No existing model of political rhetoric fully captures the complex interplay between the mainstream-populism divide and appealing to emotions like fear and anger. We present a new conceptualization and procedure that defines populism in relation to governmentalism, operationalizes both through communication frames, and allows for the analysis of emotions. We separate governmentalist-populist contestation from contestation between government and opposition, solving a longstanding theoretical and empirical problem. Analyzing one million tweets by politicians and their audiences, we fine-tune and employ supervised machine learning (transformer models) to classify populist and governmentalist communication. We find that populist tweets appeal more to anger and more to fear than governmentalist tweets. While we deploy our approach for tweets about Coronavirus in the UK, the procedure is transferable to other contexts and communication platforms.

Populist presidents often mobilize popular support for their institutional reforms by claiming to promote a democracy that is genuinely responsive to the majority. However, most of the time, they are doing the exact opposite—undermining democracy. Voters, then, should decide whether to support the incumbent’s undemocratic behavior and reforms. In this article, I argue that voters will embrace the gradual subversion of democracy when they approve of the executive’s performance in office, particularly when the populist president is a prominent and influential figure. I test this argument using survey data collected in Mexico under Andrés Manuel López Obrador—an influential populist leader who enjoyed widespread approval and advanced autocratization in the name of democracy. The results indicate, indeed, that López Obrador’s presidential approval not only reinforced the belief that Mexico is a democracy but also increased voters’ support for the president if he decided to disregard the rule of law, curb the opposition’s rights, or cancel the separation of powers. These findings suggest that populist presidents might be able to persuade voters to embrace the subversion of democracy disguised as democratic improvement.

Discussions on populism in Japan have often been overlooked in the comparative politics literature. However, as theoretical and empirical discussions progress, the need for more Japanese contributions to expand observers’ understanding of the global populist phenomenon is evident now more than ever. The sudden rise of Ishimaru Shinji as a populist figure in the 2024 Tokyo gubernatorial election sparked claims that “social media populism” has arrived in Japan. However, although social media certainly played a role in propelling Ishimaru’s popularity during his campaign, limiting considerations of populism to election campaign performances overlooks a greater question: What happens when populists are elected? This article suggests that the Ishimaru phenomenon needs to be contextualized with examples of distinct practices of populist governors. This article argues that, in a neoliberal era of “political reform” (seiji kaikaku) populist political entrepreneurs have introduced “innovations” to governing practices as a way to personalize the executive in pursuit of their policy agendas. Specifically, three governing practices of the populist governors Hashimoto Tōru and Koike Yuriko are identified and considered as a “populist playbook” from which Ishimaru, and future populists, will likely borrow.

This article examines the firm-level roots of anti-system political attitudes, focusing on Jair Bolsonaro’s rise in Brazil. Using Brazil’s RAIS dataset, a comprehensive matched employer–employee longitudinal database, and exclusive data on Aliados apoios, a unique dataset of over 69,000 Bolsonaro supporters, this study provides new insights into the employment trajectories of his base. Paired with an original representative online survey of full-time workers featuring observational and experimental components, the findings show that Bolsonaro supporters faced significant declines in wages and occupational premia relative to similar workers. Experimental evidence reveals that poor job quality, workplace unfairness, and wage inequality information might fuel anti-democratic attitudes. By leveraging distinctive data and methods, this article uncovers how firm-level inequalities shape populist and anti-system sentiments, offering a novel perspective on the political consequences of economic disparity and bringing nuance to economic theories of populism.

How did populist governments handle the COVID-19 pandemic? Did they act as erratic, irrational and unsound – in short: ‘populist’ – as observers expected them to do? Through which social policies did they respond to the hardships caused by the pandemic? And, what does populist governance explain about these governments’ social policies? This article explores these questions through a comparative analysis of a diverse set of six populist governments. We first conceptualize, operationalize and measure populist governance by constructing a novel Populist Governance Index. Second, we describe and measure governments’ welfare policies through a novel Social Policy Response Index. Third, we relate social policy responses to variations in populist governance across countries. Our mixed-method study suggests that populism explains the politics rather than the policies of populist governments. We conclude that this is the case because populism fundamentally defines a mode of governance rather than policy content

