Even though they face similar challenges with respect to recruitment, organization, the management of civilians, and the use of force, rebel groups respond to the challenges of organization in different ways. In an effort to make sense of rebel strategies, I began with the nature of a group's endowments: economic resources put groups on a path toward authoritarianism and coercion, while social endowments give rise to groups that embrace participatory structures and eschew the use of force. This story of organizational formation implies substantial path dependence: groups that employ coercive strategies in the early stages of the conflict appear doomed to repeat those strategies throughout; rebel leaders capable of disciplining the use of force and sharing power with civilians find themselves better equipped to replicate the same patterns at later stages of the conflict. Data on how force was used by the NRA, Renamo, Sendero Nacional, and Sendero–Huallaga illuminate a surprising consistency in the character of violence over time and across regions within each conflict.

But how sticky is the organizational structure of a rebel group? Before exploring how my argument fares in a broader set of cases, it is necessary to consider what types of shocks threaten the coherence and stability of the various organizational forms and what effect these shocks have on groups' behavioral patterns. This chapter begins with a discussion of four potential developments in civil conflict that can weaken the internal structures that hold groups together.