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This chapter frames the debate between those who think that Kant’s philosophy of Right is in some way independent from his moral philosophy and those who do not in two ways. First, the chapter argues that Kant recognizes only two forms of practical reason, namely the pure practical reason of morality and the empirical practical reason of prudential self-love, and that if his philosophy of Right is not to be a version of Hobbesian prudence, it can only be a part of morality – namely, the coercively enforceable part. It argues further that the moral foundation of Kant’s philosophy of Right is the innate right to freedom, itself the correlative of our obligation always to treat humanity as an end and never merely as a means, since humanity is equivalent to the ability of each to set his or her own ends, that is, freedom. In the second part of the chapter, it is argued that the duties of individuals and rulers alike to both institute and maintain the civil condition, namely the state, make sense only as moral and indeed ethical duties, although not duties of virtue to promote self-perfection and the happiness of others.
How did ambitious projects of wetland improvement give rise to a new kind of environmental politics in early modern England? This chapter first asks how such projects reconfigure understandings of when, where, and how environmental change took place in this period. Environmental acts were political, it argues, because they relied on and engendered relationships of power: decision-making institutions, laws, legitimacy, and – above all – negotiation and conflict. It next explores what kind of politics were at work in imagining, implementing, and contesting wetland improvement. In emphasising material and institutional progress, studies of ‘improvement’ and ‘the state’ have often overlooked the contingent processes through which productivity and power were made and disputed on the ground. Mobilising custom as a practice and right, wetland communities played a vital role in the trajectory of improvement. Conflict over improvement exposed the contested nature of political authority in seventeenth-century England and generated material landscapes of flux. Finally, this chapter examines how speech acted and actions spoke to remake wetlands via print, maps, institutions, and environments.
Chapter 2 provides the image of the incentive bargaining of the firm with the state (or government) as the fifth player in the three countries. Section 2.1 compares the industrial policy, which is a typical measure for the state to directly affect the incentives of management, of the three countries. Historically, all three countries have extensively used industrial policy to stimulate industries from a macro perspective and motivate the management of individual firms to take risks. Section 2.2 compares the three different incentive mechanisms of the firm, including the state. The incentive mechanism of the US firms can be expressed as a monitoring image incentive pattern, or the principal-agent model. The incentive mechanism of Japanese firms can be expressed as a bargaining image incentive pattern, or the company community model. The incentive mechanism of Chinese SOEs can be expressed as a party-state model. The incentive mechanism of Chinese POEs can be expressed as an owner management model.
Chapter 1 discusses the main concepts of the book, including diaspora and transnationalism, providing an understanding of the cross-border connections that link people and nations across time and space under modern processes of globalisation, facilitating diasporic political engagement. This is then followed by introducing the conceptual framework of diasporic state-building, which is drawn from three theoretical discussions related to the state, state-building, and civil society literature. The framework captures how diasporas are engaged in this process through an original conceptual and typological framework that operationally captures the two categories associated with building a state: firstly, diasporic mobilisation towards building the apparatus of the state and, secondly, supporting and challenging the state through civil society. This original conceptual approach to state-building captures the plethora of activity that is shaping the evolution of conflict, post-conflict, and post-colonial states. The framework guides the reader as well as demonstrating the multiple domains in which diasporas are influencing state formation under modern processes of globalisation.
This comparative analysis of business systems examines firms and enterprises across three major economies in the world: the US, China and Japan. It asks how the law relates to business practice, economic growth and social development; and how enterprise law maximizes firm value in these three jurisdictions. The divergent legal, social and economic approaches towards the market, firms, and business and corporate law in these three major economies justify a close scrutiny of enterprise law with the aim of better understanding legal and economic models for social and economic development in a comparative context. This book will be of interest to academics and practitioners in law, business, management, public policy, political science, and economics. It offers a useful framework for legislative policy makers across the world - particularly in developing countries.
This chapter analyzes the controversy that arose after the assassination of Henry IV in 1610 between the Jesuits, especially Cardinal Robert Bellarmine and Jacques Davy du Peron, and Louis XIII and his royalist supporters in France. Peron claimed in print that the young Louis XIII was illegitimate becasue the pope had annulled the marriage of Henry IV to Marguerite de Valois.. He further claimed that the popes authority was superior to that of kings. This chapter demonstrates that the language used to denounce Bellarmine and Peron by Gallican supporters of the crown, especially at the Estates General of 1614, underscored the vocabulary of the royal state.
