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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2025

Joseph Mendola
Joseph Mendola
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University of Nebraska, Lincoln
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The Neural Structure of Consciousness , pp. 240 - 257
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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  • Bibliography
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  • Bibliography
  • Joseph Mendola, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
  • Book: The Neural Structure of Consciousness
  • Online publication: 27 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009514774.009
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