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In this chapter, I contrast the account of fictionality presented in the previous chapter with Walton’s, whose work was decisive in shaping it. In recent work, he gives up his account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples that allegedly show that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. Both in support and in further elaboration of the constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton’s account that was presented in the previous chapter, I critically discuss his objections here. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, this chapter provides additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à-vis both Walton’s account and Gricean speech-act proposals.
This introductory chapter sets out the book’s key findings, methodology and structure. It also introduces the principal questions the book seeks to address. How have agents, operating at national, international and transnational levels, attempted to institutionalise the norm of corporate accountability for human rights violations linked to transnational corporate activity? What do these initiatives reveal about the nature of transnational legalisation, and how legalisation should be framed or conceptualised in the twenty-first century? Finally, could a revised framework of legalisation help explain when transnational litigation and soft law initiatives are more likely to succeed in the future?
This is a book focusing on a comparative analysis of business systems primarily involving and surrounding the firms/enterprises across three leading economies in the world, that is, the United States, China, and Japan. The book will discuss one basic question: how does law matter to business practice, together with the markets and social norms of each jurisdiction? The book’s framework is as follows: the firm acts as a forum for incentive bargaining among four major participants: management and employees as human capital providers, creditors, and shareholders as monetary capital providers. Each participant will bargain with each other to maximize its own payoff based on exogenous factors: the situation of various markets (products, labor, intellectual property rights, and capital), social norms (e.g., shareholder value maximization model and stakeholder model), and enterprise law. This book will include the government as the fifth player of this game in the sense that the government provides indispensable resources (physical, social, and legal infrastructures) to the firm, shares the pie via tax revenue, and bargains with the other four players.
Chapter 8 departs slightly from the focus on translation activity by shining a light on the translator, in an effort to highlight their role in the translation process itself, often minimized for the benefit of the text. The chapter serves as a reminder that the translator also has an impact on the text. It addresses what is meant by the translator’s (in)visibility and how practicing or aspiring translators can incorporate this notion into their practice and knowledge base. Also addressed are related topics such as norms, codes of ethics, agency, positionality and ideology. Additionally, the chapter helps inform aspiring translators and those who work with translators about the role and professional expectations for translators, including their role as agents of social justice, the translator’s workplace, recent changes in the field, translator profiles, and the qualifications and skills needed to work as a translator. This chapter guides readers to an understanding of the translator’s possible role/s and assists them with the creation of their own professional identity.
United Nations peacekeeping is drifting from its post–Cold War liberal model toward a more sovereignty-focused approach. This essay posits that the change is not formal or doctrinal, but instead emerges through institutional drift and norm reinterpretation, driven by accelerated US retrenchment, China and Russia’s growing influence, host-state assertiveness, and internal United Nations adaptation. Drawing on theories of norm dynamics, bureaucratic culture, and empirical studies of peacekeeping mission practice, the analysis shows how liberal principles, such as democratization and human rights, are increasingly sidelined in favor of conflict containment and host-state support. The essay concludes by outlining four potential futures for peacekeeping: gradual drift into stabilization, normative fragmentation and regionalization, niche reaffirmation of liberalism, and formal norm redefinition. Together, these scenarios suggest peacekeeping is entering a postliberal era, marked not by collapse, but by contested adaptation within a shifting world order.
The two crises in this chapter share three main characteristics. They involve territorial (border) conflict that relates to the independence of Ukraine (or, relatedly, the breakup of the Soviet Union), feature an East–West tension, and (as of this writing) do not escalate to a war among the major states. In 2014, after Ukraine attempted to move closer to Europe (i.e., it contemplated an EU agreement and the pro-Russian government fell), Putin annexed Crimea to secure the long-held naval base there. Although done forcefully, there were no military fatalities. In 2022, amidst a fear that Ukraine was again moving closer to Europe (i.e., it looked to be closer to joining NATO and its government became less pro-Russian), Russia invaded Ukraine. It failed to take Kyiv, even though it heavily bombed Ukraine. Russia then withdrew to the east, where a majority of Russian speakers had sought to separate from Ukraine. The United States and the European Union gave weapons and aid that expanded as the war continued. Deaths mounted on both sides. The Russians successfully created a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea. After his election, Trump attempted to negotiate a settlement that would end the war.
This chapter summarizes the main lessons for diplomacy that we derive from our study. These eight lessons are: 1. A major factor separates the crises that escalate to war from those that do not; in the latter, a strong leader reins in any hard-liners who advocate going to war. 2. Individuals make a difference. 3. Contingency plays a more important role than system structure in determining whether or not a crisis escalates to war. 4. Someone must stand for peace. 5. The secret to preventing war structurally is to find a functional equivalent to war. 6. Norms and rules are important for avoiding war – and, therefore, maintaining peace. 7. War can be avoided; it is not inevitable. 8. The realist concepts of the national interest and balance of power do not always accurately describe the behavior of states.
