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This Element introduces Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism, which provides an account of substances in terms of their 'matter' and 'form', adapting and applying it to the interface between physics and biology. It begins by indicating some reasons for the current revival of hylomorphism and by suggesting a way of classifying the confusing array of hylomorphisms that have arisen. It argues that, in order for composite entities to have irreducible causal powers which make a difference to how nature unfolds, they must have substantial forms which transform their matter such that the powers of their physical parts are grounded in the composite entity as a whole. It suggests how a contemporary form of hylomorphism might contribute to the philosophy of biology by grounding the non-intentional form of teleology that features in the identity conditions of biological systems, affirming a real distinction between living organisms and heaps of matter. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Aristotle is looking for basic entities, whose being is fully determined by their essence and not by other entities which claim priority. Aristotle discusses three sorts of examples: substantial forms, material composites, and categorial properties. Aristotle investigates the unity of definition in Metaphysics Z.I2, and that is the place to look for help with the unity of form in H.6. He explicitly distinguishes genus-differentia combinations from accidental compounds. Metaphysics Z.I2 presents itself as Aristotle's first attempt to explain the unity of definition, and he explicitly denies that a genus is related to its differentia in the way that a particular white man is related to whiteness. Aristotle turns to categorial properties: substantial kinds, qualities, quantities, and other properties. Aristotle's proposal about the manifestation of categorial properties again extends his solution for the unity of form.
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