This chapter compares the processes and outcomes of labor politics in post-uprising Tunisia and Morocco. It explores how institutional legacies from authoritarian rule created distinct opportunities for unions to exert influence over transitional governments and shaped their ability to secure meaningful political and economic reforms. The analysis underscores how historical legacies influence unions’ capacity to engage effectively in political transitions. It concludes by considering how institutional legacies might change.

This chapter analyzes shifts in labor behavior in the context of institutional change. Focusing on the period of structural adjustment (1986–1997), it examines how austerity measures, such as spending cuts and increased labor market flexibility, fractured traditional state–labor alliances in Tunisia and Morocco. The chapter links unions’ responses to these reforms to differences in institutional practices. It argues that Tunisia’s innovations in collective bargaining moderated labor opposition and disrupted alliances between unions and political elites, while Morocco’s institutional stasis, combined with deteriorating economic conditions, generated new incentives for labor unions to mobilize against the regime.

This chapter examines the initial conditions underlying the book’s theory by analyzing authoritarian labor control policies and political developments in Tunisia and Morocco in the postindependence period. It explores how these control strategies shaped unions’ interests, capacities, and perceptions during the early stages of state formation and investigates how relationships between unions and other collective actors influenced the emergence of labor movements. The chapter shows how exclusionary corporatism provided Tunisian unions with organizational resources that strengthened their capacity for opposition, while inclusionary strategies and alliances with political elites weakened labor autonomy in Morocco.

This chapter examines how labor mobilization returned to its earlier patterns of political militancy in Tunisia and business unionism in Morocco by the late 2000s. It situates the post-reform period (2000–2011) as a phase of continued decline for labor unions in both countries. However, the chapter links unions’ divergent reactions to differences in their internal governance structures, a legacy from previous experiences of institutional incorporation and exclusion. It highlights how democratic internal organization fosters labor militancy, while hierarchical structures hinder opposition, even when clear incentives to protest exist. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how labor mobilization advanced democratic transition in Tunisia while reinforcing authoritarianism in Morocco.

This concluding chapter synthesizes the key findings of the study and extends the theoretical framework by testing its predictions in four additional authoritarian regimes — Bahrain, Egypt, pre-apartheid South Africa, and Mexico under the PRI. It argues that the most important factor in sustaining labor militancy is autonomy from political elites and strong connections with the rank-and-file. The chapter reinforces the book’s central claim that labor militancy emerges from authoritarian exclusion and the absence of partisan coalitions to represent labor interests. It concludes by discussing the broader implications of these findings for theories of labor politics, authoritarianism, and institutional change.

This chapter establishes the theoretical foundations of the book by reviewing three major explanatory frameworks for labor protest: structural-economic, organizational, and institutional. Using quantitative data, it compares the structural features of Tunisia’s and Morocco’s economies and the organizational profiles of their labor unions. After finding existing explanations wanting, the chapter advances a integrative historical institutional perspective, underscoring the importance of labor incorporation policies, political coalitions, and internal union dynamics in shaping labor’s preferences and capacity for militancy. It argues that authoritarian strategies intended to depoliticize labor can paradoxically empower unions, equipping them with the resources and organizational capacity needed to challenge the state.