Against the expectations of many Myanmar watchers and security analysts, the poorly organised, poorly trained and poorly armed opposition movement gradually developed significant military capabilities. It began to pose a serious challenge to the junta's security forces. This prompted a number of prominent observers to revise their earlier pessimistic views. A few even began to contemplate the possibility that the People's Defence Force and its allies might actually win the civil war. To others, however, a military victory increasingly began to look like a chimera.

Over the past few months, there has been a significant shift in the tone of the expert commentary on Myanmar's civil war. Experienced observers are starting to hedge their bets on the eventual outcome of the conflict. A few are even allowing for the possibility of a military victory by the opposition movement, something once dismissed as impossible.

Following the coup on 1 February 2021, most professional Myanmar watchers warned that, despite the unprecedented support shown for the pro-democracy movement, Myanmar's armed forces (or Tatmadaw) should not be under-estimated. They had weaknesses, but were powerful, ruthless and determined to assert their control over the country, whatever the cost.

The nationwide civil disobedience campaign weakened the regime but could not bring it down. A shadow National Unity Government (NUG) was formed, and included a few ethnic armed organisations (EAO), but it was weak and divided. Its People's Defence Force (PDF) was disorganised, ill-equipped and poorly trained. Also, the NUG had little control over many of the other armed groups that emerged to resist the junta.

Since the beginning of this year, however, the security situation in Myanmar has been changing. The Tatmadaw is now stretched very thinly, and is relying on the police force, intelligence agencies and ad hoc militias to help enforce its will over the population. Reports of military casualties are doubtless exaggerated, but security force losses are high enough to raise questions about the attrition rate, and the sustainability of key military formations.

The resistance still lacks weapons, equipment and expertise, but it is now better organised, better trained and better armed. It reportedly consists of some 259 PDF units, with approximately 80,000–100,000 members. In addition, there are around 250 local defence groups, and 400 other “guerrilla forces” (a term that seems to include both rural guerrilla bands and urban resistance cells), that broadly support the NUG's aims.