Information in Contests

doi:10.1017/9781009589888.003

Chapter 2 - Information in Contests

from Part I - Contests and Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2025

Juuso Välimäki

Edited by

Victor Chernozhukov ,

Johannes Hörner ,

Eliana La Ferrara and

Iván Werning

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Victor Chernozhukov: Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Johannes Hörner: Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Eliana La Ferrara: Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Iván Werning: Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Summary

Every 5 years, the World Congress of the Econometric Society brings together scholars from around the world. Leading scholars present state-of-the-art overviews of their areas of research, offering newcomers access to key research in economics. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Twelfth World Congress consists of papers and commentaries presented at the Twelfth World Congress of the Econometric Society. This two-volume set includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussions of future directions for a variety of topics, covering both theory and application. The first volume addresses such topics as contract theory, industrial organization, health and human capital, as well as racial justice, while the second volume includes theoretical and applied papers on climate change, time-series econometrics, and causal inference. These papers are invaluable for experienced economists seeking to broaden their knowledge or young economists new to the field.

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Type: Chapter
Information: Advances in Economics and Econometrics
Twelfth World Congress
, pp. 47 - 68

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009589888.003 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2025

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References

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