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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2025

Catherine Herfeld
Catherine Herfeld
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Leibniz Universität Hannover
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Conversations on Rational Choice , pp. 557 - 568
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2026

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  • References
  • Catherine Herfeld, Leibniz Universität Hannover
  • Book: Conversations on Rational Choice
  • Online publication: 27 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344392.010
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  • References
  • Catherine Herfeld, Leibniz Universität Hannover
  • Book: Conversations on Rational Choice
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  • Book: Conversations on Rational Choice
  • Online publication: 27 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344392.010
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