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This Element reconstructs Kant's puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect (Achtung), which is 'a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different' from all common feelings (4:401n.). The focus is on the systematic position of respect within the framework of Kant's major works and within the faculties of the human mind. The concept of respect is discussed with regard to (i) the transcendental problem of noumenal causation in Kant's first Critique; (ii) the practical problem of moral motivation in Kant's second Critique; (iii) the aesthetic problem of feeling and the dynamic sublime in Kant's third Critique; and (iv) the problem of moral imputability and education in Kant's Religion and Metaphysics of Morals. By considering its self-reflective volitional structure, this Element argues for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true.
What is it to treat people with respect when commenting upon their appearance? What duties does widespread vulnerability to body anxiety impose on us concerning the remarks we make about people’s looks? I provide partial answers to these questions by engaging with three proposals. First, the account of aesthetic exploration developed by Sherri Irvin. Second, the principle of the unmodified body defended by Clare Chambers. Third, the ideal of body reflexivity advocated by Kate Manne. I argue that none of the moral duties these accounts point towards can be justified straightforwardly as a requirement of treating people with equal respect, but the idea that it is disrespectful to treat a person’s appearance as inadequate can be defended when hierarchies of attractiveness translate into differences in perceived moral status. Furthermore, qualified versions of each can be justified by the protection they provide when body shaming is liable to cause debilitating anxiety.
In contemporary discourse hubris is usually adduced as a dangerous state of mind, a form of pride or over-confidence which leads to downfall. This has its origins in the view once conventional among classicists that for ancient Greeks hybris was an arrogant disposition, offending the gods by exceeding mortal limits. This did not accommodate the fact that in many Greek states hybris was the term for a serious criminal offence, usually involving violence or sexual abuse. My Hybris (1992) successfully located the concept within the category of ‘honour’, and it is now widely agreed that hybris involved both arrogance and dishonouring behaviour towards others. Disagreement, however, persists over the balance to be struck between the two. This chapter reviews the debate, partially revises my earlier account (which underplayed the dispositional element) and insists that other-directed behaviour is equally essential to the concept. Using case studies from Sophocles and Herodotus, it concludes by restating the crucial distinction between hybris and related, but not necessarily pejorative, expressions such as pride or ‘thinking big/unmortal’ thoughts.
In a generic sense, to discriminate is to differentiate. Generic discrimination is not wrongful. But many instances of a more specific form of discrimination – differentiating between people because they are members of different socially salient groups (henceforth: group discrimination) – are wrongful. This means that people subjected to group discrimination are often wronged, and this bears importantly on whether such acts are morally impermissible. The three main accounts of what makes group discrimination wrongful appeal to considerations of harm, disrespect, and social relations of inequality, respectively. While each of them can explain the wrongfulness of some paradigmatic instances of wrongful direct discrimination, they explain the wrongfulness of a set of three important non-paradigmatic forms of discrimination – indirect discrimination, implicit bias, and algorithmic discrimination – less well. Overall, the prospects of a monistic account of the wrongfulness of discrimination are bleak.
This chapter tackles the issue of seemingly inconsistent statements by Kant across Groundwork and the second Critique. I show that Kant’s comment in the second Critique concerning the impossibility of proving the absolute necessity of the moral law has to do with a different question than that analysed by Kant in the first part of Groundwork III. Kant is really working with two deductions: the Groundwork deduction concerns the implications of having a will: If you take yourself as having a will, then you must also take yourself as bound by the moral law. I call this the EW deduction. But the problem of the second Critique is a different one. It actually picks up on issues already mentioned in the last part of Groundwork III (“On the Extreme Boundary of all Practical Philosophy”), and concerns insight into the real possibility of having a will (the RP deduction). We have no speculative access to such a possibility, for it would require us to have insight into the ground of both our receptivity and spontaneity. The first deduction, which concerns a hypothetical necessity, succeeds, but the second does not.
The dignity owed to every person should not cease with death.1 The processes by which individuals and societies across cultures and religions care for, honour and mourn their dead provide the necessary closure to families and their communities. When this is disrupted through improper protection and/or disrespectful treatment of the dead, it harms individuals and societies and, in the case of unlawful deaths, it undermines or impedes the victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation. With the increasing complexity of mass fatality incidents, especially as a result of conflict, migration, pandemics and natural disasters (including those caused by climate change), the need to respectfully protect the dead is of growing importance.2
The specific means by which protection of the dead occurs in practice are usually contextually adapted to the beliefs and customs of each community and State. To be universally effective, however, it is recommended that they always be guided by principles of respect, dignity and decency toward the dead and their families. This will ensure the fulfilment of applicable international human rights, humanitarian law and criminal law obligations, and help to ease the pain that families, communities and societies face with the loss of their loved ones.
