Chapter 5 examines Ottoman ideological reactions to Sudanese Mahdism, discussing how the movement differed from other Mahdi proclamations that the Ottomans only saw as uprisings and responded to them merely as political challenges. I argue that the printing press, which fell into the hands of Mahdists who looted it from the Ottoman–Egyptian government in Khartoum, saved the Mahdi rebellion from just being an uprising and allowed it to survive through the ideas of the self-proclaimed Mahdi after his death. The letters, sermons and creeds of the Mahdi were printed and disseminated quickly to distant lands. Also, the Ottoman ideological reaction was voiced through the printing press in the form of pamphlets declaring the illegitimacy of the Mahdi’s claims. Regarding the globalization of the Mahdi movement, I examine telegraphed reports that spread Mahdist ideas as far abroad as America and India. Also, I claim that the telegraph made it possible for Ottoman rulers to learn about Mahdi claims in every corner of the empire, and they were recorded in the capital city. This created an “age of the Mahdis”, which is a reference to the numerous Mahdi proclamations in this period.

Chapter 3 provides a comparison to show the differences between the new era and the previous period. This chapter discusses the centre–periphery relationship through Wahhabism in what I call “the age of caravans and manuscripts”. Accordingly, I constructed this chapter around three stories: the story of a person, a pamphlet and a land. The first is about a scholar from Istanbul who was sent to speak with the Wahhabis in 1803. It shows just how far away the capital city was from their location, as the journey to Mecca took about six months. The second is about a pamphlet that was penned by Ottoman ulema who had once served in the Hejaz. It demonstrates that one pamphlet could have provided more than enough information about the Wahhabi movement even during the peak of the rebellion. The third is about the Hejaz, and it shows how Wahhabism was perceived as an illegitimate faction by examining news about the Hejaz occupation as a key point. Through the detailed examples in these three stories, I argue that the Ottomans saw Wahhabism as a local problem before the age of steam and print, as the centre and periphery were very far from each other.

This chapter delves into the production of scientific knowledge and its practice within the expansive temporal and geographical scope of the Ottoman Empire. Organized chronologically into two main sections, the chapter portrays the foundational scientific institutions and conventions while also introducing the textual and material facets of scientific enterprises. Through this focused lens, the chapter traces the enduring and evolving elements of scientific pursuits and their sociopolitical implications from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries.

In this chapter, the debates over secularism, laicism, and secularization are presented. The oppositional ideas of an “official” and an “unofficial” religion, which date back to the Ottoman Empire, are pointed out in relationship to Turkish secularism (laiklik). In its assertive nature, the latter is not a static concept; it evolved from a state “mission” associated with modernization and westernization of society to an “instrument” by which the state could make use of religion as cement to promote national unity. Within this changing environment, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a state institution charged with religious affairs, evolved as well. In the last forty years, its bureaucratic structure of an agency in charge of the management of mosques and the employment of religious officers has been reshaped as the bearer of a modern interpretation of Islam. The chapter provides a concluding section devoted to the crucial role that the Diyanet has played over the past decade.

This chapter critically evaluates explanations that identify Western colonization/exploitation of Islam as the key factor for underdevelopment. It then explores the roles of the ulema’s anti-progressive ideas and political authoritarianism in contributing to socioeconomic underdevelopment in Muslim countries. The chapter uses the term “vicious circle” to highlight the interactivity of these problems. Next, the chapter examines the role of history and institutions. It stresses that exclusionary institutions in the Muslim world have been produced by authoritarian rulers, who hold political power, and the ulema, who provide the ideological legitimation. The chapter concludes with an explanation of why it is necessary to analyze the history of Muslim societies and polities in order to assess their contemporary problems, linking Part I of the book to Part II.

The Conclusion summarizes the book’s arguments about Muslim and Western countries’ comparative conditions of development and their historical origins. It emphasizes that these countries are similar, at least comparable. It reiterates that neither Islam nor Western colonialism can simply explain the problems of violence, authoritarianism, or socioeconomic underdevelopment in Muslim countries. Thus, both essentialist and post-colonial explanations are unsatisfactory. Instead, the ulema–state alliance, which emerged in the eleventh century and marginalized intellectual and bourgeois classes, has been the main reason for Muslims’ long-lasting problems. At the end, the book recommends that Muslims pursue a political and socioeconomic reform to revive the intellectual and economic dynamism they had in early Islamic history. For such a reform to take place, Muslims need creative intellectuals and an independent bourgeoisie, who can balance the power of the ulema and state authorities.