Popular histories of the homosexual movement in the so-called Global North have tended to paint a picture of struggle and emancipation of a sexual minority, from the early activist decades of the twentieth century to the decriminalisation of sodomy, the legalisation of gay marriage, and gay adoption. According to this narrative, LGB history is a history of rights fought for and earnt by a politicised people. Yet, as scholars have noted, many of those victories have not resulted in a break with extant ideologies of citizenship, family, or kinship but instead strengthened them, ensuring the survival and reproduction of the body of the state. This chapter draws from theories of the body politic and immunity to argue that the purported victories of the homosexual movement marked a transformation of the state’s own immunological paradigms from immunity-as-defence to immunity-as-tolerance, offering important lessons to other contemporary identity movements.
This chapter examines political discourse at various meetings of the Estates General between 1561 and 1589. it shows the evolution from an emphasis on the common good (bien public) to the good of the state (bien détat). This new language of the royal state was introduced in the 1576 meeting at Blois, but it became even more widely used in the 1588–1589 meeting of the Estates General, also at Blois.
While pointing to poetry’s diminishing role as a public medium and its increasing absence from major addresses by Australian heads of State, this chapter considers how critical discussions of events that have drawn poetry and the State together often focus on the poet’s politics rather than examining the poetry itself. An example of this is Prime Minister John Howard’s invitation to poet Les Murray to assist in drafting a Preamble to the Australian Constitution. Instead, the chapter focuses on the ideology underpinning the relationship between poetry and the State through three examples from different historical periods. It reads Douglas Stewart’s ‘The Silkworms’ as an allegory for the citizens of a modern, industrialised State in the post-war 1950s. It considers Vicki Viidikas’s ‘Weekend in Bombay’ as engaging with progressive liberalism in the 1980s, and Chloe Wilson‘s ‘Ice’ as articulating the spiritual need and helplessness felt by Australians in light of political and environmental crises and perpetual uncertainty.
This chapter examines the local bailiwick assemblies where deputies for the Third Estate were selected for meetings of the Estates General. The town of Provins and the larger region of Champagne are used here as an extended example of how these assemblies operated and how they expressed themselves in deciding what were the principal issues to present to the crown.
In 2019 and 2022, Indigenous leaders mobilized rural comunas in general strikes that forced the national government of Ecuador to negotiate the terms of newly introduced fiscal and policy measures. These mobilizations came despite long-term demographic decline in these same rural comunas. Further, the ministries charged with granting this authority to comunas today exercise little oversight. Why, then, has the comuna persisted as the preferred form of local organization amid widespread shifts to postagrarian ways of life? We have approached this problem through field research in over a dozen rural comunas, a review of comuna registrations, interviews with comuna leadership, and intergenerational dialogues among comuna members. In practical terms, we find comuna leadership consolidating an agenda focused on infrastructure development in the place of activism for land or the pursuit of agricultural investments. At the same time, it is through rituals of registration and management that local authorities not only find legitimacy but also secure a measure of “cultural autonomy” insofar as comuna members associate the disciplined fulfillment of procedures with the historical expansion of social rights. As the younger generation pursues nonagrarian careers, older comuna members underscore the mutuality of comuna life and lay out a moral purpose and a pathway that in effect centers state procedure as essential for indigenous autonomy.
Chapter 6 looks at how money acts both as an element in the moral concretion of the revolution’s moral project – one that here takes the form also of a ‘moral economy’ – but also a prime catalyst for its deterioration in the face of the pervasive condition of moral-cum-material decline Cubans call necesidad, intimating a sense of destitution that is felt to exert itself as an uncontrollable force. The relation between the revolution and what lies beyond it, then, is seen here through the prism of the duality of money as both a qualitative token of value and quantitative scale for commensuration. The former is central to the way pesos (Cuba’s national currency, issued by the revolutionary state) operate as moral concretions of the revolution, marking out the scope of its moral economy. The latter, however, comes into its own with the use of US dollars and locally issued currencies pegged to it, which have become increasingly pervasive in everyday consumption since the 1990s. In its capacity to commensurate all values quantitatively, the dollar rubs out the distinction between the state’s moral economy and the variously licit and informal realms of transaction that have grown alongside it in Cuba. Crucially, in this way, it tends to trump the revolution’s effort to position itself as transcendental condition of possibility for life, encompassing it with its own transcendental scope.
