Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 July 2025
Introduction
Extant literature is scant on data on the involvement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) in Somalia's conflict prior to 2007 (see Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000). Since its inception in 2002, the AU had been quite torpid in Somalia's affairs until after Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006.. Efforts at resolving Somalia's crises diplomatically were championed by states or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Cocodia, 2021). The AU's involvement in Somalia's conflict really began with the operations of AMISOM. Adopting peace enforcement as the first course of action by an IGO in conflict resolution is unusual bearing in mind that diplomatic efforts that ought to preclude engagement were never undertaken by the AU. In discussions with an AU official in Addis Ababa on the conflict in Somalia in 2013, Al-Shabaab was referred to as ‘those terrorists bastards’. With such a view of the opposition within the corridors of the AU, it is easy to see why diplomacy was never considered an option. The approach of the AU to the crisis was well in consonance with the dominant narrative of Al-Shabaab being a terrorist group, so there was the need to flush them out for being so labelled. This approach of the AU indicates that it was partisan right from the start, rather than an objective intervener. Partisanship in conflict resolution never bodes well for mediation, arbitration or fostering the peace in whatever form. By virtue of this approach, the AU missed the opportunity of building on the stability won by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was a golden chance for peace in Somalia.
Summary
From the AU's inception in 2002 to Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006, the AU stayed quite inactive in Somalia's affairs. Efforts at resolving the crisis diplomatically were championed by states or RECs. The AU involvement came at the insistence of the UN and the United States in 2007 for the organisation to take over the role of ‘regime changer’ from Ethiopia. The AU's involvement thus legitimised Ethiopia's invasion. The dominant narrative of the AU as a ‘peace enforcer’ has added colour to this usurpation and masked the intervention for what it truly was.
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