This chapter analyzes the problem of violence in many Muslim countries. It emphasizes that there is no Muslim exceptionalism; violence has occurred in all parts of the world. The frequent Muslim terrorist activities are a relatively recent trend that began in the 1980s. This trend is related to the worldwide decline of socialism and the rise of religious political movements. The chapter critically analyzes the explanations that point to either Islam or Western colonialism as the root cause of violence in several Muslim countries. The chapter examines the roles of Jihadi-Salafism and the ulema in Muslim countries’ problems with violence. It emphasizes that military conflicts and terrorism have multiple causes, including socioeconomic and political conditions, especially in authoritarian states.

This chapter analyzes the problem of violence in many Muslim countries. It emphasizes that there is no Muslim exceptionalism; violence has occurred in all parts of the world. The frequent Muslim terrorist activities are a relatively recent trend that began in the 1980s. This trend is related to the worldwide decline of socialism and the rise of religious political movements. The chapter critically analyzes the explanations that point to either Islam or Western colonialism as the root cause of violence in several Muslim countries. The chapter examines the roles of Jihadi-Salafism and the ulema in Muslim countries’ problems with violence. It emphasizes that military conflicts and terrorism have multiple causes, including socioeconomic and political conditions, especially in authoritarian states.

This chapter analyzes how and why the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires were militarily powerful but economically uncompetitive and intellectually stagnant. It emphasizes that out of the three technologies Western Europeans used effectively – the printing press, nautical compass, and gunpowder – these three Muslim empires employed only gunpowder effectively. The chapter explains this situation by the dominance of the military and religious classes and the marginalization of the intellectual and bourgeois classes in the Muslim world. In Western Europe, by contrast, the intellectual and bourgeois classes were influential; they played crucial roles in overlapping processes of the Renaissance, the printing revolution, the Protestant Reformation, geographical discoveries, and the scientific revolution, which led to the “rise of Western Europe.” The chapter critically evaluates alternative explanations to both the decline of the Muslim world and the rise of Western Europe.

The chapter begins with a critical analysis of Western colonialism and occupations as contributing factors for authoritarianism. It then critically examines the arguments about the influence of Islam, particularly in relation to the issues of patriarchy and secularism, in sustaining authoritarianism. Next, it elaborates the role of the ulema, in terms of their alliances with authoritarian rulers and their promulgation of authoritarian ideas regarding gender relations, public order, and Muslims’ relations with non-Muslims. It also explains the impact of rentierism (particularly oil rents) in fostering authoritarianism in the Muslim world. Finally, the chapter explicates how the connections between rentierism and authoritarianism in Muslim countries are effects of not only rich oil reserves but also economic underdevelopment in these countries.

The Introduction summarizes the book's main research questions and arguments. It asks why forty-nine Muslim-majority countries have higher levels of violence, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment, in comparison to world averages. It criticizes the explanations that point to Islam or Western colonialism as the root cause. Instead, it argues that the ulema–state alliance, which emerged in the eleventh century, has been the main reason for Muslims' enduring problems. The ulema–state alliance marginalized the intellectual and bourgeois classes. This alliance also eliminated a certain level of separation between religious and political authorities, as well as intellectual and economic dynamism, which existed in the Muslim world before the eleventh century.

Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, Muslims experienced multiple crises. The Crusaders and the Mongols destroyed the urban infrastructure and the public order across a vast Muslim geography. On the one hand, the fall of most Muslim states, except the Ayyubids and then Mamluks in Egypt, and Berber dynasties in Morocco/Andalus, weakened the ulema–state alliance. On the other hand, the perils of the Crusades and the Mongol invasions led many Muslims to seek safety from the ulema–state alliance. In general, both the Crusader and the Mongol invasions led to a deterioration of mercantile and scholarly activities in many Muslim cities. Muslim countries still produced such remarkable scholars as Ibn Rushd and Ibn Khaldun. Another scholar, Ibn Taymiyya, wrote on the theory of the ulema–state alliance. Meanwhile Western Europe was protected from destructive invasions after the halt of the Mongol invasion in Eastern Europe. In this context, Western Europe witnessed socioeconomic and political transformations. This chapter first analyzes the Muslim world and then explores these Western European transformations.

This chapter begins by examining Muslims’ military, commercial, and intellectual achievements between the seventh and eleventh centuries. At that time, most of Islamic scholars (ulema) were funded by commerce, while only a few of them served the state. The merchants flourished as an influential class. The chapter goes on to analyze the beginning of the intellectual and economic stagnation in Muslim lands in the eleventh century. It explains how, gradually, the ulema became a state-servant class and the military state came to dominate the economy. The alliance between the ulema and the military state diminished the influence of philosophers and merchants. This changing distribution of authority led to the long-term stagnation, if not the decline, of Muslim intellectual and economic life. This gradual process began in the eleventh century and continued for centuries, as subsequent chapters elaborate.