In a political system based on monarchy it is misleading to equate governance (the active and legitimate exercise of social control) with politics (the public debate surrounding that practice), for the basis of power and authority in late medieval England lay overwhelmingly in the personal rule of the king, and ‘public debate’ over how he did so was very rarely conducted in the open, though, as we shall see, it certainly could – and did – occur. For most of the time, however, there was very little ‘politics’ but an awful lot of ‘governance’. The basis of a king’s right to exercise governance over his subjects lay in the theoretically unimpeachable notion that he had been appointed by God to protect and advance the common interest of the kingdom.
Chapter 5 focuses on the state system of food provision, which continues to supply Cuban families with essential food and other household goods in heavily subsidised prices. State goods operate as concretions of the revolution’s moral project, embodying its frugal ethos metonymically, and taking it deep into people’s homes and ultimately, through ingestion, their bodies. Here too, however, the duplex personhood elaborated earlier comes into play, this time due to the fact that people gain access to these goods only by virtue of their bureaucratic designation as ‘citizens’ of the revolution. While this appears to be a version of the role/person model developed in Chapter 3, it also turns the model on its head since here the role of citizen is associated with what is deemed as the deepest level of people’s existence, namely their ‘basic needs’ as biological organisms. This puts a paradox into the heart of the state rationing system, which can be parsed out morphologically as the constitutive mismatch between a state system that purports to cater to people as whole, flesh-and-blood people, but only actually meets a small part of the needs they feel they have. The chapter builds a model of this part/whole paradox with reference to the ethnography of the system’s operation at neighbourhood level.
This chapter explains how liberal democratic institutions provide a solution to the problem that rulers cannot otherwise credibly commit to forgoing the introduction of regulations that increase state control over church activities. In particular, churches have greater autocratic risk when they have historically invested in activities, such as church schools, that the state has high capacity to regulate. As a result, churches with significant education systems have greater incentive to speak out in support of liberal democratic institutions, although this incentive is mitigated when their schools are fiscally dependent on the government to operate.
This chapter discusses the implications of the book for understanding democracy and democratic activism beyond churches in sub-Saharan Africa. It emphasizes that some churches employ coalitional strategies to advance their interests, and, in such cases, their attitudes toward liberal democracy are contingent on whether doing so will advance or hinder the power of their preferred parties. It also shows that some churches rely on liberal democracy as an institutional guarantee of their interests, suggesting that my argument applies to churches beyond Africa. It concludes by explaining how the theory can be applied to other types of actors in other regions of the world.
This chapter demonstrates that churches have often engaged in activism for liberal democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, and yet existing scholarship provides little guidance in explaining why churches sometimes engage in this type of activism while others do not. It sketches out an argument for why some churches have an interest in liberal democratic institutions because they protect them from rulers unilaterally introducing regulations that reduce their control of key church activities. It argues that church schools have particular risk of regulation by rulers, giving churches that run greater number of schools particular incentives to support liberal democratic institutions. It also argues that this risk is mitigated when churches are highly dependent on the state for financing activities.
The last chapter is the Conclusion. After a brief overview of the book’s key themes, topics, and arguments, the chapter places India in a comparative perspective and asks the following questions. How analogous are political and economic trends in India when compared to similar countries? How do India’s achievements and shortcomings discussed in the book stand up against some other comparable countries?
Chapter 2 discusses how India’s rulers have used state power to promote economic development, both growth and its distribution. While India’s growth record is relatively impressive, it is also the case that this growth has not been accompanied by the creation of well-paying jobs, and economic inequality in India has increased sharply.
Developments in military AI highlight that maintaining state control over military innovation that is driven by private corporate experts is challenging. Even the leading military AI power, the United States, has struggled to meet this challenge, while trying different modes of control over time. What explains these struggles and the shifting modes of state control over private military innovation? Bringing together the ‘competence–control theory’ of indirect governance and research on technology-driven transformations in the making of national security, we propose a novel theory of state control over military innovation. We argue that states face a trade-off between (fostering) the competence of private corporate experts and (enhancing) state control over military innovation. This trade-off is shaped by technological change and geopolitical competition. Depending on the relative strength of these drivers, varying prioritisations of competence or control lead to different hierarchical or non-hierarchical, capacities- or rules-based modes of control. Tracing the evolution of the US national security state and its relations to private corporate experts in the subfield of autonomous weapons systems, we demonstrate that our theoretical argument explains otherwise puzzling intertemporal variation in control modes. Our findings have important policy implications for the institutional design of military innovation.