The chapter reviews the geographic aspects of Madisons system at the local, state, and regional levels. It begins with the crucially important rules that translate citizens votes into seats in Congress. It then describes how the advent of computers made it easier for politicians to evade traditional anti-gerrymandering rules and argues for an alternative, computerized approach that is simultaneously neutral, transparent, and respects the constitutional principle community. The scheme is further described in an Appendix. The chapter then turns to the states role in fostering political consensus within their borders while leaving room for different policy choices on the national scale. It concludes by examining how voters pushed the federal government into expansive missions that undermined the Framers principle of limited government and produced a bloody Civil War. The result was a new uncertainty over just where federal power begins and ends which still exists today.

This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter One, first using a series of multilevel models and a dataset of over one million Russian firms. It finds empirical support that the presence of economic competition from rivals and weak political parties drive the decision to enter politics by affecting the benefits to be derived from holding office, while only those firms with sufficient resources and in poorer regions can cover the substantial costs of running. Businesspeople run for office when the commitment problem of transacting with politicians through other means is exacerbated. I then show the findings also come through using analysis of a survey of 654 Russian firms conducted in 2016. Finally, I draw on qualitative evidence from 70 interviews in three Russian regions (Tomsk, Ryazan, and Perm) to illuminate just how competition and weak parties incentivize businessperson candidacy.

This chapter looks at three types of decisions businesspeople must make once they decide to run for office. First, I take advantage of Russia’s mixed-member electoral system to develop and test hypotheses about when businesspeople run in single-member districts rather than on party lists. Using the same dataset presented in Chapter Two, I find evidence that the autonomy offered by an SMD seat is more highly valued since it provides for uninhibited and open lobbying of firm interests. Next, I investigate how businesspeople approach the issue of party alignment, showing how firm characteristics such as ownership and asset specificity (which require different types of benefits from the state) increase the appeal of aligning with the ruling party. I also show that rivals join opposing political parties in order to push for their own individual interests. At least with regard to businessperson candidates, politics is just another arena for direct competitors to protect their interests against one another. Finally, I investigate why some firms send employees other than their firm directors into public office. A final set of analysis tests this set of hypotheses linking the decision to delegate candidacy to the degree of politician shirking experienced.

This chapter investigates whether businessperson politicians actually govern differently. I argue that given their preferences and managerial expertise, businesspeople in office may adopt policies favorable to the business community and improve government efficiency. To test these claims, I collect data on over 33,000 Russian mayors and legislators and investigate policy outcomes using detailed municipal budgets and over a million procurement contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, the results show that businessperson politicians increase expenditures on roads and transport, while leaving health and education spending untouched. Prioritizing economic over social infrastructure brings immediate benefits to firms, while holding back long-term accumulation of human capital. However, businesspeople do not reduce budget deficits, but rather adopt less competitive methods for selecting contractors, particularly in corruption-ripe construction. In all, businessperson politicians do more to make government run for business, rather than like a business.

The book concludes by reflecting more broadly on the extent and character of the domestic and regional transformation delivered by the four post-liberation regimes since 1986. It outlines the significant and enduring impact that all four have had on the political fabric of East Africa, and the gradual securitisation of regional affairs and fora that their regional engagements have brought about. It also examines the re-calibration of regime structures and aspirations in the aftermath of regional conflict and internal splits and considers the longer-term durability of post-liberation governance in East Africa, and beyond.