Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Contests and Contracts
- Part II Topics in Industrial Organization
- Chapter 3 Incomplete-Information Models for Industrial Organization
- Chapter 4 Advances in Horizontal Merger Analysis
- Part III Health as Human Capital
- Part IV Social Interactions and Development
- Part V Policy Session: What can Economics do for Racial Justice?
- Part VI Topics in Microeconomic Theory
- Index
- Econometric Society Monographs Series
- References
Chapter 4 - Advances in Horizontal Merger Analysis
from Part II - Topics in Industrial Organization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2025
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Contests and Contracts
- Part II Topics in Industrial Organization
- Chapter 3 Incomplete-Information Models for Industrial Organization
- Chapter 4 Advances in Horizontal Merger Analysis
- Part III Health as Human Capital
- Part IV Social Interactions and Development
- Part V Policy Session: What can Economics do for Racial Justice?
- Part VI Topics in Microeconomic Theory
- Index
- Econometric Society Monographs Series
- References
Summary
Every 5 years, the World Congress of the Econometric Society brings together scholars from around the world. Leading scholars present state-of-the-art overviews of their areas of research, offering newcomers access to key research in economics. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Twelfth World Congress consists of papers and commentaries presented at the Twelfth World Congress of the Econometric Society. This two-volume set includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussions of future directions for a variety of topics, covering both theory and application. The first volume addresses such topics as contract theory, industrial organization, health and human capital, as well as racial justice, while the second volume includes theoretical and applied papers on climate change, time-series econometrics, and causal inference. These papers are invaluable for experienced economists seeking to broaden their knowledge or young economists new to the field.
Information
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Advances in Economics and EconometricsTwelfth World Congress, pp. 125 - 150Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
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