrian regime that it could act with further impunity. The Syrian regime realized that with Russian and Iranian support, as detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, it could win a long, slow war of attrition and wait for Western powers to lose interest.

This chapter comprises four sections. The first section briefly examines Syria's relations with the West since Hafez Asad took power in 1970, and the second section analyses Western reactions to the Syrian war. Sections three and four evaluate US and EU responses respectively, which comprised a mix of diplomacy, arms and training, sanctions and humanitarian aid.