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2 results

  • Practical Deliberation is Normative

  • JESSE HAMBLY
  • Journal:
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    09 January 2025, pp. 1-16
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  • It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis—‘the Normativity Thesis’—is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is inescapable for us. In this article, I defend the Normativity Thesis against objections.

  • Keeping track of what's right

  • Laura Schroeter, François Schroeter
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 48 / Issue 3-4 / 2018
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 489-509

  • In this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.