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The Introduction opens with the Apple tax hearings to illustrate how major multinationals exploit jurisdictional mismatches to avoid taxation and regulation. These cases introduce the concept of jurisdictional arbitrage – strategic exploitation of legal fragmentation across states – and highlight the centrality of the corporate group form known as the CCMCE. These entities operate as unified economic actors but are legally fragmented to minimise liability, taxation, and disclosure. Drawing on empirical data from the CORPLINK project, the chapter shows how jurisdictional arbitrage is not a marginal or exceptional tactic but a systemic strategy at the heart of contemporary capitalism. It critiques prevailing theories in economics, political science, and international business for treating multinational corporations (MNCs) as unitary actors, and instead proposes that power is exercised through legal design and regulatory ambiguity. Arbitrage, in this account, is not a breach of rules, but the strategic use of compliance itself to achieve dominance. By reframing arbitrage as a political and legal technology of power, the chapter calls for a rethinking of how MNCs are analysed – as architects of regulatory gaps rather than mere players in global markets.
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