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Chapter 11 compares incentive bargaining of law-making in the three countries, focusing on corporate law and securities regulations. Section 11.1 describes major lawmakers and law-making procedures by categorizing corporate law and securities regulations into statutory law, case law, and soft law. The distinct characteristic of US corporate law is the existence of competition among states. In Japan, drafters of statutory corporate law and securities regulations are bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Economic, Trade, and Industries (METI), and the Financial Service Agency (FSA). In China, although the National People’s Congress (NPC) is the supreme legislative body, it delegates law-making at several levels to many agencies. Section 11.2 introduces several examples of incentive bargaining in law-making in the three countries. In the United States, legislative lobbying also took place at both the Federal and state levels. In Japan, the incentive bargaining on corporate law-making had taken place almost exclusively in the Committee of Legal Reform. Legislation of corporate law in China includes several steps of procedure and inter-agency incentive bargaining.
Since the beginning of this century, most South American countries have modified their position within society, challenging the self-regulating nature of markets and intervening in social issues. This approach supports the transition toward a “third-generation” model for the social policy field, one in which Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) acquires a relevant role. In the last few years, many public policies have included SSE in their design, with the purpose of addressing the key issues of developing societies: unemployment and poverty. This article analyzes the main regulatory dimensions and conditionings of the national programs that promote SSE in South American countries and aim to enhance social inclusion and employment. Particularly, the article examines the most illustrative social programs implemented at the national level in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela in the last decade.
A growing number of researchers study the laws that regulate the third sector and caution the legal expansion is a global crackdown on civil society. This article asks two questions of a thoroughly researched form of legal repression: restrictions on foreign aid to CSOs. First, do institutional differences affect the adoption of these laws? Second, do laws that appear different in content also have different causes? A two-stage analysis addresses these questions using data from 138 countries from 1993 to 2012. The first analysis studies the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and constitution-level differences regarding international treaties’ status. The study then uses competing risk models to assess whether the factors that predict adoption vary across law types. The study finds that given ICCPR ratification, constitutions that privilege treaties above ordinary legislation create an institutional context that makes adoption less likely. Competing risk models suggest different laws have different risk factors, which implies these laws are more conceptually distinct than equivalent. Incorporating these findings in future work will strengthen the theory, methods, and concepts used to understand the legal approaches that regulate civil society.
The final chapter generalizes the theoretical development from other chapters of this book to states in different regions. Venezuela, similar to Zimbabwe, has also experienced many similar dynamics: hyperinflation, decline of the formal sector, and while at one time having a similar if not better level of development to other countries in its region, has now fallen distinctly behind. However, similar to ZANU-PF and the large diamond production after 2006, the PSUV in Venezuela also had a source of funding to perpetuate its rule after 2012: alluvial gold. Eritrea also has some similarities to Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as they have produced and continued to discover a large amount of resource wealth in a single-party dominant political system. Nonetheless, Eritrea may have avoided some of the extreme pitfalls of Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The rapid increase in Zimbabwean diamond wealth and the resulting “opaque” institutions provide lessons for states with a large amount of resource wealth. This study illustrates that different types of resources offer some commonalities but also distinctly different challenges for the institutional trajectory of states and overall capacity.
This chapter examines attempts by the political opposition to ZANU-PF to modify politics in the diamond sector, particularly during the GNU government from 2009 to 2013. Many studies have focused on the failures of the main opposition, the MDC party, now CCC, to provide an effective alternative to ZANU-PF. Common arguments have been that the party has been undermined by infighting, has often been viewed as being backed by foreign governments, and has had some issues with corruption. This chapter argues that a major reason why the political opposition in Zimbabwe has been unable to make inroads politically is that the diamond sector has been wholly out of its control, even during the GNU government. Thus, this has allowed factions within ZANU-PF to gain the upper hand and has increased an already tilted playing field. Other attempts to provide critical oversight for the diamond sector from NGOs, the Kimberley Process, and foreign governments have also had difficulty. While these groups have shaped some of the policies readily available to factions within ZANU-PF and have sometimes changed their behavior, the diamond sector has remained mainly in ZANU-PF control.
Three decades after the initial five-year deadline for compliance, federal agencies and museums have once more been called to account for their failure to return Ancestors and cultural items to Tribal Nations under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA). In April 2024 more than 70 practitioners collaborated in forums and paper and poster sessions to produce the first ever “Day of NAGPRA” at the 89th Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology in New Orleans. The overwhelming success of this effort is as clear a barometer as any for the current need in the discipline for more conversation, better resources, increased opportunities, and—above all—the chance at a truly collaborative push for a complete return of all Ancestors and their belongings to their communities. In this article, we set up our thematic issue by introducing readers to the various contributions concerning duty of care, education, and policy implementation inspired and informed by the “Day of NAGPRA.”
This chapter examines the relationship between intra-industry trade and trade policy outcomes. Through a cross-national time-series analysis of trade liberalization in developed economies, the chapter shows that industries with higher IIT enjoy lower tariff levels, controlling for leading alternative explanations from the literature. This tests the hypothesis that intra-industry trade is less politically controversial and easier to liberalize than classic, endowments-based trade. However, this chapter also shows that IIT is associated with higher non-tariff measures, a new and significant finding, which is discussed as it pertains to the book's arguments about intra-industry trade’s winners and losers.
Chapter 13 evaluates the challenges of SDG 12: Responsible Consumption and Production, which aims to reduce economies’ material footprints and related waste emissions to support a shift toward more environmentally responsible practices. Global trends in material resource extraction and waste emissions are reviewed, highlighting increasing per capita resource use, rising resource intensity, and escalating waste emissions. Water, land, and air pollution can impose significant economic costs due to their impacts on human health and well-being and degradation of the stock of natural capital, including ecosystems. Policy options for reducing waste emissions are compared and contrasted. Market-based mechanisms, like taxes or tradable permits, offer cost-effectiveness but may not ensure sufficient environmental protection in uncertain conditions. Conversely, regulations enforced by penalties may be necessary for meeting standards, particularly for hazardous waste, although they can introduce uncertainty about producer costs. Other strategies, such as liability for compensation and environmental assurance bonds, aim to encourage waste reduction, reuse, and recycling.
The underlying logics of how welfare states redistribute financial resources to their citizens have been studied intensively. Researchers have focussed on redistribution based on the principles of work, residency or taxpaying. However, family as a redistributive principle in its own right has never systematically been studied neither for a wide range of welfare regulations, nor for welfare benefits and obligations. Hence we do not know in how far the redistributive logics based on other redistributive principles are also found for the redistributive principle of the family. In this paper we address this question, using EUROMOD to analyse the degree of legally stipulated, family-related redistribution for forty-two hypothetical family forms. In our findings, all EU member-states show family-related redistribution in line with the ‘Robin Hood’ logic, with special redistribution to families with several children, single-earner families, and single parents.
Jerry Ellig was a unique character and a great economist. He believed in one thing, using economic analysis to help solve problems. He became an expert at Regulatory Impact Analyses and how they helped governments to choose the best option to do just that, all the while recognizing the problems that government has with necessarily much less information than markets. He believed in holding governments to account for achieving results including periodic lookbacks to see what they were doing. What was great about Jerry is that he had fun doing all of this both on the job and at his beloved Tiki bars.
What does Chinese law have to say about people who are involved in sex work and the places where it occurs? Prostitution control is a universal problem for which states have adopted a variety of policies to address the public order, public health, and commercial challenges that it presents. This chapter describes that range of regulatory possibilities. It then explains the official choices that China has made, through discussions of the policing, health, and taxation rules and institutions that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has adopted to regulate prostitution.
The past five years have seen a dramatic increase in scholars working to supplement or challenge accounts of structural injustice. Almost without exception, scholars in this area assume that the move from personal responsibility to political or public responsibility will represent a net gain in justice, at least in modern liberal regimes. In this essay, I challenge this assumption and introduce the concept of “structural hobbling” as a parallel cause of injustice, but one whose origins derive from neutral state activities rather than from intentional bad faith or diffuse private action (as in structural injustice). Using health-care regulations as a lens, I offer two narratives of individuals navigating health-care regulations that demonstrate how seemingly neutral regulatory decisions create regressive hobbling effects. Structural hobbling challenges structural-injustice theorists to take more seriously the complex and often subtle ways in which apparently benevolent state activity can create downstream injustice, while adding complexity to existing narratives around public responsibility and what it demands.
In a new era of regulatory oversight, the US Supreme Court upended traditional Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous Congressional provisions in Loper in June 2024. Federal courts were instructed to make their own assessments of statutory authorities amid an onslaught of public health agency challenges surfacing nationally. Even so, SCOTUS may be eyeing further limits on agency powers despite clear and substantial repercussions for the health of the nation.
Traditionally, corruption is seen as a rational pursuit of profit, focusing on personal gain. However, this view overlooks other influences. This paper focuses on the behavioral aspects of corruption, providing a deeper understanding of its complexities, and addressing the factors overlooked by conventional approaches. Reviewing some of the literature, we highlight how researchers have approached corruption from the perspective of behavioral sciences. Additionally, we examine how the emerging discipline of Behavioral Public Policy (BPP) employs innovative methods to reduce corrupt practices, offering new strategies that transcend traditional perspectives. Our paper innovates by demonstrating how corruption can be reduced by substituting traditional regulations with nonregulatory tools like nudges and sludge audits, or by leveraging digital choice architectures to minimize human-to-human interactions, known corruption enablers. By reducing regulations and administrative red tape, and introducing digital frameworks, these tools simplify processes minimizing opportunities for corrupt behavior. In this paper, we aim to infuse corruption research with a behavioral twist, a digital approach, and a deregulatory perspective, offering policymakers an alternative path to foster transparency, accountability and ethical governance. While this approach will not completely eradicate corruption, it strives to show how BPP can reduce its occurrences.
President Biden’s first-day memo “Modernizing Regulatory Review” directs the Office of Management and Budget to “propose procedures that take into account the distributional consequences of regulations… to ensure that regulatory initiatives appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged, vulnerable, or marginalized communities.” This paper makes two contributions. First, it discusses how economic analysis can transparently provide the information needed to make value-judgments about what distributional effects are appropriate and inappropriate. Second, it discusses the distributional consequences of regulations that are either designed to reduce internalities or might have the additional benefit of reducing internalities. Examples include tobacco product regulations, appliance energy efficiency standards, and automobile fuel efficiency standards. In many cases, the regulations will increase the prices or decrease the availability of goods that disadvantaged consumers prefer. This paper discussed how to determine whether restricting their consumption opportunities creates net benefits or net costs for disadvantaged consumers. Inframarginal consumers who do not change their consumption face higher opportunity costs but do not receive any benefits from reduced internalities. Empirical challenges include the need to quantify the fraction of inframarginal consumers and the size of the internalities.
This chapter considers the circumstances when EU law provisions can be invoked in national courts. The doctrine of direct effect enables an EU law provision to be invoked in a national court when it grants entitlements to individual parties in a sufficiently precise way. Directly effective provisions of the EU Treaties and Regulations can be invoked against both the State and private actors. By contrast, directly effective provisions of Directives can only be invoked against the State. The doctrine of indirect effects requires any national law or procedure to be interpreted so far as possible to comply with all EU law. However, this cannot be done if the interpretation would contradict the wording of the national law or aggravate criminal liability. The doctrine of State liability allows individuals to sue the State for damages for breach of an EU law which grants them individual rights in a number of circumstances: if the State has failed to transpose a Directive, it has not complied with an order of the Court of Justice, it has failed to follow settled case law of that court or it breaches a clear provision of EU law.
Gervase of Canterbury gives a detailed account of the fire that ravaged Canterbury Cathedral in the 1170s, after which an excerpt from the fire regulations published in 1212 in London after another major fire in the city is included. Building and repairs are exemplified by documents recording work done at WIndsor Castle and Westminster Abbey, as well as the accounts of payment made for repair to the clock on Westminster Palace, now replaced by Big Ben. Finally a contract is included between a builder and the authorities at St. Paul’s regarding the building of a large merchant’s house in the City of London, with details as to the plan of the house and the sourcing of the materials.
The Great Depression introduced doubts in the minds of many about the virtue of a free market economy. The absence of safety nets, at a time when unemployment had reached 25–30 percent, created major difficulties. The need for redistribution and stabilization was felt by many. The changes in the structure of the economies had facilitated tax collection. The new environment led to welfare states with high and growing progressive taxes, high levels of social spending and growing power by labor unions. For a while harmony between the roles of government and state seemed to grow. Then difficulties would begin to appear and to grow over time and this would set the stage for a counterrevolution in later years. Slow growth and growing inflation starting in the late 1960s and continuing in the 1970s would increase the reaction to the welfare policies and to the great power that labor unions had acquired. There would be increasing calls for a return to a growing role by the free market.
Hard cider is a sector of a maturing craft beverage industry that continues to experience growth in the United States. Cider is also experiencing challenges, however, such as competition from other alcohol markets, changing consumer preferences, the supply chain, and inflationary pressures. National policy changes may help promote more optimal outcomes for this sector, but public support is important to policy formation. This study uses survey data from a best-worst scaling experiment of consumers in four leading cider-producing states (Michigan, Washington, Wisconsin, and Vermont) to understand preferences toward ten broad cider policy initiatives. The results of multinomial logistic modeling reveal that consumers prefer policies mandating ingredients, nutrition facts, and allergen labeling across all ciders. The least preferred policy initiatives include allowing producers to use vintage on labeling and funding regional cider development. These results have important implications for stakeholders across the industry, including the benefits of labeling disclosures in marketing and the need to improve public awareness of barriers to cider industry development.
The effect of individual governmental drug policies and regulations has, in many cases, been the main driving force behind the direction the opioid epidemic has taken in the United States and many countries around the world. Unfortunately these policies have sometimes had dramatically different effects than were initially intended. Changes in policy which allowed for increased availability of opioid medications had the unintended consequence of widespread opioid addiction and overdose deaths. Policies which aimed to crack down on the diversion of these medications from legitimate medical use resulted in the spike in heroin use as those people who were now addicted to opioids had to turn elsewhere. As demand for heroin surged, so too did manufacturing and sales, and as law enforcement targeted illicit heroin trafficking, cartels turned to the more potent and easier to hide synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and carfentanil. It seems that every governmental policy change or new regulation intended to stop the opioid epidemic is met with a creative solution by the people profiting to keep the opioid trade open.