from Part I - Reporting and Ascribing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2022
We defend an acquaintance-based semantics for ‘de re’ attitude reports. We begin by surveying the philosophical literature on the logical form of the ‘de re’, with particular attention to how acquaintance relations solve the problem posed by so-called double vision scenarios. We reject the view that cognitive contact with the ‘res’ requires causal interaction: the causal conception of acquaintance is inadequately motivated in the philosophical literature on the ‘de re’. We then turn to other linguistic data. We show that the ‘de re’ analysis is needed to account for certain tense constructions. The success of this application provides a further reason to reject an exclusively causal conception of acquaintance, since the kind of cognitive contact relevant to ‘de re’ attitudes towards times cannot plausibly be causal. We discuss objections to the ‘de re’ analysis of tense, such as the apparent unavailability of double vision scenarios involving times. We consider various additional principles and constraints that further refine the theory’s predictions, and conclude that while further research is needed to fully vindicate the ‘de re’ analysis in this application, it offers the most unified and well-motivated account of the embedded tense data currently on offer.
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