Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • 8 - ‘On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason’ (Chapter 2 of the Analytic of Practical Reason)

  • Edited by Karl Ameriks
  • Otfried Höffe, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany
  • Book:
    Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy
    Published online:
    13 November 2009
    Print publication:
    27 April 2009, pp 179-197

  • Summary

    In the second chapter of the second Critique, Immanuel Kant explicitly addresses the object of practical reason, the categories through which practical reason determines this object and the faculty of practical judgement mediate between action and the moral law. Kant attempts to determine both whether this claim can be justified and how it can be rendered practically effective. Kant defines the object of practical reason, as distinct from the cognitive object of theoretical reason, as an envisaged consequence of an act of freedom. The categories of good and evil are applied exclusively to 'objects', which are subject to such moral evaluation. Insofar as practical reason is capable of determining the will immediately in relation to what ought to be willed, no specific practical faculty for making judgements is required. The concepts of good and evil first determine an object for the will.