The authors of this article believe that the time is ripe for the development of a set of guiding principles, framed under international human rights law (IHRL), for the dignified management and protection of the dead, and they propose seven key areas to build such principles upon. In addition to filling a conspicuous gap in human rights protection, these guiding principles will help fulfil States’ duties to respect and protect the rights of families of the deceased under IHRL. While not exhaustive, the authors believe that these guiding principles, which should be read as lex ferenda, develop a framework for stronger IHRL protections of deceased persons.
This article builds on a recent thematic report on the protection of the dead presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2024 by one of the co-authors.3
The core of the Polycrisis, along with the thinking skills and personal development needed to thrive in the Anthropocene are discussed in clear terms, laying the foundation for the next chapter.
In this article, I propose a Kantian framework for moral trust – trust in another person to only act with us in morally permissible ways. First, I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. I argue that trustworthiness embodies a moral imperative, guiding us to act in ways that are reliable and recognizable as conducive to engaging in trusting relations. However, this alone is not enough, as it does not provide a means to assess whether someone is truly committed to the moral law and thus morally trustworthy. Therefore, in the second part, I explore a basis for assessing their moral conduct found in a local version of the Kingdom of Ends: given an ideal or archetype of a morally perfect interpersonal relationship, an archetype of the morally trustworthy agent allows us to comparatively assess the moral disposition of fellow agents.
Kant did not initially intend to write the Critique of Practical Reason, let alone three Critiques. It was primarily the reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that encouraged Kant to develop his moral philosophy in the second Critique. This volume presents both new and first-time English translations of texts written by Kant's predecessors and contemporaries that he read and responded to in the Critique of Practical Reason. It also includes several subsequent reactions to the second Critique. Together, the translations in this volume present the Critique of Practical Reason in its full historical context, offering scholars and students new insight into Kant's moral philosophy. The detailed editorial material appended to each of the eleven chapters helps introduce readers to the life and works of the authors, outlines the texts translated, and points to relevant passages across Kant's works.
Researchers and research organizations acknowledge the importance of paying research participants but often overlook the process of providing participant payments as a locus for improving equity and inclusion in clinical research. In this conceptual paper, we argue that participants’ lived experiences and social context should be recognized and respected when developing these processes.
Methods:
We consider how participant payment processes that require specific payment types, delay the timing of payment, or require sharing sensitive information may impose barriers to equitable research. Building on findings from empirical research of participants’ perspectives on respect in research and a relational ethics framework of person-oriented research ethics, we explore how researchers and research organizations can better demonstrate respect through the research participation payment process.
Results:
We propose five considerations for demonstrating respect when providing payment: (1) practice cultural humility, (2) be mindful of socioeconomic factors, (3) be flexible, (4) be transparent, and (5) maintain open communication. These considerations are intended to address the lack of existing ethical guidance around the process for participant payments and promote more inclusive clinical research. We provide a set of sample questions for research teams to consider how they could modify their payment processes to better demonstrate respect.
Conclusions:
By better demonstrating respect for participants when providing payment, researchers can work toward ensuring that their research procedures are more inclusive, respond to the needs of diverse communities, and result in more equitable relationships with participants.
Numerous reports addressing the care of older people have highlighted deficiencies in th provision of nutrition, hydration, and personal hygiene. Healthcare organisations may inadvertently compromise dignity by prioritising measurable targets and not placing due emphasis on the core work of looking after frail older people who are at risk of having their dignity violated.
The concept of dignity draws on ideas of dignity of merit, moral stature, and Menschenwürde (human dignity) – the dignity that each individual has as an essential component of being a human being. It is argued here that older people, as a group, are particularly worthy of the dignity of merit of wisdom, by virtue of their experience and associated understanding.
A suitable environment is important to promoting dignity; the emphasis is not only on basics like nutrition, hydration, and hygiene but on the delivery of person-centred care that encourages understanding of an older person’s life story.
Dying will come to us all (with even greater certainty than old age), and all older people have a right to respect and dignity when dying. Understanding how someone lived their life, and what was important to that person allows us to co-write the final chapter with preservation of autonomy and maintenance of dignity of personal identity.
August Wilhelm Rehberg (1757–1836) was a civil servant in Hanover, but he also made several important contributions to the philosophical debates of his time. This chapter contains the first English translation of Rehberg’s review of the second Critique, which was highly influential and read by figures such as Reinhold and possibly Fichte as well. In the review, Rehberg doubts that pure reason can be practical. One of the most important statements of the review is Rehberg’s claim that the feeling of respect must be something sensible and, as such, must contain an element of pleasure, despite what Kant says. Kant was aware of the review and is thought to have responded to it in later works such as the third Critique.
Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740–1821) was a well-respected and well-known professor of philosophy at the University of Göttingen, especially during the 1770s and early 1780s. A turning point took place in Feder’s life and career, however, when he edited the infamous Göttingen review of the first Critique, which was originally written by Christian Garve and to which Kant responds in the Prolegomena. This chapter contains a complete translation of Feder’s review of the second Critique, which therefore captures the opinion of one of Kant’s most well-known and infamous critics. Feder discusses a number of topics in the review, including: whether pure reason can be practical without the assistance of feeling and inclination, the nature of good and evil and their relationship to pleasure and displeasure, and the idea that respect for the moral law is respect for ourselves as legislators.
This is a study on the inclusion of Muslims in liberal democracies in the presence of value conflict. We focus on handshaking controversies that appear to pit gender equality against religious freedom. The possible outcomes seem mutually exclusive: either conservative Muslim minorities must conform to the norms of the majority culture, or non-Muslim majorities must acquiesce to the legitimacy of conservative Muslim ideas. Using a trio of experiments to replicate our results, we demonstrate the efficacy of introducing alternative gestures of respect. Presented with a substitute gesture of respect – placing the ‘hand on heart’ – non-Muslim demands for Muslim conformity drop dramatically. The results of the handshaking experiments call out a general lesson. Thanks to the ingenuity and versatility of cultural customs to signal respect, value conflicts can be open to resolution in everyday encounters without minorities or majorities having to forsake their convictions.
This response to Kariyawasam and Rai affirms their critique of the pathologization of trans youth but forecasts a foreseeable negative outcome of their proposed elimination of diagnosis as a prerequisite to gender-affirming care (GAC) — the risk of removing GAC entirely from the medical sphere and compromising the wellbeing of those transgender individuals for whom GAC is deeply affirming. We suggest an ethical framework of GAC that expands past a focus on autonomy to incorporate a principle of respect for persons that affirms the dignity and diversity of trans youth — recognizing the need to facilitate both medical assistance and social change.
Chapter 2 examines criteria that people use when forming perceptions of how they and others have been treated is fair or unfair. One of the important criteria that people use is whether they were given sufficient opportunities to voice their opinions about important issues at stake. It is crucial that voiced opinions are given due consideration. Being treated in a polite and respectful manner by people, and especially people of power, is also among the core criteria for evaluating procedural fairness. Generally being treated in a fair and just manner by competent and professional authorities is also among the important criteria of perceived procedural fairness. Taken together, perceived procedural fairness boils down to feeling to be a full-fledged member of your community and society and, ideally, the entire world.
Words have powerful meaning. They can also be scary for some individual to address or confront. Oftentimes it is just “easier” to ignore or look the other way. This case study explores how inappropriate language and the response, or lack thereof, can say a great deal about the power structure of an environment and the importance of respect.
This chapter points to a dilemma at the heart of the judicial role. How can courts robustly review legislation for compliance with rights without exceeding the limits of the judicial role? And how can they pay respect to the democratically elected branches of government without ceding their obligations to uphold rights? Presenting courts as a form of constitutional ‘quality control’, this chapter argues they solve this dilemma by engaging in calibrated constitutional review. This requires judges to carefully calibrate the grounds and intensity of review depending on a complex analysis of legal and institutional concerns.
This article investigates the hitherto under-examined relations between affirmative action, paternalism, and respect. We provide three main arguments. First, we argue that affirmative action initiatives are typically paternalistic and thus disrespectful towards intended beneficiaries who oppose them. Second, we argue that not introducing affirmative action can be disrespectful towards these potential beneficiaries because such inaction involves a failure to recognize their moral worth adequately. Third, we argue that the paternalistic disrespect involved in affirmative action is alleviated when the potential beneficiaries' preferences against such initiatives are adaptive. We conclude that, although there is a relevant sense in which paternalistic affirmative action is disrespectful, it may be more disrespectful not to pursue such policies.
Chapter 19 opens by asking readers to reflect on prior collaborations, writing down their views on what makes people easy to work with and what makes them hard to work with. The chapter argues for a team-based approach to public engagement, and suggests ways to build effective teams. Also, it’s important to trust our partners at informal learning venues, as they have expertise on the audiences and logistics in these settings. Emphasizing that communication with these partners is still a conversation, the chapter returns to the principles of a successful conversation described in Chapter 3 and unpacks each one with reference to venue partners. A case study exemplifies these points, describing a partnership between university students and faculty and museum professionals. Details are given of negotiation about institutional missions and daily operations through to a demonstration on children’s science practices in a game about vowel sounds. This chapter’s Closing Worksheet asks readers to make a detailed plan for getting their demonstration into a specific place or event.