Thrasymachus is shown to be disgusted not only by the deference the interlocutors have been showing one another but also by the imminent conclusion of the Socrates–Polemarchus exchange that the t-just man helps everyone by making them better – that is, more l-just. The transition to Thrasymachus’ “political” characterization of justice as the “advantage of the stronger,” where “the stronger” is the ruler, is shown to be the natural extension of Polemarchus’ t-justice, transformed at the hand of Thrasymachus into the craft of ruling. Of the variety of labels scholars have affixed to Thrasymachus and to his position, it is determined that Thrasymachus is best described as a cynic and perhaps as an immoralist. It contends further that Thrasymachus’ view is consistent throughout. It locates the crux of the disagreement between Thrasymachus and Socrates in the clash between Thrasymachus’ notion that a ruler in the precise sense never makes, through error, laws that fail to further the ruler’s own advantage, and Socrates’ contention that, on the contrary, a ruler in the precise sense advances the welfare of the ruled, promoting the advantage not of the stronger but of the weaker.