This chapter aims to shed light on Ribot’s analysis of the types of weakening of the will that lead more particularly to indecisiveness or irresolution, the extreme form of which he identifies as “madness of doubt” (“la folie du doute”). Our goal is to tackle the extent to which the physiological and “dissolutive” perspectives proposed by Ribot in Les Maladies de la Volonté (The Diseases of the Will, Ribot, 1883) and in Les Maladies de la Personnalité (The Diseases of Personality, 1885) differ from the more classical philosophical approaches to the weakness of will in terms of akrasia. We intend to explore how the definition of the self as a combination of multiple affective tendencies, which Ribot calls character, can help us understand better how irresolution (or indecisiveness) is more of a normal psychological state than a pathological one; the resolute, “strong character”, although enviable, is too rare to be considered a statistical norm. Nonetheless, irresolution can become a pathological “madness of doubt” paralyzing all agency in the affected individual. This chapter intends to show how Ribot’s contribution can be considered a precursor to transdiagnostic and dimensional perspectives, highlighting commonalities and shared mechanisms across different psychiatric disorders.