The Munich conference notoriously symbolizes appeasement and its failure. The issue under dispute concerns territory – specifically, the Sudetenland. This territorial dispute was initially internal to Czechoslovakia, a disagreement between the Sudetenland Germans and the central government of Czechoslovakia. Eventually, however, the nationalistic element to the dispute brought in the German government. The major powers avoided war because the French and British prime ministers – Daladier and Chamberlain, respectively – forced the Czechoslovakian president, Benes, to accept the peaceful transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, based on the norm of nationalism (or self-determination). As this case shows, when actors widely agree on the norms through which territory can change hands, the probability of war declines. Nevertheless, this peace was short-lived. Indeed, the afterword to the chapter describes how Hitler invaded Prague shortly thereafter. The Danzig–Poland crises then followed. By that point, Britain and France had abandoned appeasement and shifted to balancing against Hitler; they allied with Poland and gave Hitler an ultimatum to try to stop his invasion. This conventional deterrence failed, and the Second World War began in Europe.
Italian unification ultimately emerges through four wars. This chapter covers the second of these wars (1859–1860). Austria holds sovereignty over territory in northern Italy. Cavour, the prime minister of Piedmont, learns from the first war (1848) that Piedmont cannot defeat Austria – and therefore wrest Italian lands from it – without a powerful ally. He secures an alliance with Napoleon III of France, and at a secret meeting in Plombières, Piedmont and France plot a war. The Italian nationalists argue that the “people” of a nation have a legitimate right to self-rule. The Concert plays no role in this crisis because it does not see the norm of nationalism as a legitimate justification for owning territory. In its view, the norm of dynastic succession (i.e., a king or queen coming to the throne) serves that purpose. The Concert system is therefore biased against the nationalists. The resulting clash of norms increases the probability of war. Nevertheless, territorial issues are generally more war-prone than non-territorial issues, and infusing territorial disagreements with nationalism and identity (or ethnic) claims raises the probability of war further. In the end, the case illustrates well why and how territorial issues lead to war.
Neither the First nor the Second Moroccan Crisis escalates to a war between the major states. In the First Moroccan Crisis, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not believe it was worth fighting a war over Morocco. In the Second Moroccan Crisis, the actors had recourse to the norm of compensation, which provided a focal point and procedure that guided the negotiations. It ultimately made a bargain possible and facilitated a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Nevertheless, despite the use of the norm of compensation and accommodationists at the highest levels of German decision-making, the case shows that coercive bargaining could have led to war.
This study sheds light on the diffusion of knowledge production as an institutional norm among central, development, and investment banks. It builds on an original database of 24,435 peer-reviewed scientific items published by a pool of 237 central banks, development banks, and investment banks from 1966 to 2023. The focus is on their interactive dynamics, analysed through a two-fold approach: Granger-Causality analysis for linear relationships and a multivariate Markov chain approach for non-linear interactions. Central banks emerge as leaders in scientific production, influencing development and investment banks. Results lead to further questions about inter-institutional agenda-setting, such as how central banks shape research priorities, the extent to which their intellectual leadership impacts others’ priorities, and the mechanisms through which institutional norms are diffused and reinforced within the global financial and policymaking landscape.
Constructivism emphasizes the role of ideas, identities, and norms in shaping state behavior and international politics, as well as the intersubjective and relational nature of these ideational factors. Social relations “make or construct people – ourselves – into the kinds of beings that we are. Conversely, we make the world what it is, by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other” (Onuf, 1998, 59). Constructivism therefore highlights the intangible yet relational aspects of our reality: a world in which the meaning of objects and actions is not fixed but socially constructed through our interactions; states are held together by collective belief and actively participate in the social construction of anarchy. Norms play a significant role by defining appropriate behavior and enabling action by providing a framework for actors to understand and interact with the world.
To what extent should workers in physically demanding jobs be given the possibility of earlier retirement? This is one of the many pressing pension reform issues that ageing societies face. This article examines the extent to which such special treatment is supported by the general public. We uniquely combine a representative survey (2,136 respondents) with a vignette study to explore what respondents in the Netherlands consider a fair public pension age for 29 jobs that differ by level of physical demand. We also examine whether these pension ages are associated with other attributes that are important in an ageing society, such as the presence of chronic health conditions and informal care-giving responsibilities – such attributes may affect support for the special provisions for workers in physically demanding jobs – and control for stereotypical views about older workers. The findings reveal notable differences in public pension ages, indicating that workers in highly physically demanding jobs should be given the opportunity to retire earlier and those working in physically ‘light’ jobs should work slightly beyond the standard public pension age. We compare these differences to existing special retirement programmes for physically demanding or arduous jobs. Interestingly, non-work factors – namely, chronic health conditions and care-giving responsibilities – weigh more heavily in deciding a fair or reasonable public pension age. This suggests that organizations and policy makers facing an ageing society will have to deal with a broader set of problems than can be solved by offering early retirement programmes for specific jobs.
