We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 9 concludes the book by highlighting implications that are relevant for academic researchers as well as policymakers. The book’s findings suggest at least three areas for future research. First, a more comprehensive analysis of the sources of perceptions of bias in conflict settings would productively inform scholarship and practice. Second, future work should investigate the conditions under which communal peace aggregates up to the national level. Third, scholars should examine whether governments and their partners succeed in leveraging gains from localized peace enforcement into states with robust institutions. The book also has two important implications for the practice of peacekeeping. First, given the importance of perceptions, policymakers must ensure that peacekeepers remain impartial. International actors perceived by local populations as relatively impartial are much more effective at promoting intergroup cooperation and facilitating the peaceful resolution of communal disputes. Second, given that communal peace in the analysis relies so heavily on the presence of UN peacekeepers, the international community must consider how to design peaceful transitions out of PKOs.
This introductory chapter explains the book’s motivating puzzles and outlines its theoretical and empirical strategies. The book focuses on local-level peacekeeping operations designed explicitly to prevent communal violence. It argues that deploying UN peacekeepers to fragile settings fundamentally changes the structural incentives facing communities in conflict. Scholars typically pinpoint the UN’s success at the negotiating table: peacekeepers help armed group leaders make lasting agreements that stabilize conflict settings from the top down. Yet such negotiations seem unable to prevent communal violence in places as diverse as South Sudan in East Africa, Mali in West Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Central Africa. This book shifts the analytical lens to the local level to investigate the conditions under which peacekeepers successfully build peace from the bottom up. The book’s main argument is that UN peacekeepers succeed when local populations perceive them to be relatively impartial enforcers who are unconnected to the country of deployment, the conflict, and the parties to the dispute. Impartial peacekeepers convince all parties that they will punish those who escalate communal disputes regardless of their identity, which increases communities’ willingness to cooperate without the fear of violence.
Communal disputes over local issues such as land use, cattle herding, and access to scarce resources are a leading cause of conflict across the world. In the coming decades, climate change, forced migration, and violent extremism will exacerbate such disputes in places that are ill equipped to handle them. Local Peace, International Builders examines the conditions under which international interventions mitigate communal violence. The book argues that civilian perceptions of impartiality, driven primarily by the legacies of colonialism, shape interveners' ability to manage local disputes. Drawing on georeferenced data on the deployment of over 100,000 UN peacekeepers to fragile settings in the 21st century as well as a multimethod study of intervention in Mali – where widespread violence is managed by the international community – this book highlights a critical pathway through which interventions can maintain order in the international system. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Chapter 8 draws together the major themes of the analysis and prompts further thinking on decolonial feminist modes of conflict resolution. This chapter concludes that the UN’s attempt to stay relevant through developing mediation expertise is counterproductive, and contends that it should instead adopt a solidaristic approach that foregrounds politics and aims to produce ‘knowledge encounters’ between different worlds. The bulk of the chapter discusses some principles for decolonial feminist approaches to mediation, which include encounters across different ontologies of peace, decolonising expertise, solidarity, and establishing relations of care and accountability.
This article interrogates three claims made in relation to the use of data in relation to peace. That more data, faster data, and impartial data will lead to better policy and practice outcomes. Taken together, this data myth relies on a lack of curiosity about the provenance of data and the infrastructure that produces it and asserts its legitimacy. Our discussion is concerned with issues of power, inclusion, and exclusion, and particularly how knowledge hierarchies attend to the collection and use of data in relation to conflict-affected contexts. We therefore question the axiomatic nature of these data myth claims and argue that the structure and dynamics of peacebuilding actors perpetuate the myth. We advocate a fuller reflection of the data wave that has overtaken us and echo calls for an ethics of numbers. In other words, this article is concerned with the evidence base for evidence-based peacebuilding. Mindful of the policy implications of our concerns, the article puts forward five tenets of good practice in relation to data and the peacebuilding sector. The concluding discussion further considers the policy implications of the data myth in relation to peace, and particularly, the consequences of casting peace and conflict as technical issues that can be “solved” without recourse to human and political factors.
The conclusion of the book summarizes its main arguments and findings and considers their implications for research on forced migration, conflict, and political violence. Beyond strategic displacement, the book illuminates the politics of civilian movements in wartime, which can shape the perceptions of civilians as well as combatants during and after war. To demonstrate this, the chapter provides evidence of a survey experiment from Iraq that shows how displacement decisions during the ISIS conflict influence people's willingness to accept and live alongside others after war. The chapter also discusses the policy implications of the analysis in five areas: displacement early warning, justice and accountability, humanitarian aid, post-conflict peacebuilding, and refugee resettlement and asylum. It also discusses some of the limitations of the analysis in the book and pathways for future research.
This chapter considers five practices, or constellations of practices, that emerge from imitating Jesus: (1) care for the poor and needy, including the contested practice of seeing Christ in the poor; (2) sacramental practices of the Lord’s Supper and baptism; (3) prayer, including lament; (4) forgiveness, reconciliation, and peacemaking; and (5) self-giving or kenōsis. Each practice flows in its own way from the twin imperatives to love God and the neighbor.
