The assumption that state behaviour is primarily driven by a survival interest remains widespread within international relations (IR), even as many others attract critique. This article problematises that assumption, arguing that the meaning of survival itself, not just states’ means of pursuing it, varies significantly. Common conceptions of state survival reflect a legal definition of sovereign statehood encompassing a permanent population, defined territory, government institutions, and political autonomy. Yet leaders and publics do not uniformly conceive and value these aspects of statehood, which often generate contradictory policy incentives. Expanding on recent works in ontological security studies, this article argues that national narratives produce diverse interpretations of state survival that generate distinct meanings and prioritisations among the core aspects of statehood. Put another way, states’ physical bodies and physical survival – as IR scholars frequently discuss these concepts – are chiefly ideational. These theoretical arguments are illustrated through case studies of Georgia and Kazakhstan, which displayed radically different interpretations of survival and, hence, threat perceptions and security choices during the early 1990s. Accounting for variations within the concept of survival – both across states and within a state over time – can help future research explain a broader range of state behaviour.

Does international law restrict the use of force by states in self-defense even when their survival is threatened? Should it? To answer these questions, I compare international law to domestic law and develop two ideal-types of emergency: in a ‘subject emergency’ law imposes absolute, justiciable limits on self-defense. In a ‘community emergency’ the sovereign, not law, determines what is necessary for the survival of the community and its legal system: sustaining the rule of law justifies its temporary retreat. I show that international law has elements of both ideal-types. It imposes some absolute limits on self-defense. However, international law also retreats, allowing the victim state to determine the (1) aims, (2) ad bellum proportionality, and (3) end of self-defense, as if armed threats triggered community emergencies. These three retreats serve the function of sustaining the rule of international law over the states at war. Retreats (1) and (3) also help sustain the rule of international law over the international community. That international law does and should not treat armed threats against states simply as subject emergencies, shows it can only sustain the rule of international law in an emergency by retreating. This is a negative litmus test for international law's ability to diffuse anarchy in International Relations.