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  • Chapter 12 - Two Conceptions of Freedom in Kant’s Political Philosophy

  • from Part V - Law and Morality in Kant’s Political Theory
  • Edited by Martin Brecher, Universität Mannheim, Germany, Philipp-Alexander Hirsch, Max Planck Institute, Freiburg
  • Book:
    Law and Morality in Kant
    Published online:
    16 December 2025
    Print publication:
    22 January 2026, pp 241-261
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  • Summary

    Contrary to conventional wisdom, external freedom is ambiguous in Kant’s Rechtslehre. On the one hand, external freedom can refer to freedom in the external use of choice. On the other, external freedom can refer to the kind of independence encoded in our one innate right. Recognizing the ambiguity allows us not only to see the truth in the various and incompatible ways in which commentators have understood external freedom, but also to see more clearly external freedom’s relationship to autonomy (or internal freedom). In turn, better understanding the relationship between internal and external freedom sheds light on the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy, which are often (and wrongly) assumed to be discontinuous.