Originating from a unique partnership between data scientists (datavaluepeople) and peacebuilders (Build Up), this commentary explores an innovative methodology to overcome key challenges in social media analysis by developing customized text classifiers through a participatory design approach, engaging both peace practitioners and data scientists. It advocates for researchers to focus on developing frameworks that prioritize being usable and participatory in field settings, rather than perfect in simulation. Focusing on a case study investigating the polarization within online Christian communities in the United States, we outline a testing process with a dataset consisting of 8954 tweets and 10,034 Facebook posts to experiment with active learning methodologies aimed at enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of text classification. This commentary demonstrates that the inclusion of domain expertise from peace practitioners significantly refines the design and performance of text classifiers, enabling a deeper comprehension of digital conflicts. This collaborative framework seeks to transition from a data-rich, analysis-poor scenario to one where data-driven insights robustly inform peacebuilding interventions.
International humanitarian law (IHL) provides the normative foundation for efforts to address the issue of missing persons during and after armed conflict. Whilst IHL does not engage with how parties to an armed conflict may go about restoring peace, there has been speculation that resolving the missing issue, by bringing answers to families about the fate and whereabouts of their missing relatives, can potentially play a role in building peace. This article represents an effort to compile existing evidence in academic and practice literature that supports an understanding of how addressing the missing issue relates to peacebuilding. In so doing, the article seeks to lay out a research agenda to understand how addressing the issue of the missing can serve to advance peacebuilding, and proposes avenues for further research.
In an era marked by growing conflicts, prolonged humanitarian needs and less donor funding, collaboration between the humanitarian and peacebuilding sectors is essential for more effective responses. This paper examines the complexities of fostering such collaboration, emphasizing the importance of integrated multisectoral approaches capable of addressing both immediate necessities and long-term peace and development objectives. While recent initiatives such as the humanitarian–development–peace nexus framework and the United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Humanity reflect progress toward integrated approaches, substantial collaborative challenges persist. This paper identifies three key entry points for mutual learning between humanitarian and peace actors. Firstly, it discusses a “peace-responsive” approach to humanitarian activities that proactively contributes to “peace-positive” outcomes. Secondly, it emphasizes the need for the peace sector to learn from humanitarian efforts regarding accountability to affected communities. Thirdly, it underscores the need to understand the normative foundations of each sector and their implications for joint action. Drawing on these insights, the paper offers recommendations for policy-makers and practitioners to help them advance joint approaches to humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts.
Itonde Kakoma is the President and CEO of Interpeace. Prior to Interpeace, he served as the Permanent Representative of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to the African Union and International Organizations (2021–23). Previously, Mr Kakoma served in various leadership capacities on matters of international peace mediation, including as Director for Global Strategy and member of the leadership team at CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation. Additionally, Mr Kakoma was Assistant Director for the Conflict Resolution Programme at the Carter Center, managing a portfolio of the Center's peace initiatives and supporting former president Carter's back-channel diplomatic efforts. He is an experienced facilitator and moderator for high-level peace processes and dialogue fora and has expertise in mediation, negotiation, process design, humanitarian diplomacy and transitional justice.
Kabul fell to the Taliban in August 2021 despite peace talk efforts in late 2020 and early 2021. International pundits had been predicting that Ashraf Ghani’s government might need to share power with a resurgent Taliban, but none had expected such a swift and complete takeover as the Americans readied to leave for good. Two decades of international intervention in Afghanistan were erased. The efficacy and desirability of intervention has been thrown into serious doubt, and with it the prospects for post-conflict state-building. This chapter introduces the rise, and possible fall, of the post-conflict state-building agenda. It introduces the reader to important concepts, noting the relationships between state-building, peace-building and nation-building, as well as underscoring the role of liberal ideology in shaping post-conflict state-building efforts, asking readers to reflect on what they believe external actors should, or should not, do.
This chapter presents the outlines of a constructivist understanding of world politics. We begin with a discussion of state identity and explore how identity defines and bounds state actions. To illustrate this concept, we address issues central to the study of world politics: change, governance and security. Overall, our goal is to present a textured, layered understanding of the international realm based on a notion taken for granted in much of IR theory, meaning. Constructivism is the newest but perhaps the most dynamic of the main theories of international relations. Unlike liberalism and realism (see Chapters 2 and 3), which have taken their bearings from developments in economic and political theory, constructivism – like Critical Theory (see Chapter 4) – is rooted in insights from social theory (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1967; Giddens 1984) and the philosophy of knowledge (Golinski 2005; Hacking 1999; Searle 1995).
Drawing on their own field studies, the authors examine how state and local actors involved in resource management and peacebuilding activities are implicated in the conflict between farmers and herders in Plateau State, Nigeria, and Central Darfur State, Sudan. The authors show that state officials, traditional chiefs, and security agents intensified the conflict by perpetuating the inequitable distribution of resources needed for the survival of farmers and herders, while promoting a peacebuilding process that empowered some groups and disempowered others. The divisive role state and local actors played accentuated the socio-political grievances underlying the conflict and enervated the peacebuilding process.
