This chapter examines how exchange participants resolve uncertainties in corrupt transactions by focusing on the buying and selling of government positions, a typical form of corruption in China. Drawing on sixty-two in-depth interviews, this chapter suggests that corrupt transactions are highly embedded in strong-tie relationships, the power structure of which is often imbalanced. Exchange participants who are connected through strong ties have a strong incentive to cooperate and exchange favors because the cost of losing “hostages” (e.g., ganqing – deep feelings of emotional attachment – and human capital investment in maintaining exchange relations) and mianzi (“face,” which is used to describe reputation and social esteem) is high and difficult to recover. We also find that favor-seekers, who are often low-power actors, develop power-balancing strategies, such as bribe payments and disclosing compromising information, to win exchange opportunities and lower the risk of exploitation by high-power actors (power-holders who are favor-givers). Given that corrupt intermediaries are commonly brought in when a strong tie between favor-seeker and favor-giver does not exist, this chapter also empirically examines how corrupt exchanges involving intermediaries are governed. We find that face functions as a primary assurance and enforcement mechanism regulating corrupt transactions facilitated by intermediaries.