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11 - The Effects of Partisan Polarization on the Bureaucracy

from Part III - Anxieties of Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2019

By
David B. Spence
Edited by
Frances E. Lee  and
Nolan McCarty
Frances E. Lee
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, College Park
Nolan McCarty
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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Summary

How is partisan polarization affecting the modern administrative state. Research suggests that despite a polarized Congress and a (somewhat) polarized electorate, agency policy choices do not seem to be moving systematically toward the extremes.Some combination of moderating effects seem to be at work, including the effect of divided government on appointments, agency preferences driven by moderate statutory mandates and/or the norms of issue networks, and (at times) the influence of ideologically moderate presidents on the size of the gridlock interval. The Trump administration may represent a departure from these norms: conservatives in the Trump coalition may be freer to pursue policies disfavored by a majority because of populist loyalty to the administration. Regardless, polarization-induced congressional gridlock poses ongoing challenges for the administrative state. Agencies must address problems within their jurisdiction in the absence of congressional input, using statutes that may have been poorly designed for the purpose.Courts will continue to struggle, case by case, with the implications for the constitutional legitimacy of agency policymaking.

Keywords

bureaucracybureaucratic politicsregulationadministrative agenciesadministrative lawdelegationpolitical control
Type
Chapter
Information
Can America Govern Itself? , pp. 238
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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