This chapter reflects on a few crucial terms such as locality and exteriority, arguing from the standpoint that the force of African literature lies in its call to interrogate the very idea of the global and local. Commenting briefly on the early works of two African writers, Chinua Achebe and Assia Djebar, it shows how African literature poses questions about the type of world-making that is underway, namely, who are the beneficiaries and losers in the making and remaking of conceptions of “worldliness”? The essay also speculates on conceptual and theoretical flashpoints that emerge from the encounter between notions of African literature and world literature taken as separate entities. In attempting to recharacterize the theoretical assumptions of “worldliness,” it highlights African writing’s inherent universality, its generalized orientation toward the philosophical, as well as the intersections of terms like locality and universality within African literary criticism.

This section offers a review and frequently asked questions regarding ethnography in international business.

In Tusculans 1 Cicero gives a lengthy rebuttal of the thesis that death is an evil. This raises a puzzle: how can such a one-sided presentation aspire to reveal whether it is more plausible that death is or is not an evil? Invoking the Tusculans’ practical aim – the removal of emotional disturbance – does not fully satisfy, since it is unclear how effective persuasion can be if the contrary position does not receive a fair hearing. I show that as main speaker in the book Cicero warns against over-confidence in embracing positions that one wishes to be true; and I argue that as author Cicero portrays the interlocutor of Tusculans 1 as a salutary example of how not to approach the kind of questions about death with which the work engages. We are encouraged to see the interlocutor’s failure as one not of character but of inexperience in philosophical method.

The final book of the Tusculans is intended to bring together the results of the preceding books in two ways. It concludes the argument that virtue is sufficient for happiness, where that is understood as invulnerable tranquillity and peace of mind. The book also fills out its opening praise of philosophy, understood as Academic sceptical method. However, the forceful final coda raises problems of philosophical consistency which, when examined carefully, cannot be reconciled with the book’s initial aims.

In his chapter, Christopher Morash examines the modern myth of Revival, which takes the form of what Roland Barthes calls a new “mythic concept.” A good example of this form of myth is the story Yeats tells of meeting Synge in Paris, a meeting that Morash claims did not necessarily have to take place in order for the story to acquire a mythic function. A more substantial instance of the myth of Revival emerges from Synge’s interest in philosophy and science, particularly the work of Herbert Spencer, which enabled him to create a mythic vision of nature based on the ambivalent relationship between the observer and natural world they observe. Synge’s reading of Spencer ultimately leads him to confront early on a central problem of later modernist writers, that is, the instability of the subject/object relationship and the “ambivalent revival” of the observer’s perspective in aesthetic production.

This chapter covers the multivalent, multidirectional relationship that developed between theatre and philosophy during the modernist era. It begins with the rise of German idealism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its influence on Friedrich Nietzsche’s landmark The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music. From Nietzsche’s own sway over a new generation of dramatists worldwide, the chapters expands to consider other thinkers taken as influences by global theatre-makers as well as leading philosophers and theorists around the world who took explicit interest in the stage. The chapter also explores the tensions inherent in these relationships, including open disavowals of philosophic influence by prominent dramatists and outright criticisms of the entire philosophical project by members of the avant-garde. In both its avowals of influence and disavowals of the same, the interaction between theatre and philosophy in the modernist age proved to be enormously generative for both.

Although numerous books and articles have examined Arnold Schoenberg’s religious thought, fewer have taken a close look at his core philosophical orientation. This chapter explores the composer’s philosophical milieu, musings and influences. Thinkers who began to set new coordinates for the new century sought to abolish the brand of metaphysics that had dominated German philosophy throughout the nineteenth century. While remnants of dialectical metaphysics were still circulating in Schoenberg’s Vienna, the cosmology it presupposed was rapidly fading out of fashion. This chapter traces Schoenberg’s philosophical alignment with the new ‘scientific worldview’ of proto-logical positivist Ernst Mach, his student David Joseph Bach (Schoenberg’s lifelong friend) and Schoenberg’s composition student Robert Neumann, an active member of the Vienna Circle (originally the Verein Ernst Mach).

This chapter examines the theoretical foundations of intellectual property law in the United States, setting the stage for understanding the challenges posed by artificial intelligence. The chapter focuses on utilitarianism as the dominant theoretical framework for US IP law, contrasting it with non-consequentialist theories. It provides a brief overview of the four major IP regimes:

Patent patent and copyright, which are explicitly grounded in the Constitution’s mandate to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"; Trademark, which aims to reduce consumer search costs and ensure fair competition by protecting source identifiers; and Trade secret, which has a more convoluted history but has increasingly focused on promoting innovation and protecting confidential business information. The chapter emphasizes that US IP law prioritizes practical, societal outcomes over moral or philosophical considerations. It sets the stage for subsequent chapters that explore how AI’s emergence challenges these traditional theoretical underpinnings and the practical functioning of each IP regime.

