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1 results

  • 3 - Philosophical challenges

  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William M. Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence
    Published online:
    05 July 2014
    Print publication:
    12 June 2014, pp 64-86

  • Summary

    Most contemporary philosophers would accept that the intelligence is provided by the material brains, and thus would be disinclined to challenge the possibility of artificially intelligent devices on the ground of their materiality. The questions and problems about artificial intelligence (AI) that remain can be divided into those that are largely independent of particular approaches to AI, and those that are prompted by more specific ideas about artificially realizable cognitive architectures. The chapter shows that questions about representations and their use play an important role in many challenges to AI. Connectionist devices are characterized by their rule for finding a set of connection weights that will yield patterns on their output units that are appropriate to each pattern on their input units. Dynamical systems theory (DST) views cognition as depending on a continuous interaction of a cognitive agent with its surroundings.