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States’ current emission policies are far from being aligned with what is needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. Against this backdrop, an increasing number of lawsuits have been filed around the world. As of March 2024, most courts have exercised restraint in imposing substantive limits on the legislator’s discretion in determining emission levels. Judicial restraint commonly rests on two premises: Climate models yield wide uncertainty ranges and choosing emission reduction levels is a normative decision belonging to the political domain. By engaging best available science on climate tipping points, this article examines the reasoning in favour of political discretion through a due diligence and equity lens. The analysis concludes that all factual requirements are met for states to be under an obligation to align their mitigation policies with a global carbon budget which is expected to limit global warming to 1.5°C at a likelihood as high as state capacities allow for.
In the economy as in ecosystems, one tipping point can lead on to another. Creating cascades of change throughout the global economy is perhaps the only imaginable way we could make the transition to zero emissions at the pace required. This should be the focus of climate change diplomacy throughout this decade. If enough of the world joins in, we might just have a chance.
Important parts of the Earth’s climate and environment can change in ways that are self-reinforcing, sudden, and irreversible. The risks of such changes are under-researched, under-reported in what is communicated by scientists to governments, and underestimated. In the most authoritative science assessments, the most important policy question of all – whether the climate will be stable at low degrees of warming – is hardly even raised.
At COP26, countries representing 70 per cent of the global economy agreed to work together to cross the tipping points where clean technologies outcompete the fossils in each greenhouse-gas-emitting sector of the global economy. This could mark the start of a new era for climate change diplomacy. Success will need support from all sides.
Change in the economy, just as in the climate, can be self-reinforcing, sudden, and irreversible. The world’s fastest transitions to renewable energy and electric vehicles are happening in countries where economic tipping points have been crossed in these sectors. By deliberately targeting these thresholds, we can achieve large-scale change much more quickly than we might expect. To find these opportunities, we need to move away from traditional cost–benefit analysis and adopt a very different approach to decision-making.
We need to act five times faster to avoid dangerous climate change. This is an inside story from Simon Sharpe, who has spent ten years at the forefront of climate change policy and diplomacy. In our fight to avoid dangerous climate change, science is pulling its punches, diplomacy is picking the wrong battles, and economics has been fighting for the other side. This provocative and engaging book sets out how we should rethink our strategies and reorganise our efforts in the fields of science, economics, and diplomacy, so that we can act fast enough to stay safe. This edition has been brought up-to-date throughout, and includes a new chapter on how international cooperation on climate change can be reconciled with economic and geopolitical competition. It also includes a response to the question the book has most often provoked: 'How can I help?'
New information and evidence challenge equilibrium models. Fluctuations among livestock in African rangelands and northern fur seals in the Pacific Ocean do not conform to models of competition for resources maintaining populations in equilibrium. Rather than the self-interested competition for resources predicted by the tragedy of the commons, many societies regulate resource use through cooperative arrangements. Evidence from several disciplines undermines the concept of a stable climax association that perpetuates itself indefinitely. Some so-called climax communities depend on disturbances, including natural or anthropogenic burning. Some ecosystems have multiple stable states, and some reach irreversible tipping points, which are becoming more likely because of climate change. Viewing nature as in flux rather than in balance addresses these issues, while the current scale of environmental change infuses a sense of urgency into these discussions.
To tilt the scales in favour of a faster energy transition, significant efforts to decarbonise the economy are required. This means flipping the political and economic systems that are failing to deliver deep decarbonisation and replacing them with ones built on compassion and justice. Through a cascade of regime transitions in the energy sector, mass mobilisation, and support politics, these reforms are achievable.
Civilisational collapse could occur. The cascading risks attached to climate change could happen within decades or half a century, so it is no longer the next generation that will carry the burdens of the climate emergency. Before the dominoes collapse, we must take climate risks seriously and act accordingly. If we act now, climate risks can be minimised, if not avoided.
We assault the living world from every angle, and all at the same time. As we remember this onslaught, we grieve. Reminiscing is a powerful act. In grieving, we consider the state of our natural environment and take the necessary actions to rectify our abuse of the living planet.