Why do religious militants think their actions are right or righteous? What keeps me from acting like them? Why do some religious persons act on their beliefs in charitable, inspiring and deeply humane ways? Is secularism the solution to religious violence, or is it part of the problem? This Element explores the vexed issue of violence done in the name of God, looking at the topic through the lens of peace and conflict studies, religious studies and historical studies. The beliefs of various communities, religious and secular, are explored, looking at how convictions inhibit and enable violence. This Element aims to foster a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the promises and perils of religion so that readers can better respond to a world filled with violence.
Economic development is considered one of the pillars of international peacebuilding. The mandates of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations often contain the promotion of economic growth as a prerequisite for post-conflict recovery and sustainable peace. However, the relationship between peace and economic growth needs re-examination in light of urgent calls for global sustainability and climate action. To do this, I first review the claims and critiques that economic growth is a precondition for peace. I then revisit past peacebuilding cases where the promotion of economic growth has either corresponded with or led to environmental degradation and unequal distribution of resources, contributing to new or renewed forms of violence. Finally, I explore the prospects of post-growth peacebuilding based on recent efforts to make UN peacekeeping operations more attuned to environmental considerations and the changing climate. Post-growth peacebuilding is not just about reducing the environmental footprint of peacekeeping; it is, more importantly, about breaking away from the linear and growth-driven path of peace and development towards intergenerational and ecological justice.
Despite theoretical support for including mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) with peacebuilding, few programmes in conflict-affected regions fully integrate these approaches.
Aims
To describe and assess preliminary outcomes of the Counselling on Wheels programme delivered by the NEEM Foundation in the Borno State of North-East Nigeria.
Method
We first describe the components of the Counselling on Wheels programme, including education and advocacy for peace and social cohesion through community peacebuilding partnerships and activities, and an MHPSS intervention open to all adults, delivered in groups of eight to ten people. We then conducted secondary analysis of data from 1550 adults who took part in the MHPSS intervention, who provided data at baseline and 1–2 weeks after the final group session. Vulnerability to violent extremism was assessed with a locally developed 80-item scale. Symptoms of common mental disorders were assessed with the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Scale (PTSD-8). Data were analysed through a mixed-effect linear regression model, accounting for clustering by community and adjusted for age and gender.
Results
After taking part in group MHPSS, scores fell for depression (−5.8, 95% CI −6.7 to −5.0), stress (−5.5, 95% CI −6.3 to −4.6), post-traumatic stress disorder (−2.9, 95% CI −3.4 to −2.4) and vulnerability to violent extremism (−44.6, 95% CI −50.6 to −38.6).
Conclusions
The Counselling on Wheels programme shows promise as a model for integrating MHPSS with community peacebuilding activities in this conflict-affected region of Africa.
This chapter explores third-party mediation and peacekeeping. Mediation, along with arbitration and adjudication, is a form of peacemaking. Peacekeeping means maintaining durable peace after conflict has ended. The UN is one of several kinds of actors that engage in peacekeeping missions. They leverage the costs belligerents would pay if they return to war, provide information, reduce uncertainty, and provide political cover to facilitate political concessions. Also discussed in the chapter are peacebuilding efforts, including developing the proper political, legal, social and economic infrastructure to stabilize the security environment. Challenges for third parties seeking to engage successfully in peacekeeping and peacemaking include the difficulties they face in providing long-term incentives for peace, the possibility of distorting information flows such that peace is less stable, and being sensitive to local contexts. The chapter applies many of its concepts to a quantitative study of the causes of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse, and a case study of third-party involvement during the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa in the 1990s and 2000s.
While youths in Africa are often portrayed as peace spoilers, this view largely overlooks youths who have not (yet) turned to (post-) conflict violence. In order to deepen our understanding of the risks of conflict recurrence and the ways to prevent these risks from materializing, Kuppens and Langer argue that it is crucial to study the perspectives of non-violent youths in post-conflict countries. Through an essay-based study with secondary school pupils in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire, they show that youths are concerned about issues of security, employment, and reconciliation, and yet, they look generally favorably upon the peace process and their role in it.
The founding father of the laws of armed conflict, Hugo Grotius assumed a ceasefire to be a temporary state of affairs that did not alter the legal state of war. He wrote that if hostilities resumed after a ceasefire is declared, there is no need for a new declaration of war to be made since the legal state of war is ‘not dead but sleeping’. While the official legal state of war may be sleeping’, Grotius’ metaphor perhaps does not imply that nothing happens. Even during sleep, much can and does occur that we are temporarily unaware of. However, ceasefires continue to be largely considered in relation to how to better bring warring parties to the negotiating table, hostilities to a halt and/or their influence on peace processes. The argument advanced in this book is that ceasefires in fact rarely only ‘cease fire’. Consequently, the book offers a more nuanced examination of two core questions: what ceasefires actually are and what areas they affect.