Post-Northian institutional economics has been predicated on the socially extended and enactivist concept of cognitive institution. It has recently been suggested that this framework should include North’s definition of institutions as ‘rules of the game’. In this paper, we agree with this normative turn but take issue with the mental-model framework in which it is proposed. Retaining both shared mental models and rules of the game remains too ‘Northian’, even if complemented with enactivist dynamic principles of mental-model change. We propose an alternative enactivist concept of norm that entirely avoids mental models. We base it on an alternative social ontology that considers norms as located in the relation between agents and institutions. The implications of this relational ontology for the norms (or principles) of rationality are also discussed. We argue that a truly relational framework requires abandoning the adaptationist norm of rationality in favour of coordinative rationality principles.
This chapter explores the dynamics of non-linear changes within social systems, focusing on the processes that lead to societal collapse and ‘emergence’ (when a new social order forms that is qualitatively different from the past). The chapter first reviews the forces that create stability, differentiation, and oscillation. The DIME model is introduced, which explores how activists choose tactics to follow up the success or failure of their collective action. The chapter explores dynamics of intergroup contestation, including polarisation and backlash that drive systems towards either emergence or collapse. System stability is supported through coordinated identities and norm sequences that are often localised spatially, which act as homeostatic mechanisms to create resilient systems. However, behavioural changes manifest as actors establishing new cues and framing collective actions in ways that channel energy towards new identities and norms. Finally, the chapter explores mutual radicalisation, where mutual feedback loops of failure and threat signals between groups drive radicalisation, reinforcing intergroup tensions.
This chapter introduces the dynamics of ecosystems and chaotic systems, providing an accessible overview for readers unfamiliar with complexity theory. Key concepts such as fractals and emergence are defined and applied to social groups through the FLINT model of Factional Leadership, Intergroup Conflict, Norms, and Time, which explains how factions and subgroups form and ferment within a seemingly unified group. This model examines forces driving subgroup differentiation and the challenges of achieving lasting social change because of the need to influence multiple groups simultaneously and overcome resistance. The chapter revisits psychological research on effective activism, underscoring the importance of addressing both conformity and dissent within and between groups. Finally, we discuss empirical methods for analysing these complex dynamics, including network analyses, person-centred analyses, and agent-based modelling, which offer new ways to understand and study the formation and evolution of groups.
The chapter begins by examining how groups form and socialise members, and the forces of conformity that sustain existing norms. We then consider the emergence of differentiation and innovation, exploring how processes of minority influence and dissent challenge conformity. The chapter then explores the impact of contested norms, particularly in systems of inequality, and considers how these norms are challenged and transformed under more repressive and open regimes. This chapter also explores power, repression, agency and resistance, and how reinterpretations of classical studies by Milgram and Zimbardo are now understood through the lens of social identity theory. The transmission of norms between groups is discussed, alongside the entrepreneurs of identity who mobilise advantaged groups to support disadvantaged groups. This chapter makes a transition from traditional theories of intergroup relations to new paradigms that emphasise the fluidity of norms, the role of emerging leadership, and the transformative potential of identity in group dynamics.
As coal burning was explicitly politicized with reference to coal’s contributions to climate change over the last ten to fifteen years, a number of policy norms associated with phasing out coal burning (or its financing) have emerged and stabilized in transnational politics. This chapter tracks aspects of these normative politics focusing on both the promulgation and diffusion of the new policy norms and a number of critiques and challenges – many grounded in distributional and procedural justice – to coal phaseout norms that emerge as a response to the transnational promulgation of coal phaseout policies.
Misinformation has emerged as a key threat worldwide, with scholars frequently highlighting the role of partisan motivated reasoning in misinformation belief. Yet the mechanisms enabling the endorsement of misinformation may differ in contexts where other identities are salient. This study explores whether religion drives the endorsement of misinformation in India. Using original data, we first show that individuals with high levels of religiosity and religious polarization endorse significantly higher levels of misinformation. Next, to understand the causal mechanisms through which religion operates, we field an experiment where corrections rely on religious messaging, and/or manipulate perceptions of religious ingroup identity. We find that corrections including religious frames (1) reduce the endorsement of misinformation; (2) are sometimes more effective than standard corrections; and (3) work beyond the specific story corrected. These findings highlight the religious roots of belief formation and provide hope that social identities can be marshalled to counter misinformation.
European societies are increasingly grappling with the often violent and deceitful circumstances through which now-treasured artefacts made their way from their colonies to museums in the metropole. This article shows this emerging norm of colonial heritage restitution by describing key norm components and assessing the norm’s current strength. Moreover, the article analyses the norm’s implementation in two European states to better understand how and why states implement the colonial heritage restitution norm. The comparison shows that Belgium and the United Kingdom have implemented the norm differently and incompletely: while both states have seen extensive discourse surrounding colonial heritage restitution as a moral duty to right past wrongs among civil society and museums, domestic legal changes and museum policies have varied due to different institutional contexts and government positions on heritage restitution. The paper attests to the critical role of national governments’ norm support for explaining divergent implementation, while other domestic actors such as museums and civil society groups are advocating for heritage restitution. The paper contributes to emerging research on museums as norm entrepreneurs in International Relations and transitional justice in established democracies.