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Much equitable doctrine concerning contract law is now covered in contract law or property law subjects. Our coverage will therefore be brief. Equitable intervention into contract law takes one of four forms: (a) Equity enforces some promises which are unenforceable at common law. It may also modify or even prevent the enforcement of promises which would otherwise be enforceable at common law. These results are principally achieved by estoppel doctrines. (b) Equity sets aside contracts where the consent of a party to the contract has been impaired or vitiated by factors such as mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence or unconscionability. (c) Equity intervenes in some cases where the contract is substantively unfair; for example, where it contains a penalty clause or a clause authorising forfeiture of property. (d) Equity provides remedies unavailable at common law (or, in the case of rescission, available on restrictive conditions) which: • enforce contracts (for example, specific performance or injunctions); • set aside contracts where consent has been vitiated (rescission); • correct contracts where they do not reflect the mutual intention of the parties (rectification).
With suggestions that settlements reached through mediation lack the ‘legitimacy’ of authoritative judicial decisions, the mediation process has elicited criticism. The referral of commercial disputes to mediation gives rise to the understandable concern that mediation could inhibit the development of commercial law. The benefit of mediation over litigation and arbitration – its private and informal nature – can also create potential risks; given the absence of judicial due process safeguards, opportunities can exist for manipulative and oppressive behaviour. Courts and tribunals play an important role in defining the appropriate limits of the mediation process. The primary controversies relating to the commercial mediation process can be categorised into three groups: substantive fairness, procedural fairness and public interest concerns. Much of the criticism of mediation stems from the fact that many different processes are, regrettably, characterised collectively as ‘mediation’. The judicial system and mediation should be viewed as having a symbiotic relationship, with each contributing different principles to an interconnected and increasingly integrated justice framework.
Chapter 3 takes the conception of autonomy outlined in chapter 2 and explains how it grounds moral evaluation of algorithmic systems. It begins by offering a view of what it takes to respect autonomy and to respect persons in virtue of their autonomy, drawing on a number of different normative moral theories. The argument starts with a description of a K-12 teacher evaluation program from Washington, DC. It then considers several puzzles about the case. Next, the chapter provides an account of respecting autonomy and what that means for individuals’ moral claims. It explains how that account can help us understand the DC case, and we will offer a general account of the moral requirements of algorithmic systems. Specifically, we offer the Reasonable Endorsement Test, according to which an action is morally permissible only if it would be allowed by principles that each person subject to it could reasonably endorse. The chapter applies that test to the Loomis, Houston Schools, and Wagner cases. Finally, the chapter explains why the book does not focus directly on “fairness.”
This chapter explores the themes of procedural and substantive fairness in regulating consumer contracts in ASEAN member states. Most member states have regimes that address conduct by traders that impinges upon consumers’ ability to make free and informed decision about the contracts they enter, with prohibitions on misrepresentation and undue pressure. The treatment of unfair contract terms is less even across the region. Equally, in many circumstances the law that exists ‘on the books’ is not backed up by regulatory oversight. Consumers often lack the recourses to pursue claims of unfair conduct or terms and so an active and responsive regulator is essential to the vitality and effectiveness of the consumer protection regime. Nonetheless, it does not seem overly optimistic to suggest a growing awareness of the relevance of consumer protection in a thriving market economy, including prohibitions on substantive unfairness, or the possibility of a more unified approach consistent with the ASEAN way.
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