The discourse of Somalia in academic literature portends that it has been conflict-ridden for a generation (forty years). This notion applies specifically to South-Central Somalia where an average of 5,000 conflict-related deaths were recorded between 2021 and 2022 (Acled, 2023). The northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland that were once ravaged by the same conflict have developed indigenous modes of conflict resolution and governance that have been effective since the 1990s and achieved some degree of stability and security. Unfortunately, the South-Central region has been unable to replicate this success story and this book examines the reasons for this. The forces behind South Somalia's current crisis are mainly external actors consisting of its neighbours Ethiopia, the African Union (AU) and the major powers of the west that set the parameters for global norms (Kyriakiakidis, 2012). These norms are hoisted on other regions of the world irrespective of historical experience, culture and social dynamics. Organisations involved in conflict management, the AU inclusive, keep with these rules. With the dependence of the AU on its western benefactors, it is difficult for the AU to carry out its task of providing security without first protecting and promoting these western interests. The intervention in Somalia that escalated and prolonged the crisis in the south-central region was borne out of this relationship between the AU and its benefactors. Sadly, the western narrative on the necessity of AU intervention in Somalia has dominated conflict literature, while that of the effective alternative approaches embodied in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) remained unpopular. Unfortunately too, the writings of the greater number of African scholars pander to this dominant narrative.

Contrary to the dominant narrative peddled by the global media, this book adopts a Pan-African problem-solving approach, hinged on the ‘problems of a single story’ thesis, and questions the rationale behind the AU's peace enforcement in Somalia? What justification for intervention can be given in view of the fact that a viable political alternative espoused in the ICU, existed at the time? What are the prospects for the future of (South-Central) Somalia? How can the AU and its partners retrace their steps or foster peace in Somalia?