Past research on populist supporters’ democratic orientations suggests that populist voters believe in democracy but are dissatisfied with how it is being implemented. However, this research has not adequately grappled with variation in the type of democracy citizens support or the left–right orientations of populists. Using the tenth wave of the European Social Survey (2020–2022), I distinguish between respondents’ feelings about how well their country lives up to the liberal aspects of democracy (including minority rights, media freedom, pluralism, etc.) and the aspects of democracy related to popular sovereignty (rule by the people, referenda, etc.). All populist supporters are disappointed in their countries’ performance relative to popular sovereignty, while only left-populist supporters are disappointed in their countries’ liberal performance.

In recent years, scholars have investigated the ‘corruption voting puzzle’, ie why, despite an overwhelming distaste for corruption, voters often collectively fail to ‘throw the rascals out’. While previous literature has largely investigated why voters support corrupt incumbents, our focus lies on nonvoters. Using an original two-wave panel data with Romanian voters just prior to and after the 2020 municipal elections, we test three hypotheses. First, that there is a discrepancy between voters’ intentions and their actual voting behavior (e.g. ‘norms versus actions’). Second, that those most pessimistic about other voters’ intentions to come out to the polls to vote out corrupt incumbents are most likely to abstain. Finally, building on the collective action literature, whether providing such pessimistic voters with information about the intentions of other voters will decrease abstention and increase opposition voting. Using original observational and experimental data, we demonstrate empirical support for our three hypotheses.

This article argues that opposition to environmental protection is key to understanding the development of new voting patterns in Western Europe. We theorize climate change as a collective action problem with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs and develop a range of hypotheses about the ways in which concentrated resistance to climate change measures may be channelled into electoral behaviour. We test our hypotheses using data from the European Social Survey. Our results suggest that the backlash against environmental protection is triggered by the potential ‘losers’ of these processes, contributing to the emergence of a territorial cleavage between green voters residing in metropolitical areas, and far-right voters residing in rural and peripheral areas. Our argument explains the development of new political alliances and highlights the importance of green attitudes for the emergence of societal cleavages.

It is widely believed that high inflation reduces the popularity of incumbents, and contributed to poor incumbent performance in recent elections in the United States and elsewhere. Existing research shows that voters’ inflation perceptions are associated with their evaluations of incumbent parties, but these observational studies cannot eliminate the possibility that the causal relationship runs the other way, where opposition to incumbent governments causes individuals to report higher price increases. To help overcome this inferential challenge, this study draws on a pre-registered experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey fielded just days before the 2024 US Presidential election. We find that priming Americans to think about inflation reduced support for the incumbent party. This effect is most pronounced among Independents and Democrats. These findings suggest that inflation likely contributed to the Democrats’ 2024 electoral defeat, and provide novel evidence that inflation has a causal effect on support for incumbent parties.

Voter turnout has declined across established democracies, which has been accompanied by an increase in turnout disparities along class lines. In contrast to most advanced democracies, class voting has largely been neglected in Canada. Using the entire series of the Canadian Election Study (1965–2021), this article examines the turnout gap in Canada over time by class, education, and income, and whether the offerings of political parties impact these relationships. Results find major class-based participatory inequalities, which have worsened over time. The magnitude of the turnout gap between lower and higher socio-economic status (SES) individuals has mainly been driven by the demobilization of lower-SES individuals and a significant factor is the reduced saliency of economic issues in the party system. The findings contribute to our understanding of how economic inequalities translate into political inequalities and show that rising turnout inequality between politically relevant cleavages, represents a deterioration of democratic representation.

Mental health, like physical health, represents an important resource for participating in politics. We bring new insights from six surveys from five different countries (Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States) that combine diversified questions on mental health problems and political participation. Unlike previous research on depression, we find only limited evidence for the Resource Hypothesis that mental health problems reduce political participation, except in the case of voting and only in some samples. Instead, we find mixed evidence that mental health problems and their comorbidity (experiencing multiple problems) are associated with increased political participation. Our study leads us to more questions than answers: are the measures available in public opinion surveys appropriate for the task? Do general survey samples adequately capture people with mental disorders? And is the assumption that poor mental health reduces political participation wrong?

