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3 - Holmes, Legal Realism, and Experimental Jurisprudence

from Part I - Foundations and Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2025

By
John Mikhail
Edited by
Kevin Tobia
Kevin Tobia
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

In an 1870 essay, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. made a series of penetrating observations about the common law that can still be profitably used by researchers in experimental jurisprudence today. First, Holmes observed that common law reasoning is a process in which judges decide the case before determining the principle on which that decision rests. Second, he suggested that this decision is typically fast, easy, and intuitive, while finding its rationale is often slow, difficult, and deliberate. Third, Holmes noted that this behavioral pattern applies not only to judges and lawyers, but to “other men,” that is, to human beings generally. Fourth, he observed that legal intuitions are often correct, whereas the reasons first offered to explain and justify them are often mistaken. Fifth, he suggested that common law reasoning can be modeled as a practical syllogism. Finally, Holmes implied that the common law is not a body of rules existing “outside the head” of those who discern and apply them, but a mental capacity or psychological entity of some sort. Each of these points anticipated key insights associated with strands of Legal Realism, and each offers valuable lessons for experimental jurisprudence.

Keywords

HolmesLegal Realismbehaviorismintuitionsexperimental jurisprudence

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The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence , pp. 49 - 66
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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