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The final chapter of the book summarizes its central argument and expands on the policy implications of the study. The preceding chapters, for example, suggest that perceived weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime could act as a proliferation trigger, pushing states to take that final step toward nuclear pursuit. This raises the stakes for policymakers in maintaining the credibility of the regime, by reassuring allies, committing to punishment of violators, and closing persistent regime loopholes. At the same time, the link between regime membership and latent nuclear capability suggests that confidence in the constraining power of the nonproliferation regime could give us a false sense of security.
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