Joan Costa-Font, London School of Economics and Political Science,Tony Hockley, London School of Economics and Political Science,Caroline Rudisill, University of South Carolina
This chapter provides an introduction to behavioural health economics. Far from attempting to replace what we know about health economics as a discipline, behavioural health economics aims at complementing its foundations by relaxing some of its core assumptions. This implies taking a more ‘realistic depiction’ of individual motivation even though it makes it more complex work beyond simple mathematical formulation. By incorporating what are otherwise anomalies of rational decision-making (defined as purposeful decision-making), health economics can go the extra mile with this extended toolkit which we define as behavioural health economics. Our agent is constrained by the social norms of its place and suffers from status quo bias and endowment effects that introduce bias into making decision and evaluations. ‘Real individuals’ care about others and have social preferences with regard to other people’s well-being, and often suffer from self-control problems, where impulsivity and emotion translate into suffering from a specific form of short sightedness otherwise known as ‘present bias’). These problems are arguably more prominent in the health domain. Market price is not the only relevant variable guiding behaviour in health and health care, where insurance is the most common form of payment, and tangible monetary incentives are often not made salient to influence behaviour.
U.S. soybean farmers are currently grappling with dicamba herbicide drift. Using a network diffusion framework that accommodates key features of soybean farmer networks, we estimate the damages incurred from dicamba drift across different regions. Under our baseline assumptions, we estimate an average yield loss of 3% and predict sizable levels of forced switching to dicamba-resistant seed in response to drift. The relative importance of drift on damage and seed choice holds across a range of economic and network assumptions. In the absence of policy, this damage may cause regional adoption rates of dicamba-resistant soybean seed to increase.
At COP26, countries representing 70% of the global economy agreed to work together to cross the tipping points where clean technologies outcompete the fossils in each greenhouse gas emitting sector of the global economy. This could mark the start of a new era for climate change diplomacy. Success will need support from all sides.
In the economy as in ecosystems, one tipping point can lead on to another. Creating cascades of change throughout the global economy is perhaps the only imaginable way we could make the transition to zero emissions at the pace required. This should be the focus of climate change diplomacy throughout this decade. If enough of the world joins in, we might just have a chance.
Change in the economy, just as in the climate, can be self-reinforcing, sudden, and irreversible. The world’s fastest transitions to renewable energy and electric vehicles are happening in countries where economic tipping points have been crossed in these sectors. By deliberately targeting these thresholds, we can achieve large-scale change much more quickly than we might expect. To find these opportunities, we need to move away from traditional cost–benefit analysis and adopt a very different approach to decision-making.
Important parts of the Earth’s climate and environment can change in ways that are self-reinforcing, sudden, and irreversible. The risks of such changes are under-researched, under-reported in what is communicated by scientists to governments, and underestimated. In the most authoritative science assessments, the most important policy question of all – whether the climate will be stable at low degrees of warming – is hardly even raised.
We need to act five times faster to avoid dangerous climate change. As Greenland melts, Australia burns, and greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, we think we know who the villains are: oil companies, consumerism, weak political leaders. But what if the real blocks to progress are the ideas and institutions that are supposed to be helping us? Five Times Faster is an inside story from Simon Sharpe, who has spent ten years at the forefront of climate change policy and diplomacy. In our fight to avoid dangerous climate change, science is pulling its punches, diplomacy is picking the wrong battles, and economics has been fighting for the other side. This provocative and engaging book sets out how we should rethink our strategies and reorganise our efforts in the fields of science, economics, and diplomacy, so that we can act fast enough to stay safe.
Chapter 3 lays out in more detail the grave current impacts of global heating, including such extreme weather events as heat waves, droughts, floods, and hurricanes; the alarming projected scenarios if substantial cuts in emissions do not begin soon; and how the methods and assumptions used by many economists have contributed to the failure to cut emissions.
This is our climate change status check, and the first three things to understand are that climate change is real, anthropogenic (i.e., caused by humans), and dangerous. To drive home those points, this chapter relies heavily on the science of the landmark IPCC climate assessments and particularly the most recent AR5 report. We drill down on a key figure from the AR5 to clarify the observed data since 1850 in respect of global average surface temperatures, sea level rise, atmospheric concentrations of several greenhouse gases, and annual CO2 emissions. With a second figure we examine the sources of climate forcing since 1950 and clarify the degree to which they are caused by humanity or by nature. We then divert to key facets that we don’t yet fully understand about climate change, including tipping points, “climate sensitivity” and the likely emissions pathway that humanity will choose over the remainder of the century. We conclude with the observation that irrespective of how these mysteries play out, substantial climate change is in our future. It’s coming.