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8 - Beyond a Reasonable Doubt and Intime Conviction

from Part II - Criminal Procedure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2025

By
Kai Ambos  and
Youngjae Lee
Edited by
Kai Ambos ,
Antony Duff ,
Alexander Heinze ,
Julian Roberts  and
Thomas Weigend
Kai Ambos
Affiliation:
Georg August Universität Göttingen
Antony Duff
Affiliation:
University of Stirling
Alexander Heinze
Affiliation:
University of Bremen
Julian Roberts
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Thomas Weigend
Affiliation:
University of Köln
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Summary

This chapter deals with ‘intime conviction’ and ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ as ways in which fact-finders (professional judges or lay juries) in criminal trials decide on the question of guilt. The ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is typically associated with the Anglo-American system of criminal justice, whereas intime conviction is a characteristic feature of Continental procedural systems. Both standards belong to the phase of the evaluation and assessment of evidence in the criminal trial procedure. The chapter considers the way in which the two systems have converged on essentially the same standard of proof but have taken different paths towards it, with parallel discussions taking place along the way. The chapter discusses the definition of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard in detail and introduces several important questions that have arisen around the two standards, such as those concerning definition and application of the standards, and how such issues have been resolved in the two different systems, and notes a few significant remaining differences.

Keywords

reasonable doubtintime convictionstandard of proofcriminal justicejudicial convictionmoral certaintyburden of proofjury instructionsevidence evaluationfact-finding

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Type
Chapter
Information
Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice
Volume III
 , pp. 263 - 304
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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