This chapter charts the long history of what Zola dubbed ‘the quarrel of the idealists and the naturalists’. In its wide-ranging account of a shifting literary field in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the chapter shows how naturalism came to be defined by its double-edged relationship to its chief adversary: idealism. It sets out some of the key charges that Zola formulated against idealism, as the means to justify naturalism’s ethical, political, and aesthetic superiority. Then, in looking to Zola’s contemporaries, it examines a strain of literary criticism that sought to trouble the binaries Zola established - notably, by claiming to determine an idealist tendency in the naturalist author’s own writing , albeit ‘à rebours’. The remainder of the chapter describes the so-called idealist reaction that took hold in the late 1880s, forcing Zola to contemplate ways of adapting to the demands of a younger generation.

Moral philosophy can and ought to be a source of moral wisdom. Wisdom is a special kind of understanding, in particular, an ethical understanding of what it is to be a success as a human being, a healthy and fully formed specimen. Such understanding involves both a delicate grasp of the grammar of moral concepts and an appreciation of their import for a human life, including the philosopher’s. Virtue ethics is an important department of moral philosophy, especially for the philosophical goal of becoming wise. It consists in a careful investigation of the concepts of moral virtues (generosity, justice, the sense of duty, and so forth), both in their conceptual contours and in their importance for a human life.

Practical wisdom is caring understanding of the good in the situations of a human life. Our emotions are rational to the extent that we care about the real good and are truthful about the facts. The two main kinds of virtues – the virtues of caring and the enkratic virtues – embody different aspects of practical wisdom. On the one side, in compassion, generosity, justice, and sense of duty, we care about and understand our good in its varieties and aspects. On the other side, we know about and know our practical way around ourselves, our shortcomings and the ways they may be mitigated and repaired by use of courage, patience, perseverance, and self-control. The virtues of caring form a coherent ensemble and overall picture of the good, a practical wisdom by which we see our situations in the perspective of a whole life.

This chapter explores the rap debates of philosophical aesthetics, where early academic discourse on rap was at its most active. Rap aestheticians (led by Richard Shusterman) accentuated rap’s nature as an “art form”. The chapter examines the key issues within this debate, including the aesthetic experience of rap, flow (Mtume ya Salaam), the need for public support (and Herbert Grabes’ criticism of this position), and rap’s affinities with the Harlem Renaissance (Marvin Gladney). Rap’s engagement with other cultural practices, like driving and everyday culture, was discussed very early within philosophical aesthetics. Right from the beginning the debate was very international, with many of the authors coming from the Nordic Countries (Esa Sironen, Stefán Snaevarr, Martti Honkanen). It argues that there is still a lot to learn from aesthetic discussions on rap, and these philosophical debates are an interesting historical phenomenon, which rap scholars should know more about.

The chapter discusses the issue of the evaluation of the validity of international legitimacy. This issue is important because it concerns how true international legitimacy can be distinguished from false international legitimacy, especially in the midst of change. This chapter concentrates on this matter, with its philosophical resonance, by looking into when international legitimacy, established or changing (change of/in an international system and its legitimacy), can really be considered valid or legitimate. Specifically, the following questions are addressed: First, does it make sense to examine the issue of the evaluation of international legitimacy (established or changing)? Second, if indeed it makes sense, what are the criteria that can be used to evaluate the validity of a claim or belief of international legitimacy? Third, what are the relevance and the modalities of application of this normative approach to international legitimacy (established or changing) across various periods and cultures?

This chapter focuses on four aspects of a critical philosophy of international law. First, there is a paradoxical relationship between international law and philosophy, at the same time natural and a bit tense, if not conflictual. Second, the assumptions at the heart of international law are comprised of notions/values and distinctions: universal/particular, hierarchy/equality, inclusion/exclusion, self/other, and public/private. Third, these assumptions and their interactions have three major characteristics: they have a structuring power that plays a crucial role in the determination of issues of legitimacy; the assumptions are presented as true, but this quality of truth is more posited than demonstrated; the assumptions at the core of international law are not only descriptive but also prescriptive. Fourth, all of this has an impact in terms of the legitimacy of international law. The assumptions/distinctions influence the nature, organization, and practice of the building blocks of international law and its sense of legitimacy.