This chapter examines the period from 11 December 1963 to 14 October 1973, a solid decade in which the lieutenants of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat together dominated Thailand in an informal diarchy. It was a period marked by four phenomena: the stifling of political space in a continuing stratocracy, manipulation of party politics by the military, the occupation of Thailand by US military forces, and the beginning of Thai communist insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Sarit's death in December 1963 effectively prevented Krit and Chitti from ascending to the top of Thailand's military leadership. Naturally, their regime opponents—General Thanom and General Praphas—tended to view Krit and Chitti as possible threats to their own hold on power. The United States had favoured Sarit, Krit and Chitti while backing Thanom.

As the prime minister and supreme commander of the armed forces of Thailand, Thanom had reached the apex of his career. A part-Chinese migrant to Bangkok, he had been born into an impoverished family in the Thai border area of Tak on 11 August 1911. At the mere age of nine, well-placed friends of Thanom's family had begged the Army Cadet Academy in Bangkok to enrol him. Thanom was accepted and excelled in school. His “big brother” was Sarit Thanarat, who had entered the academy in 1919. Thanom continued his military studies at the Royal Thai Army Map School, Royal Thai Army Infantry School and National Defence College (class 1), respectively. Thanom's promo¬tions had continued thanks to Sarit's patronage. In 1963, with Sarit dead, Washington became his patron, and his brother-in-law General Praphas Charusathien ensured support from the military.

Praphas was a self-made strongman, having evolved, like Sarit, as a child of the Northeast (in this case, from Udorn Thani province) to become army commander and deputy prime minister. Praphas, however, wanted more—he aspired to be premier, like Phibun, Sarit and Thanom before him. But two obstacles stood in his way: first, Thanom—both a friend

Indeed, the United States was less enthusiastic about Praphas, whom it saw as corrupt and undemocratic, though Washington did acknowledge the post-Sarit dominance of the Thai military by Praphas.