To function as nations, tribes require territorial jurisdiction. That is, tribes must be able to determine the rules governing their lands and apply the rules to all persons on their land. Much of Indian country’s land is held in trust, and trust status is blamed for many of tribes’ economic woes. Trust land should be replaced with tribal property rights regimes. That is, tribes themselves should be free to determine whether they would like to allow private property ownership. In addition to granting tribes greater authority over their land, tribes need jurisdiction over all persons on their land to function as nations. Land status – fee or trust – should be irrelevant to the equation as should Indian status. For example, outside of Indian country, police do not inquire into the citizenship of the parties prior to making an arrest. Though various rationales are offered to justify denying tribes jurisdiction over non-Indians, the reasons do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, tribes’ lack of jurisdiction over non-Indians is indistinguishable from the long-refuted imperial doctrine of extraterritoriality.

Nearly fifty years have passed since the federal government adopted its policy of tribal self-determination, and tribes remain subject to extensive federal regulations. For example, the United States still holds land in trust for tribes. The federal government holds title to trust land, so tribes and Indians cannot engage in activities on trust land without prior federal approval. Obtaining the requisite federal approval can take more than a year. Apart from the bureaucracy, trust land is inalienable, making it difficult to use for collateral. Indian trader laws are another uniquely Indian country regulation. The laws were originally enacted in 1790 on the theory Indians were too incompetent to trade with whites. To this day, the laws forbid “white persons” from trading with an Indian without first obtaining federal permission. The federal regulations extend to virtually all economic activity in Indian country, from natural resource development to Indian gaming.

This chapter examines the relationship between the administrative state and constitutional values and structures with reference to German and American legal and political theory. It recovers from these intertwined traditions three analytical approaches to the administrative state. The first analytical approach understands the administrative state to implement the constitution. The second understands the administrative state to generate new constitutional structures and values. The third understands the administrative state to displace the constitution with patterns and practices of rule that lie outside of the existing governance framework. These frameworks foreground normative analysis of how the administrative state ought to relate to general democratic principles and the specific constitutional rules that institutionalize them. I argue for a differentiated and developmental understanding of the relationship between democracy, constitution, and administration. The concrete administration of democratic values should allow constitutional rules to shift in light of social and historical context. The administrative state should not be strictly limited by, but rather should facilitate critical interrogation of, the constitution’s current instantiation of democratic values. The administrative state can and should hold the constitution open for the introduction and proliferation of new institutional configurations and forms of public life.

Regulation is a pervasive feature of contemporary capitalism. How to ensure, in democratic states, that those to whom regulatory power and functions have has been delegated act in line with constitutional norms and values is a perennial, and much explored, question. This chapter seeks to do two things: first to set out a framework for analysing regulatory systems, and second, to use that framework to explore how constitutional actors seek to regulate, or more specifically to constitutionalise, the regulators they have created. In using a regulatory framework to analyse this element of constitutional systems, it thus proposes to ‘flip’ the usual perspective, and not just look (down) at regulatory systems from a constitutional perspective, but also look (up) at constitutions from a regulatory perspective. This flipped perspective will be used to conceptualise constitutions not from the starting point of established constitutional, legal or political theory but from a particular regulatory theory, that of decentred or polycentric regulation, and to explore the different ways in which ‘regulators are regulated’ through the interplay of the constitutional governance system with the regulatory systems it creates: through the goals and values each seeks to pursue, the techniques, organisations and individuals through which each acts, the particular sets of ideas or cognitive and epistemological frameworks those actors bring, and with a continual need both for, and in constant pursuit of, trust and legitimacy in the eyes of those on whose behalf they purport to govern.

This chapter shows how the police power is justified and limited when it is structured consistent with natural rights. The power to regulate is the power to “make rights regular,” that is, to establish positive law rules that give citizens in practice freedom corresponding fairly to the freedom to which they’re entitled by natural law. Regulations can rely on any of three basic models. Some regulations make rights determinate. Some regulations prevent harm; they institute in public law prohibitions against violating rights, and they supply remedies for violations of the prohibitions. Some regulations secure average reciprocities of advantage. Those regulations reorder positive law rights when doing so seems likely in practice to serve rights-holders’ interests in using their possessions better than existing rights would. Laws that satisfy none of these three models may still be just laws – but they do not constitute just regulations and they need to be justified consistent with some other model of government action. This chapter responds to skeptical critiques of the police power influential in modern US Supreme Court case law and scholarship.