In this study, we hypothesize that positive, explicit racial appeals to Black voters from White politicians will be seen as pandering if not accompanied by an endorsement from a Black elite, which would increase credibility of the appeal. To test this, we use a preregistered survey experiment with approximately 400 Black Americans. Contrary to our expectations, we find that pro-Black appeals can function to increase support for the politician, even without an endorsement. In the full sample, the candidate enjoyed increased support when only using a positive appeal, when only receiving an endorsement, and when making an appeal and receiving an endorsement—relative to the control condition. Qualitative analyses of open-ended responses reveal that respondents saw the politician as pandering in all conditions—an appeal was not necessary to evoke pandering. We conclude that campaign strategies like appeals and endorsements can function to boost support even when the candidate is perceived as pandering.

Political self-efficacy, the civic duty to vote, and a homogeneous political atmosphere have been identified as important antecedents of turnout. However, little is known about how they explain voting behavior among minorities, who have an inherent motivation to protect their minority rights. In this article, I examine how belonging to a minority, political self-efficacy, the civic duty to vote, and a shared party identification are connected to intentions to vote. Analyzing nationally representative panel data in a structural equation model, I compare Swedish-speaking minority adolescents and Finnish-speaking majority adolescents—groups that mainly share similar background characteristics in all but language and their minority or majority status. According to the results, the significantly higher voting intentions found among the minority can partly be derived from their higher level of political self-efficacy. The unilingually Swedish-speaking adolescents also seem to benefit from their more pronounced and homogenous political atmosphere.

How does rising access to the Internet shape elections in low-income democracies? In a controversial, overturned election in Malawi, I show how online exposure can reduce incumbency advantages and improve election administration. Leveraging geocoded polling station returns and the expansion of 3G coverage in a difference-in-differences setting, I show that ruling party vote share and election irregularities decline in areas newly exposed to the Internet. This is robust to a series of specifications, including matching on pre-treatment characteristics and adjusting for polling station complexity. To examine mechanisms, I turn to interviews and focus group discussions with voters, party figures and election officials. These reveal that opposition groups used social media to campaign and organise, online platforms expanded the reach of civic education efforts, and election staff used WhatsApp to coordinate on polling day. The paper contributes to the literature on information technology, party strategy, and election administration in low-income settings.

We study the distributional preferences of Americans during 2013–2016, a period of social and economic upheaval. We decompose preferences into two qualitatively different tradeoffs—fair-mindedness versus self-interest, and equality versus efficiency—and measure both at the individual level in a large and diverse sample. Although Americans are heterogeneous in terms of both fair-mindedness and equality-efficiency orientation, we find that the individual-level preferences in 2013 are highly predictive of those in 2016. Subjects that experienced an increase in household income became more self-interested, and those who voted for Democratic presidential candidates in both 2012 and 2016 became more equality-oriented.

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.

Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime—autocracy—efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter.

How do people attribute responsibility when an outcome is not caused by an individual but results from a decision chain involving several people? We study this question in an experiment, in which five voters sequentially decide on how to distribute money between them and five recipients. The recipients can reward or punish each voter, which we use as measures of responsibility attribution. In the aggregate, we find that responsibility is attributed mostly according to the voters’ choices and the pivotality of the decision, but not for being the initial voter. On the individual level, we find substantial heterogeneity with three overall patterns: Little to no responsibility attribution, pivotality-driven, and focus on choices. These patterns are similar when praising voters for good outcomes and blaming voters for bad outcomes.

A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners’ dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative subjects and subjects with optimistic beliefs about others often vote in favor of the institution. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are identified as the most important barriers. Unresolved cooperation problems, like global climate change, are often characterized by these barriers. The experimental results also show that cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.

We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts “gains from trade” inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete information in the efficiency achieved by this new mechanism and by unconstrained negotiation. We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both bargaining parties are common knowledge. Instead, the newly proposed mechanism does best in a situation with incomplete information. The sources of inefficiencies in each of the two cases arise from the different strategic use of the available information.

Despite their numerous advantages, exit polls are not a common tool in the study of Canadian electoral behaviour. In this methodological note, we use data from two pilot projects to test small-scale exit polls’ accuracy when estimating party support. We mobilize exit-polling data collected in the 2018 Quebec provincial election (four voting locations) and the 2019 federal election in Quebec (two voting locations). We focus on chance error and bias error in small samples. Results obtained using parametric linear models suggest that small sample exit polls achieve relatively precise estimations. We do find, however, that right-of-the-centre parties’ vote share tends to be underestimated. These findings shed light on the strengths and shortcomings of small-scale exit polls in Canada.