Using the framework exposed in Chapter 6, this chapter presents how the SPS and TBT transparency mechanisms serve to address a number of the factors needed by WTO Members to adjudicate. In particular, it shows the extent to which SPS and TBT transparency allows to gain access to information about other Members’ regulations, to reduce some resource inequalities through equal access to information and to offer alternative fora to discuss conflicts and work towards a mutually acceptable solution. Still, this chapter underlines inequalities that remain in the access to WTO transparency, suggesting some explanations for unequal access to dispute settlement.

Chapter 6 compares specific trade concerns and dispute settlement, demonstrating that both fora are used in a complementary manner, mostly one after the other or in parallel. This is true looking at all requests for consultations that mention the SPS and TBT Agreements, but even more so when the main subject matter of the dispute is the SPS or TBT Agreement. Generally speaking, STCs serve as a forum for dialogue to reach a common understanding of WTO compliant measures, whereas formal disputes are raised when agreement cannot be reached and a clear and authoritative interpretation is needed from a third party. All country groups tend to participate in both fora, while developing countries are most active in trying to first solve an issue through an STC before going to dispute settlement. Overall, through an empirical study of WTO Member practice, this chapter confirms the importance of regulatory co-operation between WTO Members for the effective implementation of the SPS and TBT Agreements.

Part III shows that even for trade conflicts that do not get solved in bilateral or multilateral dialogue, transparency is still an essential ‘complement’ to dispute settlement: transparency is often used in addition to formal dispute settlement procedures, either before, in parallel or after the proceedings have finished. Indeed, the SPS and TBT transparency mechanisms facilitate access to information and foster dialogue for all Members alike, thus providing equal access to understanding about domestic factual and legislative contexts behind trade frictions. If tensions persist, transparency can support Members in having the necessary information to raise and defend disputes. In parallel, discussions in STCs at the margins of formal dispute settlement can continue to serve as a basis for Members to work towards a mutually acceptable solution.

The dispute settlement system is a costly and burdensome process that may be worth turning to only in cases of high trade losses. It is arguably in any country’s interest to avoid disputes. Building on the premise that disputes intervene only as a last resort, Chapter 7 explores the reasons that explain the difficulty to ‘climb’ the disputing pyramid. Based on pre-existing literature, it identified three general factors to explain WTO Members’ access to WTO adjudication: Members are likely to bring disputes as long as they have information, resources, and they lack alternative fora to solve the conflict. This serves as a basis for arguments in the subsequent chapter about the possible roles for transparency in accessing formal dispute settlement.