The fragmentation of the European art market after the First World War resulted not only from the war itself but also from deliberate legislative choices. Post-1918 legislation was enacted in a climate of emergency, influenced by the imperative to generate fiscal revenue and protect art. Paris’s decline as an art hub was exacerbated by well-meaning but ill-conceived export and tax regulations, hindering its ability to regain pre-war prominence. Fears of economic and political seizure influenced Weimar policymakers, worsening German isolation. In contrast, Britain opted for minimal postwar intervention. These legislative approaches reflected different economic trajectories as much as they did postwar mentalities. The state’s attempt to protect art, extract profit from it, and avoid economic and cultural expropriation was a symptom of postwar nationalisation. It dealt the final blow to an already weakened European auction system.

Environmental policies and enforcement pose fundamental corruption issues relating to the tensions between economic self-interest and the public good. By directing our attention to the challenges of collective action, they also highlight the importance of state-level institutional and political characteristics – notably, the political clout of industrial and environmental lobby groups. High levels of corruption and low levels of trust both weaken the stringency and enforcement of environmental policies and affect levels of emissions, although as levels of trust in a state increase, the effects of corruption weaken or vanish. Our environmental findings closely parallel those in other chapters having to do with COVID policies – not surprising, as they raise similar questions of policy and compliance – and support our argument that thinking solely in terms of specific acts of rule- or law-breaking is an incomplete understanding of corruption, its causes, and its consequences.

This chapter engages with the misconception that one must control or master emotional experience. Emotions cannot be controlled or contained, and by doing so the individual creates inner disturbance and havoc. The author discusses the processes of channeling emotions in growth-promoting practices. Meditation, mindfulness, and creative expression are discussed to provide readers with a multicultural perspective on emotional management. This chapter also discusses the differences and consequences of adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation habits.

This chapter evaluates anti-money laundering (AML) regulation of crypto-assets in the UK with a focus on the UK implementation of the EU’s 5th Money Laundering Directive. The UK implementation had a broader scope than that required under the Directive; however, there was a lack of specific requirements and guidance on certain potentially higher-risk areas including privacy coins, mixers, and decentralised finance (DeFi). This chapter suggests that specific AML requirements and guidance on these potentially higher risk areas may help ensure the associated risks are effectively mitigated.

In the light of the growing interest in crypto-assets and the quest for their institutionalisation, we examine the role that they can play as investable assets useful in standard portfolio problems when asset returns are predictable. In particular, we study whether a mix of macroeconomic factors and crypto-specific predictors can be combined to produce accurate and economically valuable pooled forecasts. With reference to Bitcoin data, we uncover that crypto returns are predictable out-of-sample. Moreover, when this crypto-asset is made available to a mean-variance optimising investor, it generates large risk-adjusted realised performance gains irrespective of the assumed risk aversion. The results on the predictability of cryptocurrencies are robust to a generalisation to Litecoin and Ripple, although on a shorter 2015–2020 sample. However, results turn mixed and come to depend on the assumed risk aversion, when we investigate the power of forecast combinations to generate economic value from the entire pool of cryptocurrencies.

There has been progress made in the adoption of digital assets by institutional investors. Large institutions including Fidelity, BlackRock, and several investment banks have started providing products and services to satisfy the needs of their clients. Hedge funds and venture capital funds are also investing in digital assets. Global exchanges have introduced investable products based on cryptocurrency derivatives. The number of ways one can invest in digital assets is expected to grow with the introduction of new products. Digital assets are still very new and carry considerable risk. It is prudent of regulators to cautiously approach regulation. At the same time, the markets are looking for clarity from financial regulators. If and when there is more regulatory clarity, the pace of adoption is likely to pick up.

This chapter aims to understand the entrepreneurial perspective on legal innovation. How do those who create legal innovation make the services and products that improve the way law is used? The conversation centres on topics such as passion for innovation, identifying needs for new products and services, dealing with failure, keys to success in the market, innovation networks, regulatory approaches to innovation and innovation in the financial services industry. The chapter also considers aspects of innovation that are particular to legal services. Among them are the creation and availability of legal datasets for the application of artificial intelligence and the transferability of legal innovation to other jurisdictions with different laws.