Higher-order uncertainty is uncertainty about what one’s evidence supports. In many cases, a rational reaction to such uncertainty is to engage in inquiring activities like double-checking or redeliberating, with the aim of securing a firmer grasp of the evidence. An attractive idea is to account for the epistemic impact of higher-order uncertainty in terms of these inquiring activities. However, I argue that zetetic accounts along these lines are, at best, incomplete, because they cannot deal satisfactorily with cases in which higher-order uncertainty persists even if further inquiry is not required (cases at the end of inquiry). In this paper, I put forward a more general account of the impact of higher-order uncertainty. On this view, higher-order uncertainty may defeat propositional justification by undermining one’s access to the relevant evidence. Losing access to some evidence often calls for further inquiry. However, when this further inquiring is ineffective, inadvisable, or merely optional, one may be justified to adopt instead revised attitudes that fit one’s limited access to the evidence. This proposal accounts for the impact of higher-order uncertainty at the end of inquiry and offers an appealing explanation of the relations between this type of uncertainty and inquiry.