Judicial transformation may result either from shifts in institutional context (prompting behavioral adjustment among incumbent judges) or changes in the composition of the bench (particularly through court-packing strategies that introduce new appointees). This article examines the case of the Polish Constitutional Court to evaluate which of these mechanisms better accounts for the controversial transformation of the court since late 2015. Drawing on data from constitutional abstract review decisions spanning 2003 to 2023, we analyze the behavior of distinct cohorts of judges. Our findings reveal a marked alignment with government positions following the October 2015 parliamentary elections, especially among judges appointed by the newly elected ruling party. The evidence suggests that the transformation is driven primarily by changes in judicial composition rather than by behavioral adaptation among pre-existing judges.

Past research on populist supporters’ democratic orientations suggests that populist voters believe in democracy but are dissatisfied with how it is being implemented. However, this research has not adequately grappled with variation in the type of democracy citizens support or the left–right orientations of populists. Using the tenth wave of the European Social Survey (2020–2022), I distinguish between respondents’ feelings about how well their country lives up to the liberal aspects of democracy (including minority rights, media freedom, pluralism, etc.) and the aspects of democracy related to popular sovereignty (rule by the people, referenda, etc.). All populist supporters are disappointed in their countries’ performance relative to popular sovereignty, while only left-populist supporters are disappointed in their countries’ liberal performance.

The study of populism has started to permeate international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). This literature is still characterised by a frequent focus on individual states’ foreign policies, (therefore) dearth of generalisable findings, and lack of integration with existing IR/FPA theory. This means that it struggles to explain recent findings that, in contrast to earlier assumptions that populist governments consistently disrupt international order, some populist governments are quite willing to compromise internationally and may switch between confrontation and compromise vis-à-vis those trappings of international order they perceive as representing a corrupt liberal elite. I suggest that a neoclassical realist model of populist foreign policy can help address both the larger theoretical as well as the particular empirical challenge. It explains the foreign policy of populist governments primarily by the permissiveness and threat level characterising the respective state’s international environment. However, the effect of these systemic constraints is mediated by the degree to which populist politics capture the state. Such capture is dependent on (1) decision-makers’ depth of commitment to populist ideas and their ability to (2) transform state institutions to remove checks on executive power.

How do populist publics visually represent themselves, and how have shifts in visual technologies altered this process? While research on the visual politics of populism has largely focused on ‘top-down’ uses of imagery by populist leaders and parties, less attention has been paid to how ‘the people’ depict themselves from the ‘bottom up’. This article addresses this gap by theorising the concept of the visual self-mediation of ‘the people’ and tracing its evolution across two emblematic episodes in which contested claims to popular sovereignty were visually enacted: the 2002 Venezuelan coup attempt against Hugo Chávez and the 2021 US Capitol riots. Through a structured, diachronic comparison, the article identifies a broader historical shift – from televisual mediation of ‘the people’, dependent on elite controlled platforms, to digitally enabled self-mediation, wherein publics broadcast themselves as ‘the people’ in real time via smartphones and social media. It analyses how populist publics visually presented themselves, as well as the intended and unintended audiences for these visuals. In foregrounding this transformation, the article contributes to ongoing debates in visual politics, media ecologies, and populism by illustrating how digital infrastructures have reconfigured the visibility, performativity, and legitimacy of populist publics in the twenty-first century.

Governments are increasingly targeting academic institutions such as the Central European University in Hungary, Boğaziçi University in Turkey, or CIDE in Mexico. These attacks represent the most visible symptoms of the deterioration of academic freedom. What is the cause of this trend? We argue that populism, being a thin ideology that polarizes the public sphere into virtuous citizens and a corrupt elite while emphasizing the will of the people, has made universities and academics natural targets for leaders who seek to impose a narrative in which only they possess the truth and represent the will of the people. Universities are characterized not only by a pluralism of ideas but also possess an elitist character: these attributes are in direct conflict with the values and vision of populist leaders. To support this argument, we present a global statistical analysis correlating the degree of populism exhibited by executive leaders with the extent of academic freedoms between 2000 and 2021, based on data from the Global Populism Database and V-Dem, and we illustrate our arguments with an in-depth analysis of the case of CIDE in Mexico.