Despite the affinity of monism and monotheism—and despite monism’s recent philosophical renaissance—few have defended the conjunction of the two claims, of what we might call ‘theistic monism’. I argue, first, that monism and monotheism are consistent, and second, that each one provides good reasons to accept the other one. Monotheists, qua monotheists, have good reason to be monists; and monists, qua monists, have good reason to be monotheists. There should be much greater overlap between the monist camp and the monotheist camp than there is at present.

How should you respond to higher-order evidence which says that you have made a mistake in the reasoning from your first-order evidence? It is highly plausible that you should reduce your confidence in your first-order reasoning. However, attempts to precisely formulate how this works have run into problems. I will argue that we should appeal to an independently motivated normative contextualism. That is, normative words like ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ have a different reference in different contexts. The result is that different answers to our question are true in different contexts.

In this article, I argue for a “multifunctional account” of political feasibility and against recent attempts by several theorists to defend accounts of political feasibility that reduce feasibility judgments to a single function. According to the view I defend, political feasibility can (and should) serve multiple useful functions in our political deliberative practices. This pluralist and context-dependent approach allows us to retain the insights provided by various monofunctional accounts, while avoiding the limitations of each.

It has long been recognized that Sartre’s description of “being-in-itself” in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness (B&N) is reminiscent of Eleatic monism, the view traditionally attributed to Parmenides on which there is only one mind-independent entity, which is undifferentiated and atemporal. I reconstruct two arguments from premises Sartre endorses in B&N for Eleatic monism. These arguments are interesting not only because they give new life to an old reading of B&N, but also because there has recently been a revival of interest in monism in analytic metaphysics.