Against the odds, the Syrian regime of Bashar Asad has survived a decade of conflict, which has seen it pitted against a unique series of popular protests, a region-fuelled armed insurgency, civil war and interventions by both friendly and hostile actors. By all accounts, Asad should have been swept from power or, at the very least, compelled to make significant concessions to the Syrian opposition. Other leaders in the Middle East and North Africa, during the early stages of the Arab uprisings, were forced to flee (Ben Ali, Tunisia) or step down (Hosni Mubarak, Egypt; Saleh, Yemen) or were killed (Gaddafi, Libya). However, not only did he refuse to offer any political concessions but he also chose to militarize his response and pursue the one course of action familiar to the Syrian regime: deploying a mix of ruthless force and deeply cynical guile. In doing so, Asad literally “took no prisoners” and showed his willingness to use chemical weapons and target hospitals, medical centres and schools with “barrel bombs” to terrorize civilians and defeat the array of groups challenging his rule. Asad's response, which had been fashioned by his late father, Syrian President Hafez Asad, has ensured his survival but at an unbearable cost to the country.

In this book, I aim to analyse and explain how the Syrian regime has managed to not only survive the past decade but also – piece by piece – recover territories lost to opposition groups, such as the Islamic Front, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), while retaining its authority over state institutions and diplomatic missions outside of the country. Of course, the integrity of state institutions has been compromised and circumscribed by parallel institutions set up by the regime, as well as external actors, including Iran, Russia and Turkey. Nevertheless, the regime has maintained a grip on core institutions, which has allowed it to exercise sovereignty both at home and abroad.

The conversation on Syria has changed from one where many Western policy-makers, until August 2015, were convinced that Asad would be swept from power by opposition forces to Gulf Arab state leaders seeking, in 2023, to